




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JESUS' MISSION, ACCORDING TO HIS OWN TESTIMONY

(SYNOPTICS)

Under the title of "*I came': the express self-testimony of Jesus to the purpose of His sending and His coming,*" Adolf Harnack has published a study of the sayings of Jesus reported in the Synoptic Gospels, which are introduced by the words "I came" or, exceptionally, "I was sent", or their equivalents.¹ These, says he, are "programmatic" sayings, and deserve as such a separate and comprehensive study, such as has not heretofore been given to them. In his examination of them, he pursues the method of, first, gathering the relevant sayings together and subjecting them severally to a critical and exegetical scrutiny; and, then, drawing out from the whole body of them in combination Jesus' own testimony to His mission.

It goes without saying that, in his critical scrutiny of the passages, Harnack proceeds on the same presuppositions which govern his dealing with the Synoptic tradition in general; that is to say, on the presuppositions of the "Liberal" criticism, which he applies, however, here as elsewhere, with a certain independence. It goes without saying also, therefore, that the passages emerge from his hands in a very mauled condition; brought as far as it is possible to bring them, even with violence, into line with the "Liberal" view of what the mission of Jesus ought to have been. It is reassuring, however, to observe that, even so, they cannot be despoiled of their central testimony. That Jesus proclaimed Himself to have come—to have been

¹ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1912, xxii, pp. 1-30.

sent—on a mission of salvation, of salvation of the lost, Harnack is constrained to present as their primary content. By the side of this, it is true, he places a second purpose—to fulfil the law, that is, to fill it out, to complete it. Accordingly, he says, Jesus' self-testimony is to the effect that "the purpose of His coming, and therewith His significance, are given in this—that He is at once Saviour and Law-giver". Behind both lies, no doubt, love, as the propulsive cause—"I came to minister"—and yet Jesus is perfectly aware that His purpose is not to be attained without turmoil and strife—"I came to cast fire upon the land and to bring a sword." These sayings, he remarks in conclusion, contain very few words; and yet is not really everything said in them? Shall we call it an accident that "under the superscription 'I came', the purpose, the task, the manner of Jesus' work, all seem to be really exhaustively stated, and even the note of a bitter and plaintive longing is not lacking"?

It seems to be well worth while to follow Harnack's example and to make this series of sayings in which our Lord's testimony to the nature of His mission has been preserved for us in the Synoptic record, the object of a somewhat careful examination. Approaching them free from the "Liberal" presuppositions which condition Harnack's dealing with them, we may hope to obtain from them a more objective understanding than he has been able to attain of how Jesus really thought of His mission.

I

Our differences with Harnack begin with even so simple a matter as the collection of the passages. He discovers eight, as follows: Mat. x. 34 ff = Lk. xii. 51, 53; Mk. ii. 17 = Mat. ix. 13 = Lk. v. 32; Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28; Lk. xii. 49; Lk. xix. 10; Lk. ix. 56; Mat. v. 17; Mat. xv. 24. This list, however, seems to us to require a certain amount of correction.

(1) We are compelled to omit from it Lk. ix. 56, as,

despite the vigorous defence of its genuineness by Theodor Zahn,² certainly spurious.

Harnack's argument in its favor suffers somewhat from a confusion of it with some neighboring interpolations. Because he supposes himself to discover certain Lucan characteristics in these, he concludes that this too is Lucan in origin. Because some of them appear to have stood in Marcion's Gospel he assumes that this also stood in that Gospel. It is a matter of complete indifference, meanwhile, whether it stood in Marcion's Gospel or not. It may be urged, to be sure, that it is easier to suppose that it was stricken out of Luke because of Marcion's misuse of it, than that it was taken over into Luke from the Gospel of that "first-born of Satan". Meanwhile, there is no decisive evidence that it stood in Marcion's Gospel;³ and, if it had a place there, there is no reason to suppose that it was taken over thence into Luke. It was, on the contrary, already current in certain Lucan texts before Marcion.⁴

The method of criticism which is employed by Harnack here,—a method with which Hilgenfeld used to vex us and of which Harnack and Bousset and Conybeare seem to have served themselves especially heirs⁵—is, let us say it frankly, thoroughly vicious. Its one effort is at all costs to get behind the total formal transmission, and in the attempt to do this it is tempted to prefer to the direct evidence, how-

² *Das Evangelium des Lucas* ausgelegt von Theodor Zahn, 1913, pp. 400 ff., 765 ff. The grounds on which the omission of the passage is justified are sufficiently stated by F. J. A. Hort, *The New Testament in the Original Greek*, [ii], Appendix, 1881 pp. 59 ff.

³ Cf. Zahn, as cited, p. 767: "On the other hand we do not as yet know whether Marcion had this third questionable passage also (verse 56': $\delta \gamma \alpha \rho \nu \iota \omicron \varsigma \dots \sigma \omega \sigma \alpha \iota$ in his Gospel. Tertullian, however, had precisely this passage in his text. . . ."

⁴ The character of its attestation implies as much. Accordingly Tischendorf remarks *ad loc.*: "It is unquestionable from the witnesses, especially the Latin and Syriac, that the whole of this interpolation was current in MSS. already in the second century."

⁵ This vicious critical method is thetically asserted by H. J. Holtzmann, *Einleitung*, §49, ed. 2, p. 49. It has been recently defended in principle by G. Kittel, *TSK*, 1912, 85, pp. 367-373.

ever great in mass and conclusive in effect, any small item of indirect evidence which may be unearthed, however weak in its probative force or ambiguous in its bearing. The fundamental principle of this method of criticism naturally does not commend itself to those who have made the criticism of texts their business. Even an Eduard Norden sounds a salutary warning against it,⁶ and the professional critics of the New Testament text reject it with instructive unanimity.⁷ Nobody doubts that wrong readings were current in the second century and it goes but a little way towards showing that a reading is right to show that it was current in the second century. Many of the most serious corruptions which the text of the New Testament has suffered had already entered it in the first half of that century. The matter of importance is not to discover which of the various readings at any given passage chances to appear earliest, by a few years, in the citations of that passage which have happened to be preserved to us in extant writings. It is to determine which of them is a genuine part of the text as it came from its author's hands. For the determination of this question Harnack's method of criticism advances us directly not a single step, and indirectly (through, that is, the better ascertainment of the history of the transmission of the text) but a little way.

When, now Harnack deserts the textual question and suggests that it is of little importance whether the passage be a genuine portion of the Gospel of Luke or not, since in any event it comes from an ancient source, he completely misses the state of the case. This professed saying of Jesus has no independent existence. It exists only as trans-

⁶ *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, p. 301: "The philologist knows from experience that the manuscript transmission must be given a higher value than the indirect."

⁷ Cf. C. R. Gregory, *Prolegomena* to the eighth edition of Tischendorf's New Testament, *Pars Ultima*, 1894, p. 1138; *Textkritik des Neuen Testaments*, II, 1902, p. 754; *Canon and Text of the New Testament*, 1907, p. 422; E. Miller in Scrivener's *Introduction*, etc., ed. 4, II, pp. 188-9; Hammond, *Outlines*, etc., ed. 2, p. 66. On the general subject, see H. J. M. Bebb, in the Oxford *Studia Biblica*, II, 1890, p. 221.

mitted in Luke's Gospel. If it is spurious there, we have no evidence whatever that it was spoken by Jesus. It comes to us as a saying of Jesus' only on the faith of its genuineness in Luke. Falling out of Luke it falls out of existence. There is no reason to suppose that it owes its origin to anything else than the brooding mind of some devout scribe—or, if we take the whole series of interpolations in verses 54-56 together, we may say to the brooding minds of a series of scribes, supplementing the work one of another—whose pen—or pens—filled out more or less unconsciously the suggestions of the text which was in process of copying. The manuscripts are crowded with such complementary interpolations,—E. S. Buchanan, for example, has culled many instructive examples from Latin manuscripts⁸—and none could bear more clearly on its face the characteristic marks of the class than those now before us. “And when His disciples James and John saw, they said, Lord, wilt Thou that we bid fire to come down from heaven and consume them [as [also] Elias did]? But He turned and rebuked them and said, ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of. [[For] the Son of Man came not to destroy [men's] lives, but to save them].”

(2) As an offset to the omission of Lk. ix. 56 we should insert into the list Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43.

This passage Harnack rejects on the ground that no reference is made to the mission of Jesus in Mark's “for

⁸In his *Sacred Latin Texts* (I, 1912; II, 1914, III, 1914) Buchanan is accustomed to give lists of striking readings occurring in the manuscript he is editing. Here are a few from the Irish codex, Harl, 1023: Lk. i. 57, And she brought forth *according to the word of God* a son; viii. 12, Take heed how ye hear *the word of God*; xi. 3, Give us today for bread, *the word of God from heaven*; xv. 29, But as soon as this *son of the devil came*; Jno. vi. 44, No man can come unto me except the Father which sent me *and the Holy Spirit* draw him; viii. 12, He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the *eternal light of the life of God*. See also *The Records Unrolled*, 1911. The parallel is made more striking by Buchanan's tendency to think such readings more original than those of the critical texts. The lengths he would go in this contention may be observed in his pamphlet: *The Search for the Original Words of the Gospel*, 1914.

to this end came I out", His coming forth from Capernaum alone being meant; while Luke's specific, "for therefore was I sent" is due merely to a misunderstanding on Luke's part of Mark's statement. The major premiss of the conclusion thus reached is obviously a particular hypothesis of the composition of the Synoptic Gospels and especially of the relation of Luke to Mark. On this hypothesis, Mark is the original "Narrative-Source", and the matter common to Luke and Mark is derived directly by Luke from Mark. We cannot share this hypothesis: the matter presented by both Luke and Mark seems to us rather to be derived by both alike from a common source (call it the "Primitive Mark"—*Urmarkus*—if you like) underlying both. But assuredly no hypothesis could be more infelicitous as an explanation of the relation of Luke to Mark in our present passage. If Luke is here drawing directly on Mark, he certainly uses a very free hand. The same general sense could scarcely be conveyed by two independent writers more diversely. This is apparent even to the reader of the English version, for the difference extends to the whole literary manner, the very conception and presentation of the incident. It is much more striking in the Greek, for the difference permeates so thoroughly the language employed by the two writers as to approach the limit of the possible. In the verse which particularly concerns us, for example, it is literally true that except at most the two words, translated diversely in the English version, in Mark "to this end", in Luke "therefore",⁹ no single word is the same in the two accounts. If there is anything clear from the literary standpoint, it is clear that Luke is not here drawing upon Mark but is giving an independent account. In that case, Luke's report of what our Lord said cannot be summarily set aside as a mere misunderstanding of Mark.

It may still be said, of course, that what Luke gives us is a deliberate alteration of Mark. Something like this

⁹ We give to εἰς τοῦτο the benefit of the doubt in Lk. iv. 43. Probably the right reading is ἐπὶ τοῦτο.

appears to be the meaning of C. G. Montefiori, who writes: "Luke's 'I was sent' (*i.e.* by God) is a grandiose and inaccurate interpretation of Mark's 'I came forth' (from the city)." Alfred Loisy traces at length what he conceives to be the transformation of the simple record of facts given by Mark into the announcement of a principle by Luke. "The difference between the historical tradition and the theological point of view", he remarks, "appears very clearly in the words of Christ; '*Let us go elsewhere . . . it is for this that I came out*'; and '*It must needs be that I proclaim to other towns the kingdom of God—I was sent for that*'." It is the same general conception that underlies H. A. W. Meyer's explanation that Mark's "expression is original, but had already acquired in the tradition that Luke here follows a doctrinal development with a higher meaning". And the step from this is not a long one to H. J. Holtzmann's representation of Luke's "I was sent" as a transition-step to the doctrinal language of John. Luke's language, however, bears no appearance of being a correction, conscious or unconscious, either of Mark's or anybody else's statement: it looks rather very much like an independent account of a well-transmitted saying of Jesus'. And we are moving ever further from the actual state of the case, in proportion as we introduce into our explanation the principle of a developing tradition with its implication of lapse of time. There is no decisive reason for supposing that Luke wrote later than Mark. And it is no less unjustified to describe his point of view than his Gospel as later than Mark's. The two Gospels were written near the same time,—Mark's being probably, indeed, a few years the younger.¹⁰ They came out of the same circle, the mis-

¹⁰ A Plummer's dating of Mark (*The Gospel According to Mark*, 1914), between 65 and 70 A.D., probably nearer the latter than the former date (we should say about A.D. 68), seems to us the only reasonable one: cf. Johannes Weiss, *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, I,¹ 1906, p. 32 (cf. also p. 35): "about the year 70, probably somewhat earlier." On the other hand Harnack's later view of the date of Luke as prior to A.D. 63 seems to be not improbable.

sionary circle of Paul. And they reflect the same tradition in the same stage of development, if we may speak of stages of development regarding a tradition in which we can trace no growth whatever. If the element of time be eliminated, and we speak merely of differing temperaments, there might be more propriety in attributing a more theological tendency to the one than to the other. When a matter of historical accuracy is involved, however, Luke surely is not a historian who can be lightly set aside in his statements of fact. His representation that Jesus spoke here of His divine mission and not merely of His purpose in leaving the city that morning, makes on purely historical grounds as strong a claim upon our credence as any contradictory representation which may be supposed to be found in Mark, especially as it was confessedly no unwonted thing for Jesus to speak of His divine mission.

In point of fact, however, there is no difference of representation between Luke and Mark. Mark too reports Jesus as speaking of His divine mission. The possibility that he does so is allowed by Harnack himself, when he writes: "The probability is altogether preponderant that in the words of Jesus (Mark i. 38), 'Let us go elsewhere into the next towns that I may preach there also; for to this end came I forth', the 'came I forth' (*ἐξῆλθον*) has no deeper sense, but takes up again the 'went out' (*ἐξῆλθεν*) of verse 35: 'And in the morning, a great while before day, He rose up and went out [from Capernaum] and departed'." Others, making the same general contention, open the door to this possibility still wider. C. G. Montefiori comments: "'I came out'—*i.e.*, from the city. But the phrase is odd. Does it mean 'from heaven'? In that case it would be a late 'theological' reading." In similar doubt Johannes Weiss writes: "It is not altogether clear whether He means 'For this purpose I left the house so early', or 'For this purpose I have come out from God—come into the world' (it is thus that Luke understood the text)." Mark's meaning is, then, not so clearly that Jesus referred merely

to His coming out from Capernaum, nor indeed is it quite so simple, as it is sometimes assumed to be.

Harnack is scarcely right in any event in making the "I came out" of verse 38 both refer to Jesus' leaving Capernaum and resume the "He went out" of verse 35. It is not at all likely that the "He went out" of verse 35 refers to His leaving Capernaum. The statements as to Jesus' movements in verse 35 are remarkably circumstantial: they tell us that Jesus, having got up¹¹ before dawn, went out and went forth to a desert place. It is not the "went out" (ἐξῆλθεν) but the "went forth" (ἀπῆλθεν) which refers to His departure from Capernaum: the "went out" means that He "went out of doors", "out of the house". This is very generally recognized. It is recognized, for example by both Loisy and Montefiori, as well as by Holtzmann before them, all of whom understand the "going out" of verse 38 of "leaving the town". It is recognized also by Johannes Weiss, who saves the back reference to it of verse 38 by making the "I came out" of that verse too mean "from the house". Surely, however, it would be too trivial to make Jesus say: "It was for this reason that I left the house so early this morning—that I might preach also in the neighboring towns." Was He to visit all those towns that day, and therefore needed to make an early start? Mark apparently means us to understand, on the contrary, that the reason of His leaving the house so early was that He might find retirement for prayer. The "coming out" of verse 38 is then, in any case, not a resumption of that of verse 35, but a new "coming out" not previously mentioned. What reason is there for referring it back to the "going forth" (ἀπῆλθεν, "departed") from Capernaum of verse 35? Would it be much less trivial to make Jesus say that He came out from Capernaum so early that morning to preach throughout Galilee than that He came out of the house for that purpose, The solemn declaration, "For to

¹¹ Cf. Holtzmann's note: "ἀναστὰς is to be taken here literally, therefore not merely as = ׀׀׀." Cf. also G. Wohlenberg's note.

this end came I out" must have a deeper meaning than this. In point of fact He did "come" in this deeper meaning to preach; and He did fulfil this purpose and preached throughout Galilee as Mark had just duly recorded (i. 14). Is it not much more natural that He should have said this here, and that His biographer should have recorded that He said it, than that He should have said and been recorded as saying that He came out of Capernaum that morning early with this purpose in view? We cannot but think G. Wohlenberg right in pronouncing such an understanding of the declaration "superficial". Jesus seems clearly to be making here a solemn reference to His divine mission.¹²

(3) There is another passage with Harnack's dealing with which we cannot agree. This is Luke xii. 49-53.

Harnack rends this closely knit paragraph into fragments; discards two of its five constituent sentences altogether; and, separating the other three into two independent sayings, identifies one of these (verses 51, 53) with Mat. x. 34 ff and leaves the other (verses 49, 50) off to itself. This drastic treatment of the passage seems to have been suggested to him by the comment on it of Julius Wellhausen.¹³ This comment runs as follows:

The three first verses do not square with one another. The fire which Jesus longs for is an abiding, universal effect, the baptism of death a passing personal experience, the prospect of which he dreads. What stands here is not: "My death is the necessary precondition of my great historical effect." Rather, the declarations of verse 49 and verse 50 are presented as parallel, although they are not so. Just as little is verse 50 homogeneous with verse 51. But neither do verses 49 and 51 agree together; the wished-for fire can have nothing to do with the terrible division of families. The whole of verse 50 and the second half of

¹² So J. A. Alexander, J. J. Van Oosterzee, E. Klostermann, H. B. Swete, A. Plummer, *et al.* Meyer *ad loc.* gives older names.

¹³ A. Loisy appears not unwilling also to make a discreet use of Wellhausen's disintegrating criticism in his attempt to show how Luke concocted his narrative. Montefiori after reporting Wellhausen's criticism, expresses doubt regarding it, and then slips off into the lines of his favorite mentor, Loisy.

verse 49 are lacking in Marcion. In their absence, a connection would no doubt be instituted; the fire would be the inward war, and Luke would be reduced to Matthew (x. 34, 35). I have, however, no confidence whatever in this reading of Marcion's, but rather believe that Luke has brought together wholly disparate things according to some sort of association of ideas.

This slashing criticism Harnack reproduces in its main features, as follows:

Luke would undoubtedly have these two verses [verse 49 and 50] considered as fellows: they are bound together by $\delta\epsilon$, are framed similarly, and close even with a rhyme. But their contents are so diverse as to interpose a veto on their conjunction. It has been in vain, moreover, that the expositors have tried to build a bridge between the two verses. Every bridge is wrecked on the consideration that the first verse refers to the action of Jesus, the second to something which threatens Him; for it is impossible to think in the second verse of baptism in general (Jesus' own baptism of suffering is meant, see Mk. x. 39), since the words, "How am I straitened, etc.," would then be wholly unintelligible or would have to be explained in a very artificial manner. The contention also that the eschatological idea connects the two verses is wrong; for the futures which the two verses contemplate are different. Add that the "fire" of the first verse has nothing to do with the "baptism with fire"; for Jesus could not say of that fire that He came "to cast" it upon the earth. It is therefore to be held that Luke who often follows external associations of ideas, has been led to put the two verses transmitted to him together by the similarity of their structure, and because some connection between fire and baptism hovered before his mind. He has similarly again made an arbitrary connection in the case of the next verse, when he adjoins the saying about peace and sword of which we have already spoken. This saying too can scarcely have been spoken in the same breath with ours, precisely because it exhibits a certain relationship with it but is differently oriented.

The superficiality of this criticism is flagrant. It owes whatever plausibility it may possess to the care which is taken not to go below the surface. So soon as we abstract ourselves from the mere vocables and attend to the thought the logical unity of the paragraph becomes even striking. Even in form of statement, however, the passage is clearly a unity. Harnack himself calls attention to the structure of verses 49 and 50 as a plain intimation that they form a

pair in their author's intention, and the bridge which he desiderates to connect them he himself indicates in the "but" by which the author, before the expositors busied themselves with the matter, expressly joins them. When Jesus had given expression to the pleasure that it would give Him to see the fire He had come to cast into the world already kindled, it was altogether natural that He should add an intimation of what it was that held this back—He must die first. And nothing could be more natural than that He should proceed then to speak further of the disturbance which His coming should create. It would be difficult to find a series of five verses more inseparately knit together. That such rents should exist between them as are asserted, and they be invisible to H. J. Holtzmann, say, or Johannes Weiss, neither of whom is commonly either unable or unwilling to see flaws in the evangelical reports of Jesus' sayings is, to say the least, very remarkable; and a unitary understanding of the passage which commends itself in its general features alike to these expositors and, say, Theodor Zahn, can scarcely be summarily cast aside as impossible. It is quite instructive to observe that the lack of harmony between verses 49 and 50, which is the hinge of the disintegrating criticism of the passage, is so little obvious to, say, Johannes Weiss, that it is precisely to the combination of these two verses that he directs us to attend if we wish really to understand Jesus' state of mind with reference to His death. "The parallelism of the fire and baptism, preserved only by Luke", he urges, "is one of Jesus' most important sayings, because we can perceive from it how Jesus thought of His end." "How Jesus really thought of His future", he says in another place, "a declaration like Luke xii. 49 f, perhaps shows".¹⁴

Looking, thus, upon Lk. xii. 49-53 as a closely knit unit, it would be difficult for us to accept Harnack's identification

¹⁴ *Die Schriften*, etc.,¹ pp. 438 and 138. Weiss even speaks of Mk. x. 38 as "no doubt an echo of Lk. xii. 50" (p. 160), but it is not perfectly clear what he means by this (it is retained in the second edition).

of Lk. xii. 51, 53, torn from its context, with Mat. x. 34-36, also removed from its context; and the assignment of the "saying", thus preserved by both Matthew and Luke, to the hypothetical "Discourse-Source", which it is now fashionable to cite by the symbol Q. Even apart from this difficulty, however, the equation of the two passages would not commend itself to us. The phraseology in which they are severally cast is distinctly different. The decisive matter, however, is the difference in the settings into which they are severally put by the two evangelists. Both of the sections in which they severally occur, confessedly present difficulties to the harmonist, and the dispositions which harmonists have made of them in their arrangement of the evangelical material vary greatly.¹⁵ It seems to be reasonably clear, however, that in the tenth chapter of Matthew and the twelfth chapter of Luke we are dealing with two quite distinct masses of material, spoken by our Lord on separate occasions. We may be sorry to forego any advantage which may be thought to accrue from the assignment of one of the sayings of Jesus in which He speaks of His mission to the hypothetical "Discourse-Source".¹⁶ But we cannot admit that there is involved any loss of authenticity for the two sayings in question. We see no reason to suppose that the source or sources from which the two evangelists drew severally the sayings they have reported to us compared unfavorably, in point of trustworthiness as vehicles of the tradition of Jesus' sayings, with the hypothetical "Discourse-Source", from which they both some-

¹⁵ For example, Edward Robinson, having placed Mat. x. 34 ff. in its natural position in his §62, preposits Lk. xii. 49 ff. to his §52. John H. Kerr, on the contrary, retaining the same natural position for Mat. x. 34 ff. (at his § 50), more correctly places Lk. xii. 49 ff. at his § 90. C. W. Hodge, Sr., *Syllabus of Lectures on the Gospel History*, 1888, p. 73, very properly speaks of Robinson's "dislocation" of the material of Luke as "the principal blot on his harmony": "he breaks up the connection just where commentators find a striking unity."

¹⁶ Willoughby C. Allen and A. Plummer deny that Mat. x. 34 ff. and Lk. xii. 51 ff. come from Q. "Phraseology and context alike differ," says Allen. "The two evangelists draw from different sources."

times draw in common. On the whole the certainty that Jesus said what is here attributed to Him is increased by His being credibly reported to have said it twice in very similar language and to entirely the same effect.

We therefore amend Harnack's list at this point also, and instead of listing the two sayings as Mat. x. 34-36 = Lk. xii. 51, 53, and Lk. xii. 49, 50, give them as Mat. x. 34-36 and Lk. xii. 49-53.

As the result of this survey of the material, we find ourselves, like Harnack, with eight "sayings" at our disposal, although these eight are not precisely the same as those which he lists. Arranged, as nearly as the chronological order can be made out, in the order in which they were spoken, they are as follows: Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43; Mat. v. 17; Mk. ii. 17 = Mat. ix. 13 = Lk. v. 32; Mat. x. 34 f; Mat. xv. 24; Lk. xii. 49 ff; Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28; Lk. xix. 10.¹⁷ Five of these sayings are found in Matthew; four in Luke; and three in Mark. As no one of them is found only in Matthew and Luke we need not insist that any of them is derived from the hypothetical "Discourse-Source" (Q), to which are commonly assigned the portions of the Synoptics found in Matthew and Luke but lacking in Mark. As all of these sayings are found in either Matthew or in Luke (and one in both) there seems to be no good reason, however, why some (or all) of them may not possibly have had a place in a document from which both Matthew and Luke are supposed to draw.¹⁸ One is found

¹⁷ Along with these there are certain other sayings which come illustratively into consideration. Primary among them is Mat. xi. 3 ff. = Lk. vii. 20 ff. which Harnack (p. 23) is tempted to include in the list itself as a ninth saying. Others are: Mk. xi. 9, 10 = Mat. xxi. 9 = Lk. xix. 38 = Jno. xii. 13; Mat. xxiii. 39; Mat. xi. 18, 19 = Lk. vii. 33, 34. Cf. also Mat. x. 40; Mk. ix. 37 = Lk. ix. 48; Lk. x. 16. There may be added [Mk. ix. 11 = Mat. xvii. 13; Mat. iii. 11 = Lk. iii. 16]. We have made some remarks on the general subject in *The Lord of Glory*, pp. 39 f., 76 f., 126 f., 190 f.

¹⁸ We may quote here, say, Johannes Weiss, who says (*Die Schriften*,¹ I, p. 33): "Possibly there belongs to it yet many another [passage]

in all three Gospels, one in Mark and Matthew, and one in Mark and Luke. These three at least, two of them very confidently in the form in which we have them, and the third (Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43) very possibly in one of the forms in which it has come to us, may be thought to have stood in the hypothetical "Narrative-Source" (*Urmarkus*). And it is possible that all the others may have stood in it too, since all the Gospels draw from it. Three are found in Matthew alone and two in Luke alone. These are at no disadvantage in point of trustworthiness in comparison with their companions which occur in more than one Gospel. Apart from the fact that they may have stood in any source from which their companions were drawn but did not chance to be taken from it by more than one evangelist, the determination that some of the sources used by the evangelists were drawn upon by more than one of them has no tendency to depreciate the value of those which were drawn upon by only one. No doubt the hypothetical "Narration-Source" which lies behind all three of the Synoptics is a very old document and is very highly commended to us by the confident dependence of them all upon it. There is no sound reason for assigning any of these Gospels to a date later than the sixties, and Luke and Matthew may easily have come from a considerably earlier date. A document underlying them all must have existed in the fifties and may be carried back almost to any date subsequent to the facts it records. But much the same may be said of a document underlying any one of the Synoptics: a document drawn on by one of them only may be just as old and just as authoritative as one drawn on by all of them. The matter of primary importance does not concern the particular hypothetical document—they are all hypothetical—from which it may be supposed that our Gospels have derived this saying or that. The disentangl-

which is found only in Matthew, or only in Luke." As we ourselves believe that Mark also knew the "Discourse-Source", we might add also "or only in Mark."

ing of the hypothetical sources from which they may be supposed to have derived the several items of their narratives is a mere literary matter. We know nothing of these sources after we have disentangled them except that they all are earlier than the Gospels which used them; and that when the contents of each are gathered together and scrutinized, the contents of them all prove to be, from the historical point of view, all of a piece. This is the fundamental fact concerning them which requires recognition. The tradition of Jesus' sayings and doings, gathered out of earlier sources (written or oral) and preserved by the Synoptic Gospels, is a homogeneous tradition, and the original tradition. Behind it there lies nothing but the facts. Whether written down in the fifties or the forties or the thirties: whether some short interval separates its writing from the facts it records—say ten or twenty years—or no interval at all; no trace whatever exists of any earlier tradition of any kind behind it. It is for us at least the absolute beginning. In these circumstances we are justified in holding with confidence to all the sayings of Jesus transmitted to us in these Gospels. It is not that we cannot get behind these Gospels: it is that we can get behind them and find behind them nothing but what is in them.¹⁹

The term used by our Lord in these passages to express the fact of His mission is normally the simple "I came" (*ἦλθον*, Mk. ii. 17, Mat. v. 17, ix. 13, Mt. x. 34, Lk. xii. 49; *cf.* *ἦλθεν*, Mk. x. 45, Mat. xx. 28). But variations from this "technical term" occur. Once, after it has been once employed, it is varied on repetition to "the more elegant" (as Harnack calls it) term for public manifestation, "I came forth" (*παρεγενόμην*, Lk. xii. 49, 51). Once, in a parallel, the tense is changed to "I have come" (*ἐλήλυθα*, Lk. v. 32). Once the compound "I came out" (*ἐξῆλθον*, Mk. i. 38) is used. And in two passages, "I was sent"

¹⁹ See the state of the case as presented in the PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1913, xi, 2, pp. 195-269.

(Lk. iv. 43, Mat. xv. 34; *cf.* Mk. ix. 37 = Lk. ix. 48, Mat. x. 40, Lk. x. 16) takes the place of "I came". In the majority of cases our Lord speaks directly of Himself as the one whose mission He is describing, in the first person: "I came", "I was sent", "I came out". In a few instances, however, He speaks of Himself in the third person under the designation of "the Son of Man"—"the Son of Man came" (Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28, Lk. xix. 10). There is a difference also in the nature and, so to say, the profundity of the reference to His mission. Sometimes He is speaking only of His personal ministry in "the days of His flesh", and the manner of its performance (Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43, Mat. xv. 24, *cf.* Lk. xix. 10). Sometimes His mind is on the circumstantial effects of the execution of His mission (Mat. x. 34 ff., Lk. xii. 49 ff.). Sometimes the horizon widens and the ultimate ethical result of His work is indicated (Mat. v. 17). Sometimes the declaration cuts to the bottom and the fundamental purpose of His mission is announced with respect both to the object sought and the means of its accomplishment (Mk. ii. 17 = Mat. ix. 13 = Lk. v. 32; Lk. xix. 10; Mk. x. 45 = Mt. xx. 28): "I came not to call the righteous but sinners"; "The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost"; "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many." It should not pass without notice that it is in these last instances only that our Lord deserts the simple form of statement with the personal pronoun, "I came", and substitutes for it the solemn declaration, "the Son of Man came."

II

In investigating the meaning of these sayings severally it is not necessary to follow carefully the chronological order of their utterance. In a broad sense they increase in richness of contents as our Lord's ministry develops itself. It was not until late in His ministry, for example, that our Lord spoke insistently of His death and His allusions

to His mission in His later ministry reflect this change. Nevertheless these sayings do not grow uniformly in richness as time goes on, and it will be more convenient to arrange them arbitrarily in order of relative richness of content than strictly to follow the chronological sequence. The order to be pursued has been suggested at the close of the immediately preceding paragraph.

I

Mk. i. 38: And He saith unto them, Let us go elsewhere into the next towns, that I may preach there also; for to this end came I out.

Lk. iv. 43: But He said unto them, I must preach the good tidings of the kingdom of God to the other cities also; for to this end was I sent.

As reported by Mark, in this saying Jesus declares His mission in the briefest and simplest terms possible. It was just to preach. "For to this end came I out", He says; namely "to preach".²⁰ The context intimates, it is true, that this preaching was to be done in the first instance in the immediately neighboring towns: "Let us go elsewhere into the next towns that I may preach there also." It lay in the nature of the case that any preaching intended to extend over the land should begin with the nearest towns, and that these therefore should be particularly in mind in the announcement. But that the preaching was not intended to be limited to these "next" towns²¹ is clear enough in itself, and is made quite plain (so far as the understanding of the reporter, at least, is concerned) by the next verse, which tells us what Jesus did by way of fulfilling the mission which He here announces: "And He went into their synagogues throughout all Galilee,²² preaching and casting out

²⁰ Cf. G. Wohlenberg *in loc.*: "The *εἰς τοῦτο*, verse 38, means just the *κηρύσσειν* in general, not especially the *καὶ ἐκὶ κηρύσσειν*."

²¹ In the parallel, Luke says simply, "to the other cities," which suggests no other limitation than what Th. Zahn (p. 247) calls "the self-evident one" of "the other Jewish cities of Palestine."

²² Cf. Mat. iv. 23: "And He went about in all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the good tidings of the Kingdom, and healing all manner of disease, and all manner of sickness among the

devils." Luke in the parallel, extends the boundaries even further. "And He was preaching in the synagogues of Judaea", he says,—but without prefixing the emphatic "all". By "Judaea" he means Palestine as a whole,²³ but, as the omission of the "all" already advises us, he does not intend to assert that there was no part of Palestine to which Jesus did not carry His Gospel, so much as that His mission was distinctively to Palestine.²⁴ In a word, Jesus announces His mission here as a mission to the Jewish people: He came out, was sent, to preach to the Jews.

The emphasis thus laid on preaching as the substance of Jesus' mission does not, however, so set preaching in contrast, say, to the working of miracles as to exclude the latter from any place in His mission. It has become fashionable in one school of expositors to see in the accounts which the evangelists give here a more or less complete misunderstanding of Jesus' motives in leaving Capernaum, although these are supposed nevertheless to shimmer through the narrative sufficiently to guide "the seeing eye".²⁵ When Jesus is represented as moved by a desire to preach in other places, less than half the truth, it is said, is told. What really determined His action was a desire to get away from Capernaum. And the reason for His desire to get away from Capernaum was that a thaumaturgical function had been thrust upon Him there. He fled from this in the night (Mk. i. 35). What He really announced in the words here misleadingly reported, was that His mission was to

people." The emphasis in both Mark and Matthew is on the completeness with which Galilee was covered by this itinerant preaching.

²³ See especially Th. Zahn, p. 248, and pp. 61 f. Cf. A. Loisy, I, p. 462: "Luke has chosen a general term in order to signify that the mission of Jesus was for the whole country, conformably to what was said in verse 43 (B. Weiss, *Einleitung*, pp. 307-308)." Also, B. Weiss, C. F. Keil, Johannes Weiss *in loc.* Wellhausen: "Judaea (verse 44) includes Galilee in it: cf. i. 5; vi. 17; vii. 17, and D. xxiii. 5." Godet rejects the reading "Judaea" as "absurd."

²⁴ We are following Th. Zahn here (p. 248).

²⁵ So, e.g. H. J. Holtzmann, A. Loisy, J. Weiss. C. G. Montefiori draws back.

preach, not to work miracles. So far from permitting this to shimmer through them, however, the narratives of the evangelists flatly contradict it. Mark, for example, tells us that in leaving Capernaum Jesus did not leave His miracles behind Him: "And He went into their synagogues throughout all Galilee, preaching, and casting out devils." The parallel in Matthew (iv. 23) enlarges on this: "And He went about in all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues and preaching the Gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of disease and all manner of sickness among the people." It may be easy to say, as Johannes Weiss for example does say, that such statements do not correspond with what really happened, and that Luke in his parallel account (iv. 44) has done well to omit them. But it is not so easy thus lightly to erase, not a couple of remarks merely, but the entire presentation of Jesus' work by the evangelists. According to their account, not merely at Capernaum in the beginning, but throughout His whole ministry, "mighty works" were as characteristic a feature of Jesus' ministry as His mighty word itself.²⁶ There is not the least justification in the narratives themselves, moreover, for the attempted rereading of their implications. There is no suggestion in them that Jesus was "betrayed into thaumaturgical works" at Capernaum. There is no hint that He was shocked or troubled by His abounding miracles there, or that He looked upon them as a scattering of His energies, or a diversion of Him from His proper task or as making a draft upon His strength. They are represented rather as His crown of glory. He is not represented as fleeing from them and as endeavoring to confine Himself to activities of a different nature. He is represented rather as looking upon them as the seal of His mission and His incitement to its full accomplishment. "I must needs preach in *the other* towns": "that I may preach there *also*". Not a contrast with His work at Capernaum,

²⁶ Cf. the conjunction of the two in Jesus' instructions to the Twelve, Mat. x. 5-8, and His reply to the Baptist's question, Mat. xi. 4-5.

but a repetition of it, is what He hopes for elsewhere. The whole contrast lies between Capernaum and the rest of the land: between a local and an itinerant ministry. What He had done in Capernaum, He felt the divine necessity of His mission driving Him to do also in the other cities. And therefore "He went into their synagogues throughout all Galilee preaching, and casting out devils". The ground of Jesus' leaving Capernaum lay, shortly, as Holtzmann recognizes it to be Luke's purpose to intimate, solely in "the universality of His mission".²⁷

What Jesus came out to preach in fulfilment of His mission Mark's statement does not tell us. It says simply, "I came out to preach". But this is not to leave it in doubt. It was too well understood to require statement. Mark had just told his readers summarily that "after John was delivered up, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the glad-tidings of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye and believe in the glad-tidings" (*cf.* Mat. iv. 17). When he tells them now that Jesus announced His mission to be to preach, it is perfectly evident that it is just this preaching which he has in mind. The parallel in Luke declares this in so many words. "I must needs", Jesus is there reported as saying, "proclaim the glad-tidings of the kingdom of God, for to this end was I sent." The accent of necessity is here sounded. It were impossible that Jesus should do anything other than preach just this Gospel of the kingdom of God. His mission to this end lays a compulsion upon Him: He was sent to do precisely this, and needs must do it.²⁸ Jesus' mission is to preach a Gospel, the Gospel of the kingdom of God.

For Jesus so to describe His mission, clearly was to lay claim to the Messianic function. Preaching the glad-tidings

²⁷ P. 333: "The ground of His flight, verse 43 finds in the universality of His mission."

²⁸ On the accent of "necessity" in Jesus' life, see Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, article "Foresight," at the beginning.

of the kingdom of God is the Messianic proclamation. The accompanying miracles are the signs of the Messiah. Accordingly when the Baptist sent to Jesus inquiring, "Art thou He that Cometh or look we for another?" Jesus replied by pointing to these things: "the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have the glad-tidings preached to them."²⁹ "He that Cometh" is a Messianic title, and therefore, as Harnack reminds us, those who heard Jesus say, "For I say unto you, ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say, Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord", understood Him to be speaking of the Messiah, and would have understood that just the same if the words "in the name of the Lord" had been wanting.³⁰ The question lies near at hand, accordingly, whether Jesus merely by speaking of "coming" "being sent" does not lay claim to Messianic dignity. In that case those terms would be used pregnantly. The Baptist "came", neither eating nor drinking, as truly as Jesus "came" eating and drinking (Mat. xi. 18; cf. xxi. 32). The prophet is "sent" as truly as the Messiah (Lk. iv. 26; Mat. xiii. 37 = Lk. xiii. 34; Jno. i. 6, 8, iii. 28). What the words openly declare is a consciousness of divine mission; and the two modes of expression differ according as the emphasis falls on the divine source of the mission ("I was sent") or on its voluntary performance ("I came").³¹ Something more needs to be added, therefore, to mark the mission which they assume, plainly as Messianic. That

²⁹ Mat. xi. 3 ff. = Lk. vii. 20 ff. Harnack (p. 25) says: "The question whether the miracles which are enumerated are to be understood spiritually is to be answered in the negative for Matthew and Luke, and probably also for Jesus Himself." But that places Harnack in a quandary: "But that Jesus should have spoken here literally of raising the dead is nevertheless not easy to acknowledge."

³⁰ P. 1: Mat. xxiii. 39 = Lk. xiii. 35.

³¹ Cf. Th. Zahn's words *Das Evangelium des Matthäus*,³ p. 610, distinguishing between "the execution of a commission laid on Him by God (Mat. x. 40, ὁ ἀποστείλας με, xv. 24; xxi. 37)" and "the purpose and meaning of His life comprehended by Himself (ἡλθεν)."

something more is added in the present passage by the purpose which is declared to be subserved by the mission. That purpose is the Messianic proclamation. He who came to preach the glad-tidings of the kingdom of God and who could point to the signs of the Messiah accompanying His preaching, has come as the Messiah.

Jesus, however, does not here say merely "I came". He says, "I came *out*", and the preposition should not be neglected. At the least it must refer to Jesus' coming publicly forward and entering upon the task of public teacher. J. J. van Oosterzee insists upon this sense: "The Saviour speaks simply of the purpose for which He now appeared publicly as a teacher."³² That, however, in this Messianic context, appears scarcely adequate. We seem to be compelled to see in this term a reference to Jesus' manifestation as Messiah with whatever that may carry with it. This is apparently what C. F. Keil and G. Wohlenberg have in mind. According to the former, the phrase "I came out" is used here absolutely in the sense of coming into publicity, coming into the world; and if, he adds, we wish to supply anything we may add in thought *παρὰ* or *ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*—as we may find in Jno. xiii. 3; xvi. 27, 30. Similarly the latter considers the reference to be to Jesus' entrance upon His Messianic calling, and adds that it is not surprising if the expression tempts us to find in it an allusion to the coming forth from the Father such as John speaks of at xiii. 3; xvi. 27, 30; xvii. 8. Even if we follow this path to its end and say simply, with J. A. Alexander, F. Godet, A. Plummer, H. B. Swete and others, that when He says, "I came out" Jesus means, "I came out from God" or "from heaven" we are not going beyond the implications of the Messianic reference. If Jesus thought Himself the Messiah there is no reason why He may not be supposed to have thought of Himself as that transcendent Messiah which was "in the air" in "the days of His flesh". That He did think of Himself as the Transcendent Messiah is

³² On Lk. iv. 43.

indeed already evident from His favorite self-designation of the Son of Man,—as reported by Mark as by the other evangelists. The Son of Man carries with it the idea of preëxistence. When then Mark records that He spoke of His mission as a “coming out”, the phrase may very well come before us as the vehicle of Jesus’ consciousness of His preëxistence; and F. Godet is speaking no less critically than theologically when he remarks that “Mark’s term appears to allude to the incarnation, Luke’s only refers to the mission of Jesus.”³³

When we say Messiah we say Israel. We naturally revert here, then, to Jesus’ testimony that His mission was to preach the Gospel of the Kingdom of God to the cities of Judaea. He is obviously speaking not of the utmost reach of His mission, but of the limits of His personal ministry. His personal ministry, however, He describes as distinctively to the Jews. He “came out”, He “was sent”, to proclaim the glad-tidings of the imminence of that Kingdom to the people of God to whom the Kingdom had been promised. This was, in its external aspects, His mission.

2

Mat. xv. 24: And He answered and said, I was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel.

What in the former saying is given a perhaps somewhat unarresting positive expression is in this saying asserted in a strong, almost startling, negative form. Jesus declares that His mission was not only to the Jews, but to them only. Denying a request from His disciples that He should exercise His miraculous powers for the healing of a heathen girl who was suffering from possession, He justifies the denial by explaining that His mission was not to the heathen but solely to the Jews: “I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.” The language in which He clothes this explanation had been employed by Him on a

³³ It is less obvious that the simple “I came” presupposes preëxistence as many commentators insist (*e.g.* A. Plummer, *Matthew*, p. 156, note 2, cf. A. M. McNeille on Mat. x. 40). But on this see below pp. 568, 581 ff.

previous occasion. When He was sending His disciples on their first mission He laid, first of all, this charge upon them: "Go not into any way of the Gentiles, and enter not into any city of the Samaritans; but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Mat. x. 5). The circumstantial negative clauses act as definitions of the language of the positive clause. This language is just as sharply definite in our present saying. Jesus declares that He has no mission to the heathen. His mission is distinctively to the Jews.

It may be possible to exaggerate, however, the exclusiveness of this declaration. After all, it has a context. And it should not be overlooked that despite the emphasis of His assertion that He had no mission to the heathen, Jesus healed this heathen girl. Nor can it quite be said that He healed her by way of exception; overpersuaded, perhaps, by the touching plea of her mother, or even, perhaps, instructed by her shrewd common-sense to a wider apprehension of the scope of His mission than He had before attained. When He threw Himself back on His mission, He invoked in His justification the authority of God.³⁴ And therefore, in adducing His mission, He employs the phrase "I was sent" rather than "I came". By that phrase He appeals to Him with whose commission He was charged, and transfers the responsibility for the terms of His mission to Him.³⁵ After this it can scarcely be supposed that

³⁴ Montefiori is quite right in saying: "The explanation is that God had ordered this limitation."

³⁵ In only two of the sayings in which Jesus expounds His mission (Lk. iv. 43, Mat. xv. 24) is the form "I was sent" employed. It is perhaps not without significance that in the only one of these which has a parallel (Lk. iv. 43), it is not the simple "I came" which stands in this parallel (Mk. i. 38), but a form which more pointedly refers to the source of the mission in God ("I came out"). The "I was sent" is reflected in its active equivalent in the "Johannine" (Jno. xiii. 20) phrase of Matt. x. 40; Mk. ix. 37 = Lk. ix. 48; Lk. x. 16, in which the unity of the sent and sender is suggested. Note the emphasis placed on Jesus' employment of "I was sent" in our present passage by F. L. Steinmeyer, *The Miracles of Our Lord*, pp. 140 ff., and J. Laid-

He overstepped the terms of His mission, as He understood them, in healing the heathen child. In other words, when He declares, "I was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel", He is not to be understood as declaring that His mission was so exclusively to the Jews that the heathen had no part in it whatever.

The whole drift of the incident as recorded whether by Mark or by Matthew bears out this conclusion. The precise point which is stressed in both accounts alike is, not that the Jews have the exclusive right to the benefits of Jesus' mission, but that the preference belongs to them. This is given open expression in Jesus' words as reported by Mark, "Let the children *first* be fed; it is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it to the dogs." But it is equally the implication of Matthew's account.³⁶ Jesus does not suggest that the dogs³⁷ shall have nothing; but that they shall have only the dogs' portion. What the portion of the dogs is, is not here indicated. It is only intimated that they have a portion. The children have the preference, of course: but there is something also for the dogs. Jesus' whole conversation in this incident is certainly pedagogically determined. He employed the application of this heathen woman to Him in order to teach His disciples the real scope of His mission. There is no contradiction between His declaration to them that He was sent distinctively to Israel and His subsequent healing of the heathen child. He heals the child not in defiance of the terms of His mission, but because it fell within its terms; and He commends the mother because she had found the right way: "And He said unto her, *For this saying*, go thy way: the devil is gone out of thy daughter." A comment

law, *The Miracles of Our Lord*, p. 144. Th. Zahn remarks that here for the first time in Matthew is Jesus presented as the ἀπόστολος of God, and adds: "cf. xv. 24; xxi. 37 as correlate of the ἡλθον of v. 17; ix. 13; x. 34. Apart from John cf. Heb. iii. 1, Clem., 1 Cor. 42."

³⁶ This is solidly shown by Th. Zahn.

³⁷ It has been often pointed out that the use of the diminutive here softens the apparent harshness of the language. Shall we say "dog-lings"?

of Alfred Edersheim's sums up not badly the teaching of the incident: "when He breaks the bread to the children, in the breaking of it the crumbs must fall all around".³⁹

Obviously what Jesus tells us here is very much what Paul tells us, when, summing up his Gospel ringingly as the power of God unto salvation to every one that believes, he adds, "To the Jew first and also to the Greek" (Rom. i. 16, *cf.* ii. 10). Many "Liberal" expositors therefore represent Mark as corrupting the record of Jesus' conversation when he puts on Jesus' lips a sharp assertion of this principle: "Let the children *first* be filled".³⁹ "If the Jews have only the *first* right", comments Johannes Weiss, for example, "it follows that the heathen too have a right. This is an echo from the Epistle to the Romans, i. 16,—the Jew first, then the Greek!"⁴⁰ It is not, however, merely in this sharp assertion of it that this principle is given expression in the narrative of the incident. It is present as truly in the account of Matthew as in that of Mark. The whole drift of both accounts alike—the climax of which is found not in any word of Jesus' but in a marvellous word of His petitioner's—is that there is something left for the dogs after the children are filled: "Even the dogs under the table eat of the crumbs of the children"; "even the dogs eat of the crumbs that fall from the table of their masters." Had there been no provision for the Gentiles, indeed, Jesus could scarcely have expected His disciples to recognize Him as that "One to Come" with whose mission there had from the beginning been connected blessings for the Gen-

³⁸ *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*,¹ II, 1883, p. 41.

³⁹ H. J. Holtzmann (p. 144): "*Let first* (*πρῶτον* = prius, maxim from Rom. i. 16; ii. 9, 10) *the children* (Israelites) *be filled*; this explanation, which still leaves room for the satisfaction of the mother, is simply lacking in Mat. xv. 26, and therefore the conclusion is commonly drawn that in the narrative of Mark we have a deliberate mitigation, a dependence upon the later, Pauline mission, and therefore secondary work (so Hilgenfeld, last in *ZWTh*, 1889, 497; B. and J. Weiss, Jülicher, *Gleichnisreden*, II, 256 f., even Wittichen 188, and with more reserve, Wernle, 133)."

⁴⁰ *Schriften*, etc.,¹ I, 1906, p. 128.

tiles also. The evangelists are not drawing from Paul when they represent Jesus as teaching that His mission was to Israel and yet extends in its beneficial effects to the world (*cf.* especially Mat. viii. 11; xxviii. 19).⁴¹ Paul on the contrary is reflecting the teaching of Jesus as reported by the evangelists when, as Jesus proclaimed Himself to have been sent only to Israel, he declares Him to have been made a minister of the circumcision;⁴² and when, as Jesus suggests that nevertheless there is in His mission a blessing for Gentiles also, he declares that by His ministry to the circumcision not only is the truth of God exalted and the promises unto the fathers confirmed, but mercy is brought to the Gentiles also (Rom. xv. 8 ff.).

How His mission could be distinctively for Israel and yet contain in it a blessing for the Gentiles also Jesus does not here explain to His disciples. He is content to fix the fact in their minds by the awakening object-lesson of this memorable miracle, in which His saving power goes out of Himself and effects its beneficent result across the borders of a strange land.⁴³ We can scarcely go astray, however, if we distinguish here, as in the case of Mark i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43, between His personal ministry and the wider working of His mission. When He says, "I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel", He has His personal

⁴¹ Wellhausen represents Mark as free from such universalizing utterances. Nowhere does it put such a statement as Mat. viii. 11 f. on Jesus' lips; and only in the eschatological discourse, Mk. xiii. 10, do we find a prediction of the extension of the preaching of the Gospel to the heathen attributed to Jesus. Montefiori adds xiv. 9. The implication is, of course, that neither of these passages is authentic.

⁴² "Christ has become minister of the circumcised," comments H. A. W. Meyer; "for to devote His activity to the welfare of the Jewish nation was, according to promise, the duty of the Messianic office, comp. Mat. xx. 28, xv. 24."

⁴³ "It has been remarked," says Wellhausen (*Das Ev. Marci*, 1903, p. 60), "that this is up to now the only example in Mark in which Jesus heals from a distance, by His mere word." "This is the second example of a miracle wrought from a distance," says Loisy (I, p. 977). "The first was wrought on the centurion's son." Then he cites Augustine's remarks in *Quaest. Ev.*, I, 18.

ministry in mind. It will hardly be doubted that this was the understanding of the evangelist. C. G. Montefiori, for example, paraphrases thus: "His disciples shall convert the world; He Himself is sent only to Israel." "Jesus says that He has been sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel only. This looks like a 'narrow' tradition. But it is not. It is intended to explain the undoubted but perplexing fact that Jesus the universal Saviour and Mediator, did actually confine Himself to the Jews. The explanation is that God had ordered this limitation. After His resurrection, He will send His disciples to all the world."⁴⁴ Did Jesus Himself have no anticipation of this course of events, or purpose with reference to it? It should go without saying that, just because He conceived His mission as Messianic, He necessarily conceived it both as immediately directed to Israel, and as in its effects extending also to the Gentiles. That was how the mission of the Messiah had been set forth in those prophecies on which He fed. We cannot be surprised, then, that it is customary to recognize that it is to His personal ministry alone that Jesus refers when He declares that He "was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel".⁴⁵

The messianic character of His mission is already implied in the terms in which He here describes it. When He speaks of "the lost sheep of the house of Israel", His mind is on the great messianic passage, Ezek. xxxiii., xxxiv., in which Jehovah promises that He Himself will feed His sheep, "and seek that which was lost"; and that He will "set up one shepherd over them, and he shall feed them,

⁴⁴ Vol. II, pp. 657, 658.

⁴⁵ So from Augustine and Jerome down. H. A. W. Meyer expresses the general opinion when he says: "It was not intended that Christ should come to the *Gentiles* in the days of His flesh, but that He should do so at the subsequent period (xxviii. 19) in the person of the Spirit acting through the medium of the Apostolic preaching (Jno. x. 16, Eph. ii. 17)." Cf. Th. Zahn: "His personal and immediate vocation." Also, R. C. Trench, *Notes on the Miracles of Our Lord*, second American ed., 1852, p. 274; J. Laidlaw, *The Miracles of Our Lord*, 1890, p. 252; A. Edersheim, *Life and Times*, etc.,¹ 1883, II, p. 40.

even my servant David; he shall feed them and he shall be their shepherd".⁴⁶ When, with His mind on this prophecy, Jesus spoke of His mission as to "the lost sheep of the house of Israel" it may admit of question whether the genitive is epexegetical or partitive,—whether He conceives His mission to be directed to Israel as a whole, conceived as having wandered from God, or to that portion of Israel which had strayed⁴⁷—but it can admit of no question that He conceived of those to whom His mission was directed as "lost". He thought of His mission, therefore, as distinctively a saving mission, and He might just as well have said, "I was sent to save the lost sheep of the house of Israel." Harnack is quite right, therefore, when, after calling attention to the adoption of the language of Ezek. xxxiv. 15, 16, he adds: "And the mission to the lost sheep contains implicitly the 'to seek and to save'." How He is to accomplish the saving of the lost sheep of the house of Israel, Jesus does not in this utterance tell us. He tells us only that He has come, as the promised Messiah, with this mission entrusted to Him,—to save these lost sheep.

3

Mat. x. 34 ff.: Think not that I came to cast peace on the earth; I came not to cast peace but a sword. For I came to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law: and a man's foes shall be they of his own household.

⁴⁶ Observe the address of the petitioner in our passage (Mat. xv. 22), "O Lord, Son of David", which is not repelled by Jesus. "Spoken by a heathen", remarks Edersheim (ii, p. 39), "these words were an appeal, not to the Messiah of Israel, but to an Israelitish Messiah". They supply the starting point for a conversation, however, in which the Messiah of Israel brings relief to the heathen.

⁴⁷ That in Mat. x. 6, "the lost sheep of the house of Israel", the genitive is not partitive seems to be shown by the contrast of verse 5: the disciples are to go, not to Gentiles or the Samaritans, but to Israel, described here as "lost sheep". Cf. H. A. W. Meyer *in loc.*: "Such sheep (ix. 36) were *all*, seeing that they were without faith in Him, the heaven-sent Shepherd." The same phrase in Mat. xv. 24, in a similar contrast (with the Canaanitish woman), might naturally be held to be used in the same broad sense. Israel as a whole in that case would be the "lost sheep".

In this context Jesus is preparing His disciples for the persecutions which awaited them. They must not think their case singular: their Teacher and Lord had Himself suffered before them. Nor must they imagine that they are deserted: the Father has not forgotten them. And after all, such things belong in their day's work. They have not been called to ease but to struggle. Strife then is their immediate portion; but after the strife comes the reward.

When Jesus introduces what He has to say with the words, "Think not", He intimates that He is correcting a false impression, prevalent among His hearers (*cf.* v. 17).⁴⁸ His reference can only be to expectations of a kingdom of peace founded on Old Testament prophecy.⁴⁹ Since these expectations are focussed upon His own person He is obviously speaking out of a Messianic consciousness; and is assuming for Himself the rôle of the Messiah, come to introduce the promised kingdom.⁵⁰ Of course He does not mean to deny that the Messianic kingdom which He has come to introduce is the eternal kingdom of peace promised in the prophets. He is only warning His followers that the Messianic peace must be conquered before it is enjoyed. As His mind at the moment is on the individual, He describes the strife which awaits His followers in terms of the individual's experience. The language in which He does

⁴⁸ *Cf.* B. Weiss (Meyer, 9, 1898) and A. Plummer *in loc.*, and A. Loisy, i, p. 891.

⁴⁹ G. S. Goodspeed, *Israel's Messianic Hope*, 1910, p. 123: "All the seers of Israel look forward out of the present, whether gloomy or bright, to a golden age of peace." W. A. Brown, *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, III, p. 733a: "Among the blessings to which Israel looks forward in the Messianic Times, none is more emphasized than peace." *Cf.* A. Loisy, i, p. 891.

⁵⁰ Neglecting this, Harnack speaks inadequately when he writes: "This discourse is not Messianic in the literal sense—even John the Baptist could, it would appear, have said it—but in the burden of the discourse and in the saying, 'I came for this purpose', there lies a claim which soars above the prophets and the Baptist. For Jesus implicitly demands here that the severest sacrifices be made and the enmity of the nearest kindred be incurred, *for the sake of His person.*"

this is derived from an Old Testament passage (Micah vii. 6) in which the terrible disintegration of natural relationships incident to a time of deep moral corruption is described. The dissolution of social ties which His followers shall have to face will be like this. Let them gird themselves to meet the strain upon them loyally. For, as the succeeding verses show, it is distinctly a question of personal loyalty that is at issue.⁵¹

It should be observed that Jesus does not say merely, "Think not that I came to *send* (or *bring*) peace upon the earth", as our English versions have it. He says, "Think not that I came to *cast* peace upon the earth." The energy of the expression should not be evaporated (*cf.* vii. 6). What Jesus denies is that He has come to fling peace suddenly and immediately upon the earth,⁵² so that all the evils of life should at once and perfectly give way to the unsullied blessedness of the consummated kingdom. Such seems to have been the expectation of His followers. He undeceives them by telling them plainly that He came on the contrary to cast a sword. Strife and struggle lie immediately before them, and the peace to which they look forward is postponed. The pathway upon which they have adventured in attaching themselves to Him leads indeed to peace, but it leads through strife.

When Jesus says that He came to cast a sword upon the earth and to set men at variance with one another, the declaration of purpose must not be weakened into a mere prediction of result.⁵³ He is speaking out of the funda-

⁵¹ *Cf.* the excellent remarks of Th. Zahn, p. 415.

⁵² So B. Weiss, *Das Matthauevangelium und seine Lucas-Parallelen*, 1876, p. 281, also in Meyer, 9th ed. 1898, and in *Die Vier Evangelien*, etc., 1900 *in loc.* So also H. J. Holtzmann, *Die Synoptiker*,³ 1901, p. 235, who remarks: "Thus Jesus strikes out of the picture of the Messianic age, at least for the immediately following transitional period, the joy and peace predicted in Micah. iv. 3, v. 4, Zech. ix. 9, 10, and brings war into prospect in its stead, in reminiscence of Ex. xxxii. 27, Ezek. vi. 3, xiv. 17, xxi. 12."

⁵³ It is often so weakened. Thus *e.g.* A. Loisy: "The appearance of the Christ has therefore, for consequence—not for end, but the

mental presupposition of the universal government of God, which had just found expression in the assertion that not even a sparrow, or indeed a hair of our heads, falls to the ground "apart from our Father" (verses 29-31). The essence of the declaration lies in the assurance that nothing is to befall His followers by chance or the hard necessity of things, but all that comes to them comes from Him.⁵⁴ Not merely the ultimate end, but all the means which lead up to this end—in a linked chain of means and ends—are of His appointment and belong to the arrangements which He has made for His people. They are to face the strife which lies before them, therefore, as a part of the service they owe to Him (verses 37 ff.), their Master and Lord (verses 24 f.). This strife is not indeed all that Jesus came to bring, but this too He came to bring; and when He casts it upon the earth, He is fulfilling so far His mission. He "came", "was sent" (verse 40) to "cast a sword".

In this saying, too, we perceive, Jesus is dealing with what we may without impropriety speak of as a subordinate element of His mission. He does not mean that the sole or the chief purpose of His coming was to stir up strife. He means that the strife which His coming causes has its part to play in securing the end for which He came. When He said in Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43, "I came to preach", He was looking through the preaching, as means, to the end which it was to subserve. When He said in Mat. xv. 24 that He was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, He did not forget the wider end of which His ministry to Israel should be the means. So, when He says, "I came to cast a sword upon the earth", He is thinking of the strife which He thus takes up unto His plan not for

Biblical language does not make a sharp distinction between the two—the division signified by the sword." Also, B. Weiss (Meyer, 9th ed., 1898): "What is the immediate, inevitable consequence of His coming, Jesus announces as its purpose." Cf. A. H. McNeille on Mat. x. 34.

⁵⁴ Cf. B. Weiss, *Das Matthaeusevangelium*, etc., 1876, p. 281: "It does not come like an unavoidable evil which is connected with the sought-for good, but it is foreseen and intended by Him."

itself but as an instrument by which His ultimate purpose should be reached. He tells us nothing of how long this strife is to last, or through what steps and stages it is to pass into the peace which waits behind it. Is He speaking only of the turmoil which must accompany the acceptance of Him as Messiah by His own people, involving as it does adjustment to the revised Messianic ideal which He brought?⁵⁵ Is He speaking in a "springing sense" of the ineradicable conflict of His Gospel with worldly ideals, through age after age, until at last "the end shall come"?⁵⁶ Or is He speaking of the "growing pains" which must accompany the steady upward evolution through all the ages of the religion which He founded?⁵⁷ The passage itself tells us nothing more than that Jesus came to cast a sword

⁵⁵ This appears to be A. Loisy's idea: "Because the proclamation of the kingdom has as its immediate effect (had not the Saviour found this Himself in His own home?) to cause discord in families—one accepting the faith, another rejecting it, and this discord placing believers and unbelievers at odds." See also C. G. Montefiori: "The sword does not mean war between nations, but dissension between families, of which one member remains a Jew, while another becomes a Christian."

⁵⁶ This appears to be A. Plummer's meaning: "So long as men's wills are opposed to the Gospel there can be no peace. . . . Once more Christ guards His disciples against being under any illusions. They have entered the narrow way, and it leads to tribulation, before leading to eternal life."

⁵⁷ Something like this seems to be Johannes Weiss' meaning: "This saying belongs to the most characteristic and the most authentic sayings of Jesus concerning Himself: 'I came not to bring peace on the earth but a sword.' Jesus must have felt deeply how utterly His proclamation stood in contradiction with what men were accustomed to hear and wished to hear. And what He Himself in His parental home seems to have experienced, that he foresees as a universal phenomenon which He portrays by means of words derived from Micah: a cleft is to go through families; and indeed it is to be the young generation which shall oppose the old ('three against two and two against three' says Luke: the wife of the son lives in the house of her parents-in-law). Jesus does not reprehend this, and offers no exhortation against loss of piety. He simply posits it as an inevitable fact. Thus it has always been a thousand times over; and it may be to the elders a warning and to the children a consolation, that even the Gospel of Jesus must create so painful a division."

upon the earth; that there were to result from His coming strife and strain; and that only through this strife and strain is the full purpose for which He came attainable. For what is more than this we must go elsewhere. Only let us bear well in mind that the note of the saying is not discouragement but confidence. There rings through it the "Fear not!" of verse 31. There underlies it the "I too will confess him before my Father in heaven" of verse 32. And it passes unobserved into the "He who loses His life for my sake shall find it" of verse 39, and the "whosoever shall give to drink to one of these little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward" of verse 42. Jesus warns His followers of the stress and strain before them. But He does this as one who buckles their armor on them and sends them forth to victory. The word on which the discussion closes is "Reward".

4

Lk. xii. 49-53: I came to cast fire upon the earth; and how I wish that it was already kindled! But I have a baptism to be baptised with; and how am I straitened until it be accomplished! Think ye that I am come to give peace in the earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division: for there shall be from henceforth five in one house divided, three against two and two against three. They shall be divided, father against son, and son against father; mother against daughter, and daughter against her mother; mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law, and daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law.

To some of the questions started by Mat. x. 34 ff., answers are suggested by the present saying. Here too Jesus is protecting His followers against the false expectation which they had been misled into forming, that He, the Messiah, would at once introduce the promised reign of peace.⁵⁸ In repelling this expectation, His own claim to the Messianic dignity and function is given express intimation. He corrects, not their estimate of His person or vocation, but their conception of the nature of the Messianic

⁵⁸ Cf. Hahn's note *in loc.*

work. The language in which He makes this correction is very strong: "Ye think that it is peace that I am come to give in the earth. Not at all, I tell you; nothing but division."⁵⁹ The emphasis which, by its position, falls on the word "fire" in the first clause, corresponds with this strength of language and prepares the way for it: "It is fire that I came to cast upon the earth".⁶⁰ It is clear that the two sentences belong together and constitute together but a single statement. The "fire" of the one is, then, taken up and explained by the "division" of the other, just as the "came" (ἦλθον) of the one is repeated in the "am come" (παρεγενόμην) of the other, and the "cast" (βαλεῖν) of the one by the "give" (δοῦναι) of the other. The greater energy of the language in the former declaration is due to its being the immediate expression of Jesus' own thought and feeling: "It is fire that I came to cast upon the earth"; whereas in its repetition it is the thought of His followers to which He gives expression: "Ye think that it is peace that I am here⁶¹ to give." What it is of chief importance for us to observe is that by the "fire" which He has come to cast upon the earth, Jesus means just the "division"⁶² which He describes in the subsequent

⁵⁹ A. Plummer: "I came not to send *any other thing than* division." Th. Zahn: "Think ye that I am come to give peace on earth? No, I say to you, nothing else than division." Cf. 2 Cor. i. 13.

⁶⁰ Cf. Plummer's note.

⁶¹ παραγίνομαι, "to come to the side of", is, says Harnack, a "more elegant" word than ἔρχομαι, and Luke has varied the ἦλθον of verse 49 to the παρεγενόμην of verse 51 for the sake of better literary form. If Luke was really the author of all the nice touches with which he is credited, he would need to be recognized as one of the most "exquisite" writers of literary history. The variations of language between the parallel statements of verses 49 and 51 are grounded in the nature of the case and reflect the truth of life. It is better to explain παρεγενόμην as the natural phrase to express the disciples' thought of Jesus' "coming" relatively to themselves, than to give it with Thayer-Grimm the sense of "coming forth", "making one's public appearance" (Mat. iii. 1, Heb. ix. 11).

⁶² Cf. Loisy, p. 893: "In view of the expressions chosen and of the progress of the discourse, the fire is nothing else than the discord introduced into the world by the preaching of the Gospel, or, better still

clauses in much the same language in which He had spoken of it in Mat. x. 34 ff. That is to say, He has in mind, here as there, a great disarrangement of social relationships which He speaks of as the proximate result of the introduction of the Kingdom of God into the world.

No more here than there does Jesus mean to represent this discord which He declares He came to give in the earth, as the proper purpose or the ultimate result of His coming.⁶³ The strength of the language in which He declares it to be His purpose in coming to produce this dissension, shuts off, indeed, all view beyond. When He says, "Ye think it is peace that I am here to give on the earth. Not at all, I tell you: nothing but division", He is thinking, of course, only of the immediate results, and, absorbed in them, leaving what lies beyond for the time out of sight. The absoluteness of the language is like the absoluteness of the, "I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." But something does lie beyond. This not only belongs to the nature of the case, but is already intimated in the last clause of the first sentence (verse 49): "It is fire that I came to cast on the earth, and how I wish that it was already kindled." Clearly Jesus did not long for the kindling of the fire for the fire's own sake; but for the sake of what would come out of the fire.

What this clause particularly teaches us, however, is that the fire which Jesus came to cast on the earth was not yet kindled. The clause is of recognized difficulty and has been variously rendered. Most of these renderings yield, however, the same general sense; and it is reasonably clear that the meaning is represented with sufficient accuracy by,

perhaps the movement excited for or against the religion of Jesus by the Apostolic preaching, from which the discord arose."

⁶³ Cf. Zahn, p. 516: "That the ultimate purpose of His life and work is to bring peace upon the earth, Jesus of course does not here deny" [cf. to the contrary, Acts x. 36, Lk. i. 79, Is. ix. 6, Eph. ii. 14-17], "but only that the intended and immediate consequence of His coming and manifestation is a universal condition of peace upon earth,—a thing which even the angels on the night of His birth did not proclaim. . . ."

"And how I wish that it was already kindled."⁶⁴ For even the fire which He came to cast upon the world, Jesus thus points to the future. Not even it has yet been kindled. The peace which His followers were expecting lies yet beyond it. He was not to give peace in the world but nothing but division: yet even the division was not yet come—for even that His followers were to look forward. He is, then, not accounting to His followers for the trials they were enduring: He is warning them of trials yet to come. He is saying to them in effect, "In the world ye shall have tribulation"; but the subaudition also is present, "But be of good cheer; I have overcome the world." These things He was speaking to them, therefore, that despite the impending tribulation, they might have the peace which they were expecting—at least in sure prospect.

From the strong wish which Jesus expresses that the fire which He came to cast upon the earth had already been kindled, Harnack takes occasion to represent Him as a disappointed man. Harnack explains the fire which Jesus says He came to cast upon the earth as "an inflammation and refining agitation of spirits", and discovers an immense pathos in Jesus' inability to see that it had as yet been kindled.

Jesus moved with pain, acknowledges that the fire does not yet burn What Jesus wishes, yes, what He speaks of as the purpose of His coming, He does not yet see fulfilled—the great trying and refining agitation of spirits in which the old is consumed and the new is kindled. That "men of violence" (*βασταί*) are necessary that the kingdom of God may be taken, He says at Mat. xi. 12. To become such a man of violence (*βαστής*) one must be kindled from the fire. This fire He fain would bring, He has brought; but it will not yet burn; hence His pained exclamation. Elsewhere, only in the saying about Jerusalem (Mat. xxiii. 37) does this pained complaint of the failure of results come to such sharp expression.

⁶⁴ So Kinuol, Olshausen, De Wette, Bleek, Meyer, B. Weiss, Holtzmann, Zahn. On this use of the *τί* see A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek of the New Testament*, 1914, on Lk. xii. 49 as per Index, and Zahn *in loc.* p. 514, note 54. On the *εἰ ἡδη ἀνήφθη* see Zahn *in loc.* and note 53.

It is needless to point out that this whole representation is in direct contradiction with the context. Harnack has prepared the way for it by cutting off the context and taking the single sentence of verse 49 in complete isolation. In so doing, He has rendered it impossible, however, confidently to assign any particular meaning to that, in that case, perfectly insulated saying. It is in this state equally patient to a dozen hypothetical meanings. The sense which Harnack puts upon it is simply imposed upon it from his own subjectivity: he merely ascribes to Jesus the feelings which, from his general conception of His person and work, he supposes He would naturally express in such an exclamation. Fortunately, the context interposes a decisive negative to the ascription. We have here not the weak wail of disappointment, but a strong assertion of conscious control. That, indeed, is sufficiently clear from the declaration itself. When Jesus asserts, "It is to cast fire upon the earth that I came" it is anything but the consciousness of impotence that is suggested to us. And the note of power vibrating in the assertion is not abolished by the adjoined expression of a wish that this fire was already kindled. No doubt there is an acknowledgment that the end for which He came was not yet fully accomplished: He had not finished His work which He came to do. But this does not involve confession either of disappointment at the slowness of its accomplishment, or fear that it may never be accomplished. The very form of the acknowledgment suggests confidence in the accomplishment. When Jesus says, "Would that it was already kindled"! He expresses no uncertainty that it will in due time be kindled. And even the time, He does not put outside of His power. He even tells us why it has not already been kindled. And the reason proves to lie in the orderly prosecution of His task. "How I wish", He exclaims, "that it was already kindled! But" He himself is postponing the kindling: "But I have a baptism to be baptised with." The fire cannot be kindled until He has undergone His

baptism.⁶⁵ Its kindling is contingent upon that. No doubt He looks forward to this baptism with apprehension: "And how am I straitened till it be accomplished"! But with no starting back. It is to be accomplished: and His face is set to its accomplishment. The entire course of events lies clearly in His view, and fully within His power. He has come to cast fire on the earth; but one of the means through which this fire is to be cast on the earth is a baptism with which He is to be baptized. This baptism is a dreadful experience which oppresses His soul as He looks forward to it. He could wish it were all well over. But He has no thought of doubting its accomplishment or of shrinking from His part in it. It is a veritable pre-Gethsemane which is revealed to us here.⁶⁶ But as in the actual Gethsemane, with the "Let this cup pass from me", there is conjoined the, "Nevertheless not my will but thine be done."

That the baptism with which Jesus declares that He is to be baptized (*cf.* Mk. x. 38) is His death is unquestionable and is unquestioned. What we learn, then, is that the kindling of the fire which He came to cast upon the earth is in some way consequent upon His death.⁶⁷ Of the manner of His death He tells us nothing, save what we may infer from the oppression of spirit which its prospect causes Him. Of the nature of its connection with the kindling of the fire which He came to cast upon the earth He tells us

⁶⁵ So Holtzmann (p. 374), and Zahn (p. 515).

⁶⁶ *Cf.* *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, pp. 71 f.

⁶⁷ The "from henceforth" of verse 52 introduces no difficulty; *cf.* H. A. W. Meyer's comment: "Jesus already realizes His approaching death". "The lighting up of this fire," he remarks at an earlier point, "which by means of His teaching and work He had already prepared, was to be effected by His death (see ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν verse 52) which became the subject of offense, as, on the other hand, of His divine courage of faith and life (comp. ii 35)." A. Loisy is altogether unreasonable when he writes (p. 893): "In making Jesus say that the divisions will exist henceforth, 'from now', the evangelist appears to forget that, according to him, the fire of discord should be kindled only later, when the Saviour had been baptized in death; but with him the time when Jesus spoke and that of His death were almost confounded together."

as little. We may be sure, indeed, that the relation of the two events is not a merely chronological one of precedence and subsequence. The relation between such events cannot be merely chronological; the order of time which is imperative in the development of Jesus' mission can never be a purely arbitrary temporal order. We must assume that the death of Jesus stands in some causal relation to the kindling of the fire He came to cast on the earth. What this causal relation is He does not, however, tell us here. Can we think of His death as needed to prepare Him to execute His task of casting fire upon the earth? Shall we think of His death giving impressiveness to His teaching and example and so creating in all hearts that crisis which issues in the decision by which there is produced the division with which the fire is identified? Or are we to think of His death entering in some yet more intimate manner into the production of this crisis, lying in some yet more fundamental manner at the basis of His efficient activity in the world? Jesus is silent. He tells us only that His death has a part to play in the kindling of the fire which He came to cast upon the earth; and that before it—and that means without it—that fire cannot be kindled. He tells us that His death is indispensable to His work; but He does not explain how it is indispensable.

Meanwhile we are advanced greatly in our understanding of what Jesus means by the "fire", the "sword", the "division" which, according to His statement in Mat. x. 34 ff., Lk. xii. 49 ff., He came to cast on the earth. And our sense of His control over the events by which His mission is accomplished is greatly deepened. What He came to do, He will do; even though in order to do it, He must die: even though He die—nay, just because He dies—He will do it. He came to set the world on fire. He came to die that He might set the world on fire. He wishes that the conflagration was already kindled: He is oppressed by the prospect before Him as He walks the path to death. But let no man mistake Him or His progress in the performance

of His mission. His death, He will accomplish: the fire He will kindle. Men may fancy that He is come to give peace: not at all: nothing but division. That primarily. We shall see the whole world turned up-side-down (Acts xvii. 6). After that, no doubt, we shall see what we shall see. But the implication is express that, in whatever we shall see, will be included at least that peace which, after all said, lies at the end of the sequence.

5

Mat. v. 17, 18: Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil. For, verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished.

"Think not", says Jesus to His disciples, "that I came to destroy the law or the prophets." That is as much as to say that they were thinking it, or at least were in danger of thinking it.⁶⁸ And that is as much as to say that He was recognized by them as the Messiah, and that He was speaking to them on the presupposition of His Messiahship, and of His Messianic mission. On the basis of such a prophecy as that on the New Covenant in Jer. xxxi. 31 ff.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ It is unreasonable for Johannes Weiss (p. 246) to say: "The error that Jesus came to destroy the law and the prophets was no doubt current in the time of the evangelist in certain circles, but cannot be proved for the life-time of Jesus, at least in the case of His disciples." Harnack refutes Weiss on his own ground (pp. 19 f.): but no refutation is needed beyond the words themselves.

⁶⁹ Cf. F. Giesebrecht, *Com. on Jer.*, 1894, in *loc.*: "For Jeremiah, to whom it was a matter of course that the old covenant would not last forever, there can therefore lie in the future only a new covenant, as with Is. lv. 3; lix. 21, lx. 20, lxi. 8, and Ezek. xxxiv. 25, xxxvii. 26. The old covenant had proved its insufficiency by the people's not keeping it and not being able to keep it. And since every good and perfect gift comes from above, God must for the future give the strength which the people lack for keeping the law, or else no stable, abiding relation between God and the people is ever possible. The requirement envisaging the people now in external letters must become one with the mind and will of man. . . . He has not yet attained to the conception of a 'new heart', Ezek. xi. 19, xxx. 2 ff.; Ps. li. 12, although he thinks of an inward influencing of the heart by divine power, so that it acquires a new attitude towards the content of the law."

it was not unnatural to think of the Messiah as a new law-giver under whom "the old law should be annulled and a new spiritual law given in its stead".⁷⁰ This point of view, we know, existed among the later Jews,⁷¹ and could hardly fail to have its part to play in the Messianic conceptions of Jesus' time. That Jesus needed to guard His disciples against it was, thus, a matter of course,⁷² and it was most natural that He should take opportunity to do so after the great words in which He greeted them as the salt of the earth and the light of the world, and exhorted them to let their light so shine before men that their good works should be seen and their Father in heaven be glorified. In guarding them against it He declares, almost expressly following out the thought of Jeremiah's prediction with respect to the writing of the law on the heart (Jer. xxxi. 33), that He came not to abrogate but to perfect. Thus, in the most striking way possible, Jesus lays claim to the Messianic dignity.

Richness and force is given to Jesus' declaration, "I came not to destroy but to fulfil," by the absence of an expressed object. The object naturally taken over from the preceding clause is a double one, "the law or the prophets". The development in the subsequent verses deals only with the law. The statement itself stands in majestic generality. Jesus declares that His mission was not a destroying but a fulfilling one. In making this declaration, His mind was particularly engaged with the law, as the course of the subsequent discussion suggests; or rather with the Scriptures of the Old Covenant as a whole, thought of at the moment from the point of view of the righteousness which they inculcate, as the collocation of the "law" and the "prophets" in the preceding clause suggests. But His mind

⁷⁰ These words are quoted from A. F. Gfrörer, *Das Jahnndert des Heils*, 1838, ii., p. 341.

⁷¹ See Gfrörer as cited, and especially the citation (p. 342) from the book Siphra on Levit. xxvi. 9.

⁷² H. A. W. Meyer states the matter excellently with respect to our passage.

is engaged with the law as an application⁷³ of the general principle asserted, rather than as exhausting its whole content. He presents Himself quite generally as not an abrogator but a perfecter.

The commentators are at odds with one another as to the exact meaning which should be assigned to the word "fulfil". Some insist that, in its application to the law, it means nothing but to do what the law commands: Theodor Zahn, for example, employing a lucid figure, describes the law—or more broadly the written Word—as an empty vessel which is fulfilled when it receives the content appropriate to it,—law in obedience, prophecy in occurrence.⁷⁴ Others urge that "to fulfil the law" means to fill the law out, to bring it to its full and perfect formulation:⁷⁵ Theophylact beautifully illustrates this idea by likening Jesus' action to that of a painter who does not abrogate the sketch which he completes into a picture. The generality of the expression surely requires us to assign to it its most inclusive meaning, and we do not see that Th. Keim can be far wrong when he expounds "to fulfil" as "to teach the law, to do it, and to impose it". It is clear enough from the subsequent context that when Jesus applied to the law His broad declaration that He had come not as an abrogator but as a fulfiller, He had in mind both the perfecting and the keeping of the law. In point of fact, He presents Himself both as the legislator developing the law into its fullest implications (verses 21 ff.), and as the administrator, securing full obedience to the law (verses 18-20). The two functions are fairly included in the one act spoken of by Jeremiah—whose prophecy we have seen reason to suppose underlay Jesus' remark—as writing the law on the heart. To write the law on the heart is at once to perfect it—to give it its most inclusive and most searching meaning—and to secure for it spontaneous and therefore perfect obedi-

⁷³ See Zahn's discussion here.

⁷⁴ P. 213f

⁷⁵ So H. A. W. Meyer, and A. H. McNeille.

ence. It is to obtain these two ends that Jesus declares that He came, when He represents His mission to be that of "fulfiller" with reference to the law.

Harnack, nevertheless, lays all the stress on the single element of legislation.⁷⁶ Jesus, he supposes, presents Himself here as law-giver; and what He declares, he paraphrases thus: "I came not to break, that is, to dissolve the law together with the prophets: I came not in general to dissolve but to consummate, that is, to make complete." He explains:

The exact opposite to *καταλύσαι* is to "establish", to "ratify". But Jesus intends to say something more than this. He is not satisfied, as Wellhausen finely remarks, with the positive but chooses the superlative. Not to ratify, that is to say, to establish (see Rom. iii. 31), is His intention, but to consummate. That could be done, with reference to the law, in a twofold manner, either by strengthening its authority, or by completing its contents. Since, however, the former cannot be thought of—because the law possesses divine authority—only the latter can be meant; and it is precisely this to which expression is given in verses 21-48. In this discourse the law is completed thus—that what "was said to them of old time" remains indeed in existence (*οὐ καταλύω*) but is completed by deeper and stricter commands which go to the bottom and direct themselves to the disposition, through which moreover it comes about that many definitions are supplanted by others. Those that are replaced do not appear, however, to be abrogated because the legislative intention of Jesus does not look upon the previous legislation as false but as incomplete, and completes it.

What is said here is not without its importance. Jesus does present Himself as a lawgiver come to perfect the law, by uncovering the depths of its meaning, and thus extending its manifest reach. How He, thus, as legislator brings the law to its perfection He shows in the specimen instances brought together in verses 21-48. But, saying this, we have said only half of what must be said. What Jesus is primarily concerned for here, is not the completer formulation of the law but its better keeping. And what He proclaims His mission fundamentally to be is less the perfecting of

⁷⁶ So also Wellhausen.

the law as a "doctrine" as Harnack puts it—"our verses [17-19] too are spoken by Him as *legislator*, that is, they contain a doctrine"—(although this too enters into His mission) than the perfecting of His disciples as righteous men (a thing which could not be done without the perfecting of the law as a "doctrine"). The immediately succeeding context of His proclamation of His mission as not one of destruction but of fulfilment, deals not with the formulation of the law but with its observance (verses 18-20).

"I came not", says Jesus, "to destroy but to fulfil,—*for*" And, then, with this "for", He immediately grounds His assertion in the further one that the whole law in all its details, down to its smallest minutiae, remains permanently in force and shall be obeyed. "For, verily I say unto you, until heaven and earth pass away, not one jot or one tittle shall pass away from the law until all [of them] be accomplished." This assertion is made with the utmost solemnity: "Verily, I say unto you"; and there are two elements in it neither of which should be allowed to obscure the other. On the one hand it is asserted with an emphasis which could not easily be made stronger, that the law in its smallest details remains in undiminished authority so long as the world lasts. Jesus has not come to abrogate the law—on the contrary the law will never be abrogated, not even in the slightest of its particulars—the dotting of an i or the crossing of a t—so long as the world endures. But Jesus does not content Himself with this "canonizing of the letter" as H. J. Holtzmann calls it, certainly without exaggeration. The law, remaining in all its details in undiminished authority, is, on the other hand, to be perfectly observed. Jesus declares that while the world lasts no jot or tittle of the law shall pass away—until they all, all the law's merest jots and tittles, shall be accomplished. He means to say not merely that they should be accomplished, but that they shall be accomplished. The words are very emphatic. The "all", standing in correlation with the "one" of the "one jot" and "one tittle", de-

clares that all the jots and all the tittles of the law shall be accomplished. Not one shall fail. The expression itself is equivalent to a declaration that a time shall come when in this detailed perfection, the law shall be observed. This amounts to a promise that the day shall surely come for which we pray when, in accordance with Jesus' instruction we ask, "Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done as in heaven so on earth". So far from coming to abrogate the law, He comes then to get the law kept; not merely to republish it, in all its reach, whether of the jots and tittles of its former publication, or of its most deeply cutting and widely reaching interpretation, but to reproduce it in actual lives, to write it on the hearts of men and in their actual living. "Therefore", He proceeds to tell His disciples (verses 19-20), the "breaking"⁷⁷ of one of the least of these—these jots and tittles of—commandments, and the teaching of men so, is no small matter for them. Their place in the kingdom of heaven depends on their faithfulness to the least of them; and unless their righteousness far surpasses that of the Scribes and Pharisees with all their, no doubt misplaced, strictness, they shall have no place in that kingdom at all.

In a word, we do not understand the nature of the mission which Jesus here ascribes to Himself until we clearly see that it finds its end in the perfecting of men. His purpose in coming is not accomplished in merely completing the law: it finds its fulfilment in bringing men completely to keep the completed law. If we speak of Him as legislator, then, we mean that He claims plenary authority with respect to the law. The law is His, and He uses it as an instrument in the accomplishment of His great end, the making of men righteous. He knows what is in the law, and He brings all its content out, with the most searching analysis. But this is but the beginning. He came to make this law, thus nobly expounded, the actual law of

⁷⁷ That λύση, verse 19, is "break", not "abrogate", the parallel ποιήση sufficiently shows.

human lives. Abrogate it? Nothing could be further from His purpose. He came rather to fulfil it, to work it out into its most wide-reaching applications, and to work it, thus worked-out, into men's lives. Those who are His disciples will not be behind the Scribes and Pharisees themselves in the perfection of their obedience to its very jots and tittles. But their righteousness will not be the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees. The difference will be that their obedience will not be confined to these jots and tittles. In their lives there will be "accomplished" the whole law of God in its highest and profoundest meaning. Their lives will be a perfect transcript in act of the law of God, a perfect reflection of the will of God in life. It is for this that Jesus says that He "came". When this complete moralization of His disciples shall be accomplished; how, by what means, in what stages this perfect righteousness is to be made theirs; He does not tell us here. He tells us merely that He "came" to do this thing: so that His disciples shall be truly the salt of the earth which has not lost its savor, the light of the world which cannot be hid.

6

Mk. ii. 17: And when Jesus heard it, He saith unto them, They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the righteous but sinners.

Mat. ix. 12-13: But when He heard it, He said, They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick. But go ye and learn what this meaneth, I desire mercy and not sacrifice: for I came not to call the righteous, but sinners.

Lk. v. 31: And Jesus answering said unto them, They that are whole have no need of a physician but they that are sick. I am not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance.

In the immediately preceding saying (Mat. v. 17), Jesus tells us that He came to make men righteous. In this He tells us what manner of men they are whom He came to make righteous. They are sinners. "I came not to call

righteous but sinners." The anarthrous terms throw the qualities of the opposing classes into strong relief. Of course Jesus means by these terms the really righteous and really sinful. This Harnack perceives. "The righteous", he rightly remarks, "are really, apart from all irony, the righteous; and the sinners are really the sinners; and Jesus says that His life-calling is not to call the one but the other." Here, says Harnack; is an immense paradox. "It is one of the greatest milestones in the history of religion", he declares; "for Jesus puts His call in contrast with all that had hitherto been considered the presupposition of religion." So Celsus, he adds, already saw; and that is the reason of his passion when he writes:⁷⁸

Those who invite to the solemnization of other mysteries make proclamation as follows: "He who has clean hands and an understanding tongue, come hither", or "He who is pure from all fault, and who is conscious in his soul of no sin, and who has led a noble and righteous life, come hither." This is what is proclaimed by those who promise expiation of sins! Let us hear, on the other hand, what kind of people the Christians invite: "Him who is a sinner, a fool, a simpleton, in a word an unfortunate—him will the Kingdom of God receive. By the sinner they mean the unjust, the thief, the burglar, the poisoner, the sacrilegious, the grave-robber. If one wished to recruit a robber band, it would be such people that he would collect.

The contrast here is very arresting and very instructive. But we can scarcely call it paradoxical to invite sinners to salvation—as Origen did not fail to remind Celsus. Paradox is already expressly excluded when Luke, in his record, adds the words, "to repentance". There is no paradox in calling not righteous but sinners—to repentance. Harnack, no doubt, asserts that this addition is "inappropriate". So little inappropriate is it, however, that it would necessarily be understood even if it were not expressed, and it is understood in the records of Matthew and Mark where it is not expressed. There can be no doubt that Jesus came preaching precisely repentance (Mk. i. 15, Mat. iv. 17): and when He says that He came to call not

⁷⁸ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, iii. 59.

righteous but sinners, it is clear that this was just because He was calling to repentance. All paradox, moreover, is already excluded by the preceding "parable" of which this declaration is the plain explanation: "They that are strong", says Jesus, "have no need of a physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call righteous but sinners." If Jesus' mission is like that of a physician and its end is healing, how could it be directed to the strong? Just because He came to save, He came to call only sinners. "But", says Harnack, "we have no certainty that this saying stood originally in this context (see Wellhausen on the passage), nor that the saying of Jesus originally combined both clauses." And if it did (he contends),—it would not yield the idea of calling to repentance. For in that case, sin would be likened to sickness, and sickness requires healing not repentance. It is best, then, to take the simple words, "I came not to call righteous but sinners" by themselves. They need no presupposition to be supplied by the preceding "parable": "they stand on their own feet with equal surety". This is obviously special pleading. Harnack does not desire the qualifications provided by the context, and therefore will have no context. Meanwhile, it is clear that Jesus who came preaching the Gospel of God, and crying Repent! (Mk. i. 15, Mat. iv. 17)—to preach which Gospel He declares that He "was sent", (Lk. iv. 43)—very naturally represents that His mission is not to righteous but sinners; and equally naturally likens His work to that of a physician who deals not with well people but with the sick. He does not mean by this to say that sin is merely a sickness and that sinners must therefore be dealt with in the unmixed tenderness of a healer of diseases; but that the terms of His mission like those of a physician cast His lot with the derelicts of the world. He has come to call sinners, and where would men expect to find Him except with sinners?

When Jesus declares, "I came not to call righteous but sinners", then, He uses the words "righteous" and "sin-

ners" in all seriousness, in their literal senses. By "righteous", He does not mean the Pharisees; nor by "sinners" the Publicans. Nevertheless it is clear that He so far takes His start from the Pharisaic point of view that He accepts its estimate of His table-companions as sinners. He does not deny that those with whom He ate were sinners.⁷⁹ His defence is not that they were miscalled sinners, but that His place was with sinners, whom He came to call.⁸⁰ Similarly His employment of the term "righteous" may not be free from a slight infusion of ironic reference to the Pharisees, who, by their question, contrasted themselves with the others and thus certainly ranked themselves with those "which trusted in themselves that they were righteous and set the rest at nought" (Lk. xviii. 9). His saying would at least raise in their own minds the question where they came in; and thus would act as a probe to enable them to "come to themselves" and to form a juster estimate of themselves. That such a probing of their consciences was within the intention of Jesus, is made clear by a clause in His declaration, preserved only by Matthew, interposed between the "parable" of the physician and the plain statement of the nature of His mission: "But go and learn what this meaneth, I desire mercy and not sacrifice" (Mat. ix. 13).⁸¹ He is as far as possible from implying, therefore, that the Pharisees were well and had no need of His curative ministrations. He rather subtly suggests to them (and perhaps with

⁷⁹ Cf. H. A. W. Meyer on Mat. ix. 10: "Observe that Jesus Himself by no means denies the *πονηρὸν εἶναι* in regard to those associated with Him at table, ver. 12 f. They were truly diseased ones, sinners."

⁸⁰ Cf. Johannes Weiss (p. 167): "The answer which He gives to the criticism of the Scribes neither provides a complete analysis of His motives nor wholly reveals what He holds as to the publicans and sinners. He justifies His conduct only by an immediately obvious reason against which there is nothing to adduce: 'The strong have no need of a physician, but the sick' . . . He goes to those who need help and where He can help."

⁸¹ Cf. H. A. W. Meyer *in loc.*: "Through that quotation from the Scriptures . . . it is intended to make the Pharisees understand how much they too were sinners."

Hos. vi. 6 in mind we would better not say so subtly either) that they deceived themselves if they fancied that to be the case. In thus intimating that the Pharisees were themselves sinners, He intimates that there were none righteous. A. Jülicher, it is true, vigorously asserts the contrary,⁸² and insists that the "righteous" must be as actually existing a class of men as "sinners": and A. Loisy follows him in this. Jesus, looking out upon mankind, saw that some were righteous and some sinners. With the righteous, He had nothing to do; they needed no saving. It was to the sinners only that He had a mission; and His mission to them was, as Luke is perfectly right in adding, to call them to repentance. There were many who needed no repentance (Lk. xv. 2), but no sinner can be saved without repentance, and Luke's motive in adding "to repentance" is to make this clear and thus to guard against Jesus' call of sinners being taken in too broad, not to say too loose, a sense. This, however, is quite inconsistent with the whole drift of the narrative. Jesus is not separating mankind into two classes and declaring that His mission is confined to one of these classes. He is contemplating men from two points of view and declaring that His mission presupposes the one point of view rather than the other. Reprobation of Him had been expressed, because He associated with publicans and sinners. He does not pursue the question of the justice of the concrete contrast—though, as we have seen, not failing to drop hints even of it. He responds simply, "That is natural, I came on a mission not to righteous men but to sinners." The question whether any righteous men actually existed is not raised.⁸³ The point is that His mission is to sinners, and that it ought to occasion no surprise, therefore, that He is found with sinners.⁸⁴

⁸² *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*, ii., pp. 175, 322.

⁸³ So far rightly, H. H. Wendt, *The Teaching of Jesus*, E. T., vol. ii., p. 51: "In these words He left quite untouched the question whether they were truly righteous in this sense."

⁸⁴ Cf. J. A. Alexander: "The distinction which He draws is not between two classes of men, but between two characters or conditions of the whole race."

What Jesus does in this saying, therefore, is to present Himself as the Saviour of sinners.⁸⁵ He came to call sinners; He is the physician who brings healing to sick souls. He does not tell us how He saves sinners. He speaks only of "calling them", of calling them "to repentance". From this we may learn that an awakened sense of wrong-doing, and a "change of heart", issuing in a changed life, enter into the effects of their "calling",—that, in a word, it issues in a transformed mind and life. But nothing is told us of the forces brought to bear on sinners to bring about these results. Meanwhile Jesus declares explicitly that His mission in the world was to "call sinners". That was no doubt implicit in all the definitions of this mission which have heretofore come before us. It is here openly proclaimed. Harnack says this saying is not Messianic, "because", he explains, "it has nothing to do with the Judgment or the Kingdom". When He who came to announce the Kingdom of God, calling on men to repent, called sinners to repentance,—had that nothing to do with the Kingdom? A "call to repentance"—has that not the Judgment in view? Who in any case is the Saviour of Sinners if not the Messiah? And who but the Messiah could proclaim with majestic brevity, "I came not to call righteous but sinners"?

7

Lk. xix. 10:—For the Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost.

This saying is very much a repetition of the immediately preceding one in more searching language. Harnack himself points out the closeness of their relation. "This saying, says he, "in the best way completes that one, with which it is intimately connected; the 'sinners' are the 'lost', but in

⁸⁵ J. Weiss will not allow that Jesus spoke more than the "parable" of the physician; but he recognizes that the Evangelist, by the main saying he puts into Jesus' mouth reflects the belief of the community that Jesus is the Saviour of sinners: "All those called into the community, felt themselves saved sinners, and in the retrospect of the whole work of Jesus, He appears as the savior of sinners. Cf. Lk. xix. 10."

being 'called' they are 'saved'." The expressive language of the present saying is derived from the great Messianic prophecy of Ezek. xxxiv. 11 ff., which Jesus has taken up and applies to Himself and His mission. Harnack is thoroughly justified, therefore, in saying: "What is most important about this saying, along with its contents, is that Jesus claims for Himself the work which God proclaimed through the prophets as His own future work." The whole figurative background of the saying, and its peculiarities of language as well, are taken from Ezekiel. "Thus saith the Lord Jehovah", we read there: "Behold I myself, even I, will search for my sheep, and will seek them out. As a shepherd seeketh out his flock in the day that he is among his sheep that are scattered abroad, so will I seek out my sheep and I will deliver them . . . I will seek that which was lost, and will bring again that which was driven away, and will bind up all that which was broken, and will strengthen that which was sick. . . ." Jesus obviously means to say that He came like this shepherd, with the particular task laid upon Him to seek and to save what was lost. Because the statement is introduced as the reason, we might almost say the justification, of His saving that "sinful man", Zacchaeus, the word "came" is put prominently forward,⁸⁶ with the effect of declaring with great emphasis that it was the very purpose of Jesus' "coming" "to seek and to save that which is lost". Here too Harnack's observations are just:

Ἡ ἀποστολή is given the first place here with emphasis. Thus it is made very clear that the salvation of what is lost (see Mat. x. 6, xv. 24; Lk. xv. 6, 9, 32) is the main purpose of Jesus' coming. What appears often in the parables and in separate sayings, is here collected into a general declaration, which elevates the saving activity of Jesus above all that is accidental. He Himself testifies that it is His proper work.

The term "lost" here is a neuter singular, used collectively.⁸⁷ It is simply taken over in this form from Ezek.

⁸⁶ Cf. H. A. W. Meyer: "ἡ ἀποστολή; emphatically placed first."

⁸⁷ Cf. the similar use of the collective neuter in Jno. vi. 37, xvii. 2, 24.

xxxiv. 16, where Jehovah declares: "I will seek that which was lost."⁸⁸ In explaining His saving of Zacchaeus, Jesus assigns him to the class to seek and save which He declares to be His particular mission. Precisely what He meant by speaking of the objects of His saving actively as "lost" has been made the subject of some discussion. Hermann Cremer, for example, wishes us to bear in mind that "lost sheep" may always be found again; that they exist, so to speak for the purpose of being found. And A. B. Bruce, taking up this notion, even reduces the idea of "the lost" to that of "the neglected", and invites us to think of Jesus' mission as directed to "the neglected classes".⁸⁹ Such minimizing interpretations are not only wholly without support in the usage of the terms, and in the demands of the passages in which they occur. They are derogatory to the mission which Jesus declares that He came to execute. He speaks of His mission in tones of great impressiveness, as involving supremely great accomplishments. Obviously "the lost" which He declares that He came to seek and to save were not merely neglected people but veritably lost people, lost beyond retrieval save only as He not merely sought them but in some great sense saved them. The solemnity with which Jesus speaks of having come as the Saviour of "the lost" will not permit us to think lightly of their condition, which necessarily carries with it thinking lightly also of His mission and achievement.

⁸⁸ Harnack therefore remarks that Wellhausen rightly supplies "sheep", translating: "For the Son of man came to seek and save das verlorene Schaf." Is the employment of the singular, "Schaf", here accurate? Wellhausen can scarcely intend it to apply to Zacchaeus as the example of a class.

⁸⁹ *The Kingdom of God*, p. 138. Bruce allows that the middle voice of the verb ἀπόλλυμι sometimes imports "irretrievable predition", but he will allow no such connotation to "the neuter participle τὸ ἀπολωλός." The neuter participle τὸ ἀπολωλός is found in the absolute sense of the "the lost", however, only in Lk. xix. 10. The participle occurs, however, as a qualifier of substantives in Lk. xv. 4, 6, 24, 32, Mat. x. 6, xv. 24. These are all the passages which Bruce has to go on: they obviously do not sustain his contention.

The solemnity of this declaration is much enhanced by Jesus' designation of Himself in it by the great title of "the Son of Man." He does not say here simply, as in the sayings we have heretofore had before us, "I came", or "I was sent", but, speaking of Himself in the third person, "The Son of Man came." By thus designating Himself He does far more than explicitly declare Himself the Messiah and His mission the Messianic mission, thus justifying His adoption of Ezekiel's language to describe it. He declares Himself the transcendent Messiah, and in so doing declares His mission, to put it shortly, a divine work, not merely in the sense that it was prosecuted under the divine appointment, but in the further sense that it was executed by a divine agent. Great pregnancy is at once imparted to the simple verb "came" by giving it the transcendent Son of Man for its subject. To say "I came" may mean nothing more than a claim to divine appointment. But to say, "the Son of Man came" transports the mind back into the pre-temporal, heavenly existence of the Son of Man and conveys the idea of His voluntary descent to earth. We recall here the language of Mk. i. 38, and see that intimation that Jesus thought of His work on earth as a mission of a visitant from a higher sphere, raised into the position of an explicit assertion. We perceive that Jesus is employing a high solemnity of utterance which necessarily imparts to every word of His declaration its deepest significance. The terms "lost", "saved" must be read in their most pregnant sense. Jesus represents those whom He came to seek and save as "lost"; but He declares that the Son of Man who came from heaven for the purpose has power to "save" them. The stress lies on the greatness of the agent, which carries with it the greatness of the achievement, and that in turn carries with it the hopelessness, apart from this achievement by this agent, of the condition of the "lost". It is with the fullest meaning that Jesus represents Himself here as the Saviour of the lost.

If Jesus represents Himself here as the Saviour of the

lost, however, does He not represent Himself as the Saviour of the lost of Israel only? We have heard Him in a previous saying, with the same passage from Ezekiel lying in the background, declaring, "I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Mat. xv. 24). Is not salvation here similarly declared to have been brought by Him to Zacchaeus' house only because Zacchaeus too was a son of Abraham?⁹⁰ Jesus is speaking, primarily, of course, of His own personal ministry, which was strictly confined to Israel.⁹¹ It was in the prosecution of His personal ministry to Israel that He came to Zacchaeus' house, bringing salvation. When He justifies doing this by appealing to the terms of His mission as the Saviour of the lost, He naturally has primary reference to the salvation of Zacchaeus, that Son of Abraham, and may be said by the "lost" to mean, in the first instance, such as he. Must we understand Him as having the lost specifically of Israel therefor exclusively in view? The evangelist who has recorded these words for us certainly did not so understand them. They are in themselves quite general. The Gentiles too are sinners, and are comprehended too under the word "lost". However they may have lain outside the scope of Jesus' personal ministry, they did not lie beyond the horizon of His saving purpose.⁹² If we cannot quite say that He tells us here that His mission of salvation extends to them also,

⁹⁰ Cf. the language of Lk. xiii. 16. We cannot take the words in a spiritual sense, even with the modification suggested by Holtzmann and Plummer who combine the two senses.

⁹¹ Cf. Zahn p. 623, note 73: "According to the whole evangelical tradition, Jesus repeatedly indeed visited localities with a preponderant heathen population, and even worked some healings there (cf. Lk. viii. 27-39, Mat. xv. 26-28, xv. 29-39, and see *Commentary on Matthew*,³ pp. 531 ff.), but He never preached to the heathen or even once entered a heathen's house (cf. Lk. vii. 2-10, Jno. vii. 35, xix. 20-32, and see *Commentary on John*,³ pp. 391f. 511, 518)."

⁹² Cf. in Luke, iii. 56; iv. 24 ff.; xiii. 18-21, 29; xiv. 22f.; xx. 16; xxiv. 47. See above in Mat. xv. 24. On the universalism of Luke, cf. Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. iii, pp. 172 f. On the universalism of Jesus, cf. F. Spitta, *Jesus und die Heidenmission*, 1909, and the article "Missions" in Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*.

we need not contend that He tells us that it does not. The declaration has, in point of fact, nothing to say of the extension of His mission. It absorbs itself in the definition of its intensive nature. It is a mission of salvation. It is a mission to the "lost". Jesus in it declares that the explicit purpose of His coming was to save the lost. This is the great message which this saying brings us.

8

Mk. x. 45: For verily the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many.

Mat. xx. 28: Even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many.

Although Harnack too includes this saying among Jesus' testimonies to the purpose of His "coming", he nevertheless, expresses grave doubt of its authenticity; and this doubt passes, with respect to the latter member of it, into decisive rejection. The grounds on which he bases this doubt and rejection are three.⁹³ The saying is not recorded in Lk. xxii., 24-34, a passage which Harnack chuses to consider another and older form of the tradition reproduced in Mat. xx. 20-28 = Mk. x. 35-45. The transition from "ministering" to "giving the life as a ransom", Harnack represents as, although not unendurable, yet unexpected and hard: "ministry" is the act of a servant and no servant is in a position to ransom others. Nowhere else, except in the words spoken at the Last Supper, is there preserved in the oldest tradition an announcement by Jesus that

⁹³ In these criticisms Harnack pretty closely follows Wellhausen, *Das Evangelium Marci*, 1903, p. 91: "The ἀπολύτρωσις through the death of Jesus intrudes into the Gospel only here: immediately before, He did not die *for* others and in their stead, but He died *before* them that they might die afterwards. The words καὶ δοῦναι κτλ. are lacking in Lk. xxii. 27. They do not in fact fit in with διακονῆσαι, for that means 'wait at table' as the third and fourth evangelists rightly understand. The passage from serving to giving life as a ransom is a μετὰβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. It is explained by the service at the Lord's Supper, where Jesus administers His flesh and blood with bread and wine." Wellhausen is an adept at this sort of carping, surface verbal criticism.

He was to give His life instead of others.⁹⁴ As these reasons bear chiefly upon the latter portion of the saying, Harnack contents himself with rejecting it, and allows to Jesus the former half, which commends itself to him, moreover, by its paradoxical form and the pithiness of its contents. The statement of these grounds of doubt is their sufficient refutation. There is no reason to suppose that the incident recorded in Lk. xxii., 24-36 is the same as that recorded in Mat. xx. 20-28 = Mk. x. 35-45. The differences are decisive.⁹⁵ Jesus does not represent the giving of one's life as a ransom for others as a servant's function, or even ascribe the act to a servant. He represents the giving of one's life as a ransom for others as a supreme act of service for one, not Himself a servant, to render when He gave Himself to service to the uttermost. Harnack Himself allows that in one other saying, at least, Jesus does represent His death as offered for others, and, indeed, in a subsequent passage, himself extracts all the probative force from this objection, by pointing out that no presumption can lie against Jesus' expressing Himself concerning His death as He is here reported as doing (p. 26) :

Whether Jesus Himself expressly included in the service which He performed, the giving of His life as a ransom for many, we must leave an open question; but the matter is not of so much importance as is commonly supposed. If His eye was always fixed upon His death (and the zealous effort to throw this into doubt is, considering the situation in which He ordinarily stood, simply whimsical) and knew Himself as the good shepherd,

⁹⁴ Johannes Weiss, *Die Schriften*, etc.¹ I. p. 161, tells us that the grounds on which recent criticism denies the saying to Jesus are these three—which may be compared with Harnack's: "First, the entire life-activity of the Lord is here reviewed ('He came'); secondly, the term 'ransom' and the whole series of conceptions opened up by it, do not occur elsewhere in Jesus' preaching; and thirdly, the parallel declaration from the Discourse-Source, Lk. xxii. 27, contains nothing of the redemptive death." That is to say, in brief, Jesus cannot have said what He is here reported to have said, because He is not reported to have said it often.

⁹⁵ Cf. G. Hollmann, *Die Bedeutung des Todes Jesu* and Runze as there quoted.

John has only said the most natural thing in the world when he puts on Jesus' lips the declaration that the good shepherd gives his life for the sheep. Whether Jesus really said it, whether He, in another turn of phrase, represented His life as a thing of value for the ransoming of others, is not to be certainly determined; but if He designated His life in general as "service" then His death is properly included in it, for the highest service is—so it has been and so it will remain—the giving of the life.⁹⁶

The case being so; it is surely unreasonable to deny to Jesus words credibly reported from His lips in which He declares that His ministry culminated in the giving of His life for others, merely because He is not reported as having frequently made this great declaration.⁹⁷

There is the less reason for doubting that we have before us here an authentic saying of Jesus', because it was eminently natural and to be expected that Jesus, at this stage of His ministry, when describing the nature of His mission, should not pause until He had intimated the place of His death in it. According to the representation of all the evangelists, it was characteristic of this period of His ministry that He spoke much and very insistently of the death which He should accomplish at Jerusalem, and of the indispensableness of this death for the fulfilment of His

⁹⁶ Somewhat similarly, Johannes Weiss, who denies Mk. x. 45, Mk. xx. 28, to Jesus but allows to Him Lk. xxii. 27, writes (*Die Schriften*¹, vol. I, pp. 161-2): "It is, however, of course not inconceivable that Jesus should have included also His approaching death in this work of service and love. It is even probable that He was of the conviction that His death would somehow accrue to the advantage of the men for whom He had labored in word and deed. But whether He thought directly of a sacrificial death, or of a vicarious punishment, such as is described by Isaiah in the Fifty-third chapter,—that must remain doubtful, Cf. ix. 24." Why—when He certainly knew Isaiah liii, certainly applied it to Himself, and is credibly reported to have spoken of His death as a sacrificial offering (Mk. xiv. 24) and as a vicarious punishment (Mk. x. 45)? The discussion by H. J. Holtzmann, *Synopt.*³, p. 160 is notable from the same point of view.

⁹⁷ It is purely arbitrary for Harnack to add in a note: "If the declaration," as to giving His life as a ransom, "comes from Jesus, we have at least no guaranty that it was spoken in connection with the *διακονεῖν* and was introduced by *ἡλθον*." There is no justification in any legitimate method of criticism for thus rending unitary sayings into fragments and dealing with each clause as a separate entity.

task. "From that time", says Matthew, marking the beginning of a period, "began Jesus to show unto His disciples, how that He must go unto Jerusalem . . . and be killed."⁹⁸ His insistence upon this teaching during this period is marked by all the evangelists again and again,⁹⁹ and it was immediately after the third of these insistences which have been recorded for us that the incident is introduced by Matthew and Mark which occasioned the declaration before us. Jesus' preoccupation with His death is strikingly betrayed by His allusion to it even in His response to the ambitious request of James and John, and that in such a manner as to show that it held, in His view, an indispensable place in His work.¹⁰⁰ It would have been unnatural, if when, in the sequel to this incident, He came to reveal to His disciples the innermost nature of His mission as one of self-sacrificing devotion, He had made no allusion whatever to the death in which it culminated, and the indispensableness of which to its accomplishment He was at the time earnestly engaged in impressing upon them.

The naturalness, not to say inevitableness, of an allusion to His death in this saying has not prevented some expositors, it is true, from attempting violently to explain away the open allusion which is made to it.¹⁰¹ Thus, for example, Ernest D. Burton¹⁰² wishes us to believe that "to give His life" means not "to die" but "to live",—"to devote His life-energies"—and that Jesus here without direct reference to His death is only exhorting His followers to devote their lives without reserve to the service of their fellows. In support of this desperate contention, he urges that he has not been able to find elsewhere the exact phrase, "to give

⁹⁸ Mat. xvi. 21; cf. Mk. viii. 31; Lk. ix. 22.

⁹⁹ Mat. xvii. 22f, Mk. ix. 30f, Lk. ix. 43ff; Mat. xx. 17ff, Mk. x. 32ff, Lk. viii. 31ff.

¹⁰⁰ Mat. xx. 22, Mk. x. 38.

¹⁰¹ Not Harnack, whose phrase: "The announcement that Jesus gave His life as a *λύτρον* for others, that is to say, was to die for all" . . . indicates his conception of the meaning of the words.

¹⁰² *Biblical Ideas of Atonement*, 1909, pp. 114ff.

life", used as a synonym of "to die".¹⁰³ It does not seem very difficult to find;¹⁰⁴ but in any event Burton might have remembered that this phrase is not so much used here as the synonym of "to die", as the wider phrase "to give His life a ransom for" is used as a synonym for "to die instead of".¹⁰⁵ In other words, the employment of the term "to give" is determined here by the idea of a ransom—which is a thing given, whether it be money or blood—and not by the idea of dying.¹⁰⁶ Its employment carries with it, indeed, the implication that Jesus' death was a voluntary act—He gave it; but the thought is not completed until the purpose for which He gave it is declared—He gave it as a ransom.

In this context, the saying occurs as an enforcement of Jesus' exhortation to His disciples to seek their greatness

¹⁰³ He finds the phrase "give your lives" in the exhortations of Mat-thias to his sons, 1 Macc. ii. 50 f.; but he supposes it to mean there, "to devote your life energies", an interpretation which did not suggest itself to Josephus, *Antt.* xii. 6. 3, Niese iii. pp. 120 f. (cf. Sirach xxix. 15, and, with *παρδίδωμι*, Acts xv. 26, Hermas, *Sim.*, ix. 28.2; Just. *Apol.* I, 50 from Is. 53, 12).

¹⁰⁴ See preceding note, and also cf. Ex. xxi. 23: *δώσει ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς*. A. Seeberg, *Der Tod Christi*, etc., 1895, p. 350, says: "The words *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν* refer in any case to death, for this formula which corresponds to the Hebrew *נָתַן נַפְשׁוֹ* occurs frequently in the sense of the surrender of the life in death." In a note he cites Ex. xxi. 23, 1 Macc. ii. 55, Sr. xxix. 15, with other less close parallels. There can be no doubt that "to give His life" means to Clement of Alexandria, for instance, *Paed.* I, ix, somewhat past the middle, simply to die.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Th. Zahn, *Das Ev. d. Matthaeus*,¹ 1903, p. 604, ed. 3, 1910, p. 611: "The greatest service, however, will be done by Him only in the gift of His life. No doubt this is not said clearly by *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ* by itself; *δοῦναι* rather finds its necessary supplement only in the object-predicate *λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν*. But just this action described so figuratively, can take place only in a voluntary endurance of death; for no one can give a purchase-price for another without in doing so depriving himself of it."

¹⁰⁶ Cf. H. A. W. Meyer, on Mat. xx. 28 (E. T. II, p. 51): "*δοῦναι* is made choice of, because the *ψυχὴ* (the soul, as the principle of the life of the body) is conceived of as a *λύτρον* (a ransom)." Note Josephus, *Antt.* xiv. 7.1: *λύτρον ἀντὶ πάντων ἔδοκεν*, and cf. LXX Ex. xxi. 50, xxx. 12.

in service. He adduces His own example. "For even the Son of Man", He says, "came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many." To enhance His example He designates Himself by the transcendent title, "The Son of Man."¹⁰⁷ If any, the Son of Man might expect "to be ministered unto" in His sojourn on earth. In His sojourn on earth—for, when we say "Son of Man" we intimate that His earthly life is a sojourn. The eye fixes itself at once on a heavenly origin and a heavenly issue; and we necessarily think of pomp and glory. If even the Son of Man "came" not to be ministered unto but to minister, what shall we say of the proper life-ideal for others? Jesus is not speaking of the manner of His daily life on earth when He speaks here of "coming" to serve. The manner of His daily life on earth was not that of a servant. He lived among His followers as their Master and Lord, claiming their obedience and receiving their reverence.¹⁰⁸ He did not scruple to accept from others or to apply to Himself titles of the highest, even of super-human, dignity. In this very saying He speaks of Himself by a title which assigns to Him a transcendent being. It was not the manner of His earthly life but the mere fact of this earthly life for Him, which He speaks of as a servile mission. That He was on earth at all; that He, the heavenly one, demeaned Himself to a life in the world; this was what required explanation. And the explanation was, service.

This was not news to His followers. He is not informing them of something hitherto unimagined by them. He is reminding them of a great fact concerning Himself

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Harnack (p. 10): "That Jesus says here, not 'I' but 'the Son of Man' is explained from the contents of the saying, which acquires force from Jesus' laying claim at the same time to the (future) Messianic dignity." This is saying too little and it says it with a wrong implication, but it allows the main matter. Jesus' use of "the Son of Man" here plays the same part that Paul's phrase "being in the form of God" plays in Phil. ii. 5.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. the striking presentation of the facts here by Zahn, *Matthew*¹, p. 603.

which, He intimates, it were well for them to bear in mind. He "came", not to exercise the lordship which belongs naturally to a great one like Himself, but to perform a service. What the service which He came to perform was, and how He performs it He tells us by mentioning a single item, but that single item one lying so much at the center that it is in effect the whole story. "To minister *and* to give His life a ransom" are not presented as two separate things. They are one thing presented in general and in particular. The "and" is not merely copulative; it is intensive,¹⁰⁹ and may almost be read epexegetically: "The Son of Man came to minister, *namely* to give His life a ransom."¹¹⁰ It is in "to give His life a ransom" that the declaration culminates; on it that it rests; through it that it conveys its real meaning. For this is the wonderful thing of which Jesus reminds His followers, to compose their ambitious rivalries—that He, the Son of Man, came unto the world to die. Dying was the service by way of eminence which He came to perform. Dying in the stead of others who themselves deserved to die¹¹¹—that they need not die. We do not catch the drift of this great saying until we perceive that all its emphasis gathers itself up upon the declaration that Jesus came into the world just to die as a ransom.

The mode in which the service which Jesus came to render to others is performed is described here, then, in the phrase, "to give His life a ransom for many." It would be difficult to make the language more precise. Jesus declares that He came to die; to die voluntarily; to die voluntarily in order that His death may serve a particular pur-

¹⁰⁹ Cf. H. A. W. Meyer: "intensive: adding on the *highest act*, the culminating point in the *διακονῆσαι*."

¹¹⁰ Cf. Seeberg, p. 368: "Jesus became man, in order as Messiah, to give His life in death, for of course the words *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν* give the content of *διακονῆσαι*."

¹¹¹ Whoever the "many" are, they certainly include the "sinners" whom He "came to call" (Mk. iii. 17, Mat. ix. 13, Lk. v. 327) and "the lost" whom "He came to seek and save" (Lk. xix. 10). For these "sinners" and "lost" He came to give His life a ransom. This is the way He saves them.

pose. This particular purpose He describes as a "ransom"; and the idea of a "ransom" is explicated by adding that, in thus giving His life as a ransom, His given life, His death, is set over against others in a relation of equivalence, takes their place and serves their need and so releases them.¹¹²

It is always possible to assign to each word in turn in a statement like this the least definite or the most attenuated meaning which is ever attached to it in its varied literary applications, and thus to reduce the statement as a whole literally to insignificance. Thus Jesus' strong and precise assertion that He came into the world in order to give His life as a ransom-price for the deliverance of many has been transmuted into the expression of a dawning recognition by Him that His death had become inevitable and of a more or less strong hope, or expectation, that it might not be quite a fatal blow to His wish to be of use, but might in some way or to some extent prove of advantage to His followers.¹¹³ According to H. H. Wendt,¹¹⁴ for example,

¹¹² Cf. H. A. W. Meyer on Mat. xx. 28: "ἀντί denotes *substitution*. That which is given as a *ransom* takes the *place* (is given *instead*) of those who are to be set free in consideration thereof." The "meaning is strictly and specifically defined by λύτρον (לִפְדּוֹן) according to which ἀντί can only be understood in the sense of *substitution*, the act by which the ransom is presented as an equivalent to secure the deliverance of those on whose behalf it is paid." In the *κοινή*, ἀντί seems to be going out of use. Instead of it ὑπέρ is employed (L. Rademacher, *N. T. Grammatik*, 1911, pp. 115-116). It must therefore be held to be fully intended when used.

¹¹³ Cf. C. G. Montefiori, vol. I, p. 260: "Moreover Jesus may just conceivably have realized that His death would be to the advantage of many; that many would enter the Kingdom as the effect of His death. Menzies takes this view. He thinks 'Jesus became reconciled to the prospect of death when He saw that He had to die for the benefit of others'. This is a possible view, though I think it an unlikely one. It is rebutted by Pfeiderer, *Urchristentum*, I, p. 372. Holtzmann thinks that λύτρον here is a translation of an Aramaic word which may merely mean 'deliverance'. Jesus 'delivered' people by causing them to repent" "Holtzmann" at the end of this extract is a misprint for "Hollmann": see G. Hollmann, *Die Bedeutung des Todes Jesu*, 1901, pp. 124f: "The following is then to be summarily derived from our passage: (1) that Jesus' death stands on the same plane with Jesus' life-work; (2) (negatively) that it

Jesus makes no reference whatever here to the "ransoming" of individual souls from the guilt and punishment of sin: "it is more correct to say that Jesus meant the bringing about of the salvation of the Messianic end-time in a wholly general sense".

Because He now, as death threatened Him for His works' sake, was determined rather to give His life up than be untrue to the vocation imposed on Him by God (Jno. x. 13-18); and because in strong trust in God, He was assured that His death would work out not for the destruction but for the furthering of His work; He could designate His yielding up of His life a "ransom", that is a means for bringing about the Messianic "liberation" for all those who would permit themselves to be led by Him to the Messianic salvation.

According to Friedrich Niebergall,¹¹⁵ on the other hand, there is no objective reference in the allusion to a ransom: "the figure is doubtless here only an expression for the religious impression that by Christ's death we are liberated from evil Powers". In a similar vein Johannes Weiss says:¹¹⁶

When Mark wrote this declaration it was immediately intelligible to all his readers. For their religious life was governed by the fundamental feeling that they were liberated from the dominion of the devil and the demons (*cf.* 1 Cor. xii. 2, Gal. iv. 8) and therewith delivered from the terrible destruction which impended over the kingdom of sin at the end of the ages.

Questions, such as have been raised by the dogmaticians, as to the meaning of the saying "will no longer occupy us", says Weiss, "if we keep the main idea in mind, that the immediate liberation from the dominion of demonic tyrants which was felt directly by the ancient Christians

prevents many souls from falling into destruction; (3) (positively) that it brings many hitherto unbelieving to salvation. There can be added as most probable that (4) their salvation lies in the operation of *μετανοια*."

¹¹⁴ *System der Christl. Lehre*, pp. 308ff, 323.

¹¹⁵ Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum N. T.*, v., 1909, pp. 102 f.

¹¹⁶ *Die Schriften*, etc.¹ vol. I, p. 161. He speaks of the statement as Mark's, not Jesus'. *Cf.* W. Beyschlag, *Leben Jesu*, vol. I, p. 356: a deliverance "from the dark powers which hold men morally in bondage."

was a mark of the ministering love of the Christ who gave His life for them."

Comments like these merely lead away from the simple, penetrating declaration of Jesus, the meaning of which is perfectly clear in itself,¹¹⁷ and is further fixed by the testimony of His followers. For Jesus' declaration did not fall fruitless to the ground: it finds an echo in the teaching of His followers, and in this echo we can hear His own tones sounding.¹¹⁸ It marks the very extremity of perverseness, when an attempt is made to reverse the relation of this key-declaration and its echoes in the apostolical writings, explaining it as rather an echo of them. How this is managed may be read briefly in, say, H. J. Holtzmann's comment on Mk. x. 45.

The thought of the Discourse-Source, Lk. xxii. 27, is so expressed here in Paulinizing form (*cf.* Ro. xv. 3) that Jesus also is represented as having found His vocation only in service (Phil. ii. 7, 1 Cor. ix. 19), and as having yielded up His life in that service (Phil. ii. 8). . . . While, however, the disciple can only "lose" his life in the service of his Lord (Mk. viii. 36 = Mat. x. 39, xvi. 25 = Lk. ix. 24, xvii. 33), it is the part of the Lord to give it voluntarily, according to Gal. i. 4, ii. 20. Especially, however, the "give His life a ransom for many" corresponds to the "who gave Himself a ransom for all" of 1 Tim. ii. 6 and the "He gave Himself for us that He might ransom us" of Titus ii. 14, that is, the idea of Jesus is glossed by a reminiscence of the Pauline doctrine of redemption.

Perverse as this is, it at least fixes the sense of Jesus' declaration. The attempt to represent it as a reminiscence of the Pauline doctrine of redemption shows at any rate that it is identical with the Pauline doctrine of redemption.

It lies in the nature of the case that a brief saying, consisting of only two short clauses, made, moreover, not for itself but in order to enforce an exhortation to conduct becoming in followers of Jesus, should not tell us all we

¹¹⁷ We content ourselves with referring here to the excellent remarks of James Denny, *The Death of Christ*, 1903, pp. 36ff, cap. pp. 42ff.

¹¹⁸ *Cf.* Zahn, p. 605, note 90: "The conception of the redemption (*redemptio*) wrought by Jesus and especially by His death, would not recur everywhere in the New Testament, if it did not go back to Jesus Himself." Zahn then cites the details.

should like to know of the great matter which it thus allusively brings before us. Many questions arise for guidance on which we must look elsewhere. Fortunately answers to some of them are supplied by the sayings which have already engaged our attention. We can scarcely refuse to correlate Jesus' testimony in them, for example, that He came "to call sinners", that He came "to save the lost" with His testimony here that He came to do many a service,—above all, this service, by His death to ransom them. Undoubtedly the giving of His life as a ransom is the manner in which He saves the lost. And undoubtedly by the "lost" are meant just "sinners", and by "sinners" in turn are meant those who are not "righteous", that is to say the guilt-laden.¹¹⁹ What we have here, then, is a declaration by Jesus that He came to save lost sinners by giving His life a ransom for them. The effect, called in a former saying "salvation", is clearly in the first instance relief from the penalties due to their sin: He purchases lost sinners out of the obligations which they have incurred by their sin, by giving His life a ransom for them. That is as far perhaps as our particular saying will carry us. Others of the sayings which have come before us, however, carry us further. They tell us that Jesus secures for lost sinners also perfected righteousness of life—and perhaps something like that is after all suggested in this saying also, for it too has to do with conduct. His disciples are exhorted to follow Jesus' example, and it is implied that His example is a perfect one. The ransom-paying certainly lies at the bottom of all and of that alone is there explicit mention. But there is a call to perfection of life too: and not a call to it merely, but a provision for it. In a word there is a complete "salvation" hinted at here: relief from sin both in its curse and its power. Say that it is in this its completeness only hinted at. That is to say that it *is* hinted at.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Harnack (p. 20): "The 'lost' and the 'sinners' are, however, still more closely characterized by the contrast 'not the righteous',—they are really the dying and guilt-laden, who must perish without Him."

III

We shall only in the briefest possible manner sum up the results of this survey of the eight sayings in which, according to the report of the Synoptics, Jesus declared the purpose of His mission. In doing so we may take our start from the remarks with which Harnack opens the summary of the results of his survey of practically the same series of sayings. "The eight sayings from the Synoptics which we have collected and studied", says he, "contain very few words, but how much is said in them! On investigation they compose a unity which is equally important for the characterization of Jesus, and for the compass and range of His work." We shall wish to say a word each on both of these matters.

First of all, we note, then, that these sayings are not without their teaching as to Jesus' person. The simple phrases, "I came", "I was sent", naturally, do not of themselves testify to more than Jesus' consciousness of a divine mission. It is quite clear, however, that, this divine mission of which He thus expresses consciousness, stands in His mind as that of the Messiah. He speaks in all these sayings out of the Messianic consciousness and assumes in them all Messianic functions. Even that, however, does not exhaust their implications.¹²⁰ There is a certain pregnancy of speech in them, a certain majesty of tone, a certain presupposition of voluntariness in the action expressed by the "I came",—of active acquiescence lying behind the "I was sent"—which have constantly led expositors to feel in them a claim greater than that to the Messianic dignity itself. Harnack will not admit that even the specifically Messianic consciousness speaks through them, and yet is constrained to exclaim (p. 28):

¹²⁰ A. Seeberg, *Der Tod Christi*, etc., 1895, p. 348, is quite right when he says: "All the passages in which a coming of Jesus into the world is spoken of (Mk. ii. 67, Mat. v. 17, ix. 113, Lk. v. 32, xii. 219, xix. 10) fix their eyes upon a nearer or more distant purpose of His Messianic vocation."

Who, then is this "I" that here "came". . . . Undoubtedly there lies in that "I came", no matter who is meant, something authoritative and final. There lies in it the consciousness of a divine mission, as indeed it is interchanged with the expression "I was sent." The finality, however, is given by the definitions of purpose. He who came to perfect the law, He who was sent to recover the lost sheep, that is, to fulfil the prediction of the coming of God Himself, He who came with fire and sword—He comes as the final and ultimate one.

To others, even this seems inadequate; and they are right. Justice may be done by it to the impression which the reader receives from these sayings of the majesty of the speaker; scarcely to the impression which they equally make on him of the speaker's sense of complete control over all the circumstances of His mission, including the mission itself. It is this strong impression which expresses itself in the constant tendency of expositors to see in the "I came", "I was sent" a testimony by Jesus not merely to His divine mission but to His heavenly origin. "In the coming of Jesus", expounds A. Seeberg, for example,¹²¹ "it is not some kind of an appearance (*Auftreten*) of Jesus in the world that is spoken of, but His entrance (*Eintritt*) into the world, such as is unmistakably spoken of in Jno. xvi. 28, where the coming into the world corresponds to the going away to the Father".

Unquestionably in some of these sayings Jesus speaks out of a consciousness of preëxistence. That is not merely suggested by the appearance in one of them, instead of the simple "I came" of a more significant "I came out" (Mk. i. 38), which is scarcely completely satisfied by any other supplement than "from heaven" or "from the Father". It is clearly presupposed in two of them by the employment, instead of the personal pronoun, of the descriptive periphrasis, "the Son of Man", the particular Messianic designation which especially emphasizes preëxistence (Lk. xix. 10, Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28). The declaration of Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28 runs most strikingly on the same lines with Phil. ii. 5 ff., and bears similar testimony to the pre-

¹²¹ As cited.

existent glory of the great exemplar of humility, whom both passages hold up to view. The whole force of the example presented turns on the immense incongruity of the Son of Man appearing in the rôle of a servant; this force would be much decreased, if not destroyed, if the Son of Man had never been anything but a servant, was in His own nature a servant, and was fitted only for a servant's rôle. That three out of eight of these sayings thus imply the preëxistence of Jesus, and take their coloring from this implication, perhaps sufficiently accounts for the tendency of commentators to read the whole of them from this point of sight. We know at least that He who says in them, "I came", "I was sent", was conscious of having come from heaven to perform the mission which He ascribes to Himself.

In this implication of a preëxistence in glory, distinct in some of these sayings, possibly to be assumed in them all, they range themselves by the side of the more numerous similar sayings of Jesus recorded in the Gospel of John.¹²² "The not infrequent addition, 'into the world'," remarks Harnack, in commenting on these, "shows a new horizon, alien to Jesus Himself". Not so. The difference in this as in other things, between the Synoptic and the Johannine record, is rather quantitative than qualitative. This Johannine feature too is found in the Synoptic record; but in fewer instances.

It is not, however, of the person of Jesus, but, as was to be expected—for do they not speak of His mission?—of His work, that we learn most from these sayings. According to their teaching Jesus' work may be fairly summed up in the one word, "salvation". He came to call "sinners"; He came to seek and save "the lost"; He came to give His life a "ransom" for many. Everything else which Jesus testifies that He came to do takes a place

¹²² The Johannine passages are adverted to by Harnack twice, pp. 2 and 22. For a synoptical view of them see B. F. Westcott in the "additional note" on Jno. xx. 21.

subordinate and subsidiary to "salvation". Even the "fulfilling" of the law. Harnack is wrong in attempting to co-ordinate the two functions of Saviour and Lawgiver in Jesus' testimony to His mission. "According to His self testimony, the purpose of His coming and thus His significance is given in this—that He is at once Saviour and Lawgiver. . . . Redeemer and Lawgiver: all that constitutes the significance of His coming is exhausted in that collocation . . . Programmatic in the strict sense are only these two sayings: 'I came to save' and 'I came to fulfil the law'."¹²³ Jesus does declare that He came to fulfil the law, and by this He means also "to fill it out", to complete and perfect it, so that it shall be a faultless transcript of the will of God, the Righteous One. But not this only, or even mainly. He means more fundamentally that He came to get the law observed, so that it shall be perfectly expressed in righteous lives. His mind is more on the transforming of law-breakers into law-keepers, than on the perfecting of the codex itself. That is to say, He is thinking of salvation; of salvation in its ultimate effects. And what could be more poignant than to declare side by side, "I came not to call righteous but sinners", "I came to make human lives the perfect reflection of the law of God"?

Those whom Jesus came to call, He describes as sinners and as lost, that is to say as lost sinners; as those who can lay claim to no righteousness of their own and who have no power to obtain any, that is to say as helpless dependents on Him the Saviour. To them He comes to preach the Gospel of the Kingdom; He calls them to repentance; He seeks them out and saves them; He gives His life a ransom for them; He writes the law of God upon their hearts. This is the process of His "salvation". Their own energies are enlisted: He preaches the Gospel of the Kingdom to them and calls them to repentance. Their hearts are changed: He writes the law of God upon their hearts and sets them spontaneously to fulfil it. But beneath all this,

¹²³ Pp. 25-26.

there lies something deeper still which attracts to itself especially His greatest word: "I came to save". He gives His life a ransom for them. And it is only as He thus ransoms them by the gift of Himself that they cease to be "lost"; and having thus ceased to lie under the curse, can cease also to lie under the power of sin.

Harnack pushes this greatest declaration, "I came to give my life a ransom for many" into the background. It makes little difference, he hints, whether Jesus ever said it or not. Jesus certainly died. And if all His work in the world was comprehended—as He witnesses that it was—in the category of ministry, then of course His death was included in this ministry. We may even say it was the culmination of His ministry, since the gift of one's life is the highest ministry which he can render. But the main matter is that Jesus declares that He came into the world to minister—whether by living or dying. "What it has meant in history that Jesus expressly said that He did not come to be ministered unto but to 'minister'—that cannot be expressed in words! All the advance in ethics, in these nineteen centuries which have flowed by, has had its most powerful lever in this".¹²⁴

Imitatio Christi! It certainly is the most powerful lever to move men to endeavor which has ever entered the world; it has revolutionized all conceptions of values; it has transformed the whole spirit of conduct and changed the entire aspect of life. But it has one indispensable precondition. Only living things can imitate anything. Dead things must be brought to life. Lost things must be found. Sinners must be saved. Even the heathen knew that he may see the good and yet pursue the bad. The awakened soul cries out, O wretched man that I am who shall deliver me out of this body of death? Jesus has done for us something far greater than set us a good example, and summon us to its imitation: something without which there could have been no imitation of His example; no transformed ethics; no transfigured

¹²⁴ P. 26.

lives. He has undoubtedly set before our eyes in living example the perfect law of love. But He has done more than that. He has written it on our hearts. He has given us new ideals. And He has given us something even above that. He has given us the power to realize these ideals. In one word, He has brought to us newness of life. And He has obtained for us this newness of life by His own blood.

It is this that Jesus declares when He says, "I came to give my life a ransom for many." And therefore this is the greatest declaration of all. In it He shows us not how He has become our supreme example merely, but how He has become our Saviour. He has set us a perfect example. He has given us a new ideal. But He has also given us His life. And in giving us His life, He has given us life. For "He gave His life a ransom instead of many".

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

HEBREWS, THE EPISTLE OF THE DIATHEKE

In the following article an attempt is made to trace the part which the Greek *διαθήκη* plays in the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

We leave the Greek word untranslated, because it is in part with the problem of its proper translation that we are concerned and it appears best not to prejudice the question. We notice first of all that Hebrews is the only New Testament document in which the concept and the term *diatheke* appear with any degree of prominence. In the teaching of our Lord we meet with the idea only once, in the institution of the Supper. More frequently it occurs with Paul, in Romans (ix. 4; xi. 27), 2 Corinthians (iii. 6, 14), Galatians (iii. 15, 17; iv. 24), Ephesians (ii. 12), altogether nine times in six contexts. In Luke's writings we find it, apart from the institution of the Supper, once in the Gospel (i. 72), and twice in the Acts (iii. 25; vii 8). Once also it is met with in the Revelation of St. John (xi. 19). This makes sixteen instances of its occurrence outside of Hebrews. Over against this stand seventeen occurrences in Hebrews alone. In other words in this single Epistle the conception is more frequent than in all the rest of the New Testament writings put together.

Both these facts require an explanation—the relative quiescence of the idea in the New Testament as a whole, no less than its sudden activity in Hebrews. It seems strange at first that a conception which plays so dominant a rôle in the Old Testament and so strongly colors the representation of religion there should have found so little employment in the later stage of revelation. The cause is usually sought in this, that other ideas like the Kingdom of God and the Church have forced it into the background and taken its place. But this is rather a fuller statement of the problem, and only in so far of help towards the solution, than the solution itself. For the question

persists: Why did other ideas, and precisely these ideas, become so dominant as to relegate the diatheke-idea to semi-oblivion? To this question the answer can only be found in the momentous change to which in the development of redemption and revelation the general character of religion became subject. Through the coming of the Messiah and the accomplishment of His work the people of God received a Messianic organization; their whole constitution and manner of life became determined by their relation to the Christ. Now the Old Testament idea of the berith, had in the long course of its history, scarcely come as yet into fructifying contact with the Messianic hope of Israel. Therefore at the dawn of the new dispensation it was not prepared to take the lead in the great rearrangement of doctrinal values characteristic of this epoch. While inherently not incapable of entering upon an organic union with the Messianic point of view, yet on the surface it did not suggest or invite such an interrelation. It will be remembered that the great prophecy of Jeremiah concerning the new berith which Jehovah will make with Israel in the future is not Messianically oriented. A definite, specific historical situation was required to draw this ancient idea into the service of the new Messianic outlook created by the appearance of Jesus and the accomplishment of His work.

In general we may say that such a situation was bound to arise as soon as the consciousness of the original and unique blessings conferred by Christianity led to a comparison between the present stage of redemptive attainment and the past. It is the retrospective, comparative mode of thinking applied from the exalted standpoint of Christian privilege and seeking to reach an adequate apprehension of the rich content of the latter by placing it over against the lower pre-Christian stage of redemption and revelation that has in most cases resurrected the diatheke-idea and brought it into new significance. This is entirely in accord with the first use made by Jeremiah of the idea in connection with the

future. The future order of things appears to the prophet as a berith because he pointedly compares it with and exalts it above the past and present order of things. Partly in dependence on this prophetic passage, but also with a broad historical comparison between the era introduced by the sacrifice at Sinai in the time of Moses and the era introduced by His own sacrifice, our Lord speaks of the latter in the institution of the Supper as a new diatheke. Again it is under the influence of the same comparative train of thought when Paul in 2 Corinthians iii. represents his apostolic ministry as a service connected with a diatheke, the new diatheke, not of the letter but of the Spirit, over against which he places the ministry of Moses as subservient to another diatheke, embodied in the Old Testament Scriptures. It may be observed in passing that the Apostle here by way of metonymy applies the term diatheke to the Scriptures themselves, since he alternates the phrase "the reading of Moses" with the other phrase "the reading of the old diatheke" (verses 14 and 15). This is the first instance of the literary usage of the term so familiar to us in the names Old Testament and New Testament as designations of the two canons of Scripture. The fact should not be overlooked, however, that even this literary usage has its roots in the Hebrew Scripture since berith there appears as a synonym of thora, law, and consequently like the latter comes to designate the written code as a rule of faith and practice. On the other hand there is no proof that the literary turn given by Paul to the phrase "old diatheke" had anything to do with the apocalyptic custom of representing the alleged oracular utterances of ancient Scriptural personages as their "testament", e.g. "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs." The other source is plainly indicated because Paul in the same sense speaks of the reading of Moses and the reading of the old diatheke.

With equal clearness the comparative view-point as inducing the emergence of the conception can be observed in Galatians iv. Here Paul speaks of two contrasting διαθήκαι,

i.e. two great religious systems operating by diverse methods and with opposite results, the one a Hagar-diatheke, geographically associated with Mount Sinai, the other a Sarah-diatheke having its local center in the heavenly Jerusalem. There is a difference between this and 2 Corinthians iii. insofar as there the old and the new were contrasted in their original God-willed and God-given character, whilst here in Galatians the Sinaitic-Hagar-diatheke is the old system as perverted by Judaism. But the comparative manner of handling the idea is the same in both passages and in both cases is alike responsible for its introduction.

These are the only instances in the New Testament, apart from Hebrews, where the term is applied to the Christian dispensation. In all other cases its use is purely retrospective, the reference being to the ancient theocratic order of affairs. Coming with the result obtained to Hebrews, it is not difficult to see that here likewise the motive of comparison between the old and the new religious systems very largely underlies the prominent use made of the diatheke-idea. In view of the specific purpose which the writer pursues it was inevitable that this idea should spring into prominence. We need not at this point discuss the problem why the author of Hebrews institutes such a careful and elaborate comparison between the old theocratic and the new fabric of religion. The old view, still widely taken of the matter, is that the readers of the Epistle, by reason of their Jewish descent and Old Testament associations, perhaps also their proximity to the still existing temple-service, were personally and practically interested in the comparative merits of the two systems contrasted and in need of fresh assurance in regard to the superiority of the Christian religion to that of Judaism. In recent times this older view has been steadily losing ground and it has been widely assumed that the interest of both author and readers in the Old Testament mode of religion was produced by theoretical rather than by practical considerations, the Mosaic institutions being used merely as a foil to set off

the excellence of Christianity as the supreme and final religion. As observed, it is immaterial for our present purpose to take sides in this debate for on either view of the question the comparative structure of the Epistle's argument stands out in bold relief. For whatever purpose he did it, the writer plainly wanted to contrast the old dispensation with the new. For doing this he needed a common denominator, and since the old order was to all intents a berith, a *διαθήκη*, the new order had, in order to be commensurable with the other, to be likewise represented under the same aspect. The only other form of which the writer might have availed himself to carry through the comparison was that of law and legal organization. The Epistle actually in a few passages approaches this point of view (vii. 12 "the priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of law"; viii. 6 Christ is "Mediator of a better covenant which has been legally enacted upon better promises"). But it is easy to see that, however admirably this might suit the Mosaic order of things, the Christian order could not be adequately described as a new law, since in its fundamental aspects it transcends the category of law and since precisely in this supra-legal character consists a large part of that superiority of the Christian state which the author is intent upon bringing out. The exigency, therefore, of the comparative view-point, here no less than in the case of our Lord and of Paul, brought the diatheke-idea to the front and incorporated it in the new Christian thought-system.

While this explanation of the prominence of the idea in Hebrews is undoubtedly correct so far as it goes, it does not quite satisfy. One cannot help feeling that after all the writer's attitude of mind towards the conception is a somewhat different one from that of Jesus and Paul. With Jesus and Paul the term is taken up for the momentary purpose of comparison and, having served its purpose, allowed to drop out of sight. It exerts no further influence upon the structure of thought. Even what it expresses

might have been expressed in other terms without essentially altering the content of truth. It is not so in Hebrews. Here the *diatheke*-idea shapes and colours the doctrinal outlook to a considerable degree and in important respects. Though the writer may at first have called it into requisition for formal purposes merely, yet we can clearly perceive how in his hands it outgrows this subsidiary function and leaps to the rank of a valuable concept doctrinally suggestive and stimulating to the author's own mind, fruitful and pregnant with new potentialities of thought. Therefore to take this idea out of Hebrews would have quite different results than would follow its elimination from the teaching of our Lord and Paul. Through its removal the inner organism of the Epistle's teaching would be injured and significant lines and shades of its doctrinal complexion obliterated from our view. Its revelation-value would suffer a real impairment.

In order to show that this is so it will be necessary to face a problem which up to this point we have purposely refrained from injecting into the discussion. The problem concerns the meaning of the word *diatheke* in its religious usage. The two renderings "covenant" and "testament" have long contended for the supremacy. Of the thirty-three times in which the word occurs in the New Testament the Authorized Version renders it twenty-one times by "covenant" and twelve times by "testament." This already marks a considerable preponderance of "covenant" over "testament". In the Revised Version this preponderance becomes far greater, for here of the twelve instances of "testament" only two remain, so that the proportion according to the Revisers stands thirty-one to two. When the Revised Version was made, therefore, *i.e.* more than three decades ago, the meaning "covenant" seemed in a fair way of dislodging the other rendering from the English Bible. This preference for "covenant" was undoubtedly due in large measure to the presumption in its favor created by the Old Testament. In the Hebrew Scriptures the meaning "testament"

has no standing at all. Proceeding on the legitimate principle that in a matter of this kind harmony and continuity may be assumed to exist between the two canons of Scripture, the translators naturally felt bound to retain "covenant" so long as the import and context of a passage did not absolutely exclude it. At the same time there seems to have persisted in the mind of the Revisers a feeling that their verdict in favor of "covenant" was not absolutely final. They appear not to have been enough convinced to rule the rendering "testament" entirely out of court. In each of the cases where they substitute "covenant" for the "testament" of the Authorized Version they give in the margin "testament" as a possible alternative. And not only this, they offer of their own accord the same marginal alternative in nine additional cases, where the Authorized Version had already "covenant". That is to say, even where the Authorized Version and the Revised Version agreed in favoring "covenant", the Revisers deem it necessary to warn the reader that the possibility of the word meaning "testament" must be reckoned with. As a matter of fact, then, the Revision, so far from decisively settling the question, has by accentuating in so many instances the double possibility of rendering, placed the old problem more than ever in evidence.

That this was a wise suspension of judgment seems to be borne out by the recent course of investigation. If at the time of the Revision "covenant" was gaining on "testament," the rôles have now been reversed. The opinion of writers who of late years have occupied themselves with the subject has been steadily moving away from the rendering "covenant" to the other translation. Even where a stop is made at the half-way station of "disposition", "arrangement" and the specialized meaning of "testament" not insisted upon, the idea of "covenant" is none the less deliberately rejected as inapplicable. In this point Riggenbach and Deissmann and Behm and Lohmeyer all agree. This remarkable veering around of opinion is the result

of a new method of approach to the problem. The linguistic method of settling such a question is at present in the ascendant. The interest of scholars is no longer directed towards giving *diatheke* a meaning which shall keep it in touch or harmony with Old Testament precedent but exclusively towards explaining it from the common, secular Hellenistic *usus loquendi* at the time when the Septuagint and the New Testament were produced. The discovery and utilisation for New Testament science of the papyri and ostraka has made it possible to turn "the light from the Orient," as upon so many other things, also upon the *diatheke*-idea. The Septuagint has been studied with the distinct thought in mind that it should not be read in dependence upon the Hebrew original but treated as a linguistically self-explanatory document. Even the classical meaning of the word, in distinction from the later Hellenistic usage, has been exhaustively traced through its several stages and thus a complete history of the development of *διαθήκη* in the Greek language from its earliest emergence down to the eve of the New Testament period and to a much later point, has been laid before us.¹

As a result of all this investigation and discussion it is now claimed by prominent scholars that *diatheke* in Hellenistic Greek bore and could bear no other meaning than that of "testament" and consequently must have been meant in the same sense by the Septuagint translators and the New Testament writers, at least if we assume that these desired to be understood by their readers. Now, since nothing is more certain than that such a conception of *berith* as a "testament" is utterly foreign to the intent of the Hebrew Scriptures, the position taken implies that the Seventy by

¹Cpr. Riggenbach *Der Begriff Διαθήκη im Hebräerbrief* in the volume of Theological Studies dedicated to Theodor Zahn, 1908; Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten*, second and third ed., 1909; Norton, *A Lexicographical and Historical Study of Διαθήκη from the Earliest Times to the End of the Classical Period*, 1909; Franz Dibelius, *Das Abendmahl*, 1911; Behm, *Der Begriff Διαθήκη im Neuen Testament*, 1912; Lohmeyer, *Διαθήκη*, 1913.

translating as they did committed a stupendous blunder, and that in two directions; first by importing a false idea into the Old Testament, secondly by failing to reproduce the correct idea there found. So far as the Septuagint is concerned, this might not seem in itself such a very serious matter. We do not ascribe to the Greek Old Testament infallibility; its text is not to us a canonical text. None the less the matter is of considerable importance. The seriousness arises from the connection between the Septuagint and the New Testament. For the New Testament writers inherited this blunder from the Seventy. They also took diatheke as "testament" and labored under the same delusion that the berith of the Hebrew Scriptures was to be so understood. In other words there is involved in the case a huge misunderstanding of the Old Testament on the part of the writers of the New.

The advocates of the new view, however, are not much troubled by this. They care as little for the inspiration and infallibility of the New Testament, as we would be apt to care for the inerrancy of the Septuagint. But not only are they not seriously disturbed by the matter, they are enthusiastically elated over it. To their mind it is a most extraordinary case of religious good coming out of linguistic evil. To the cause of religion the Greek translators rendered by their mistake a signal service. The Old Testament idea of the berith, that is of the "covenant", was an idea of very inferior worth and questionable associations, belonging to a low plane of religious development. It is at bottom unworthy of the relation between God and man, ideally considered, to think of the two as contractually united. And, on the other hand, the idea of God issuing a testament, that is making sovereign disposal in matters of religion is an inherently noble conception. Although, therefore, the procedure of the Septuagint cannot be justified philologically, we are invited to hail its result as a great religious gain. Deissmann speaks about it in the following words: "The Bible which conceives of the relation

between God and man as a divine 'testament' moves, with Paul and Augustine, on a higher plane than the Bible (*i.e.* the Hebrew Scriptures) which represents God as making contracts."² And Behm delivers himself to the same effect: "The act of making a contract with its synergism gives way" (through the rendering of the Septuagint) "to the monergism of the sovereign pronouncement by which God prescribes His will to man, either commanding or promising gifts, by way of law or of grace."³

What shall we say to these things? In our humble opinion the conclusion which these scholars arrive at is a mixture of error and truth, both as regards its linguistic side and as regards the comparative estimate they put upon the religious value of the two ideas of "covenant" and "testament" as exponential of the spirit of the older and later Scriptures respectively. To begin with the linguistic aspect of the question, the whole antithesis between *berith* as meaning "covenant" and *diatheke* as meaning "testament" is, in the absoluteness with which it is here advocated, untenable and in the highest degree misleading. To charge the Old Testament, on account of its *berith*-conception, with the doctrine that God synergistically enters into contracts with man is a gross injustice. The fact is that, preoccupied with their own specialty of Hellenistic Greek, the scholars who make this charge have failed to keep up with the progress of Old Testament science. Even if *diatheke* meant "testament" pure and simple in Hellenistic Greek, even then a downright conflict of the Hebrew Bible with this could only be made out by giving *berith* the unqualified modern sense of "covenant" *i.e.* of "contract", "agreement". But the adequacy of such a rendering will no longer be upheld by any reputable Old Testament scholar. The sense of "contract", "agreement" does not belong to the essence of the *berith*-conception at all. This does not mean that sometimes in the

² *Die Hellenisierung des Semitischen Monotheismus*, p. 175, quoted by Lohmeyer, p. 96.

³ *Der Begriff Διαθήκη im Neuen Testament*, p. 31.

Old Testament the berith does not appear in the form of an "agreement" between parties and that this may not be an important feature theologically considered. It only means that even in such cases what constitutes the agreement a berith is not the two-sidedness but something else which equally well can appear where there is no compact at all. This essential element is the absolute confirmation of the arrangement by means of a religious sanction or ceremony; in other words it is the introduction of the divine factor securing stability that gives to the berith its specific character. This is so in the secular berith between man and man; but it is from the nature of the case more emphatically so when God is one of the parties entering into an arrangement with man. The circumstance that in virtue of its berith-character the arrangements must derive its security not from man but from God has for its necessary result that God where He Himself enters as a party acquires in the transaction a monergistic preponderance which from the outset excludes any idea that He parleyed and contractually negotiated with man in a manner derogatory to His divine position. It thus appears that even where there is a reciprocal relationship the berith-aspect of it is the very aspect that keeps it within the bounds of religious dignity and decorum. However bilateral the arrangement may be in its outcome, to God alone belongs the prerogative of initiating it and with Him alone lies the right of determining its content. God never deliberates or bargains with man as to the terms of the berith He condescends to enter into. Man may accept voluntarily but can in no wise modify what the sovereign divine will arranges for him. Thus even in the case of an avowed bilateral berith there already is seen to exist a balance of monergism on the divine side sufficiently strong to exclude every thought of a contractual procedure unworthy of God. But the berith by no means involves such a two-sided arrangement everywhere in the Old Testament. There are numerous instances where the berith is wholly one-sided in its import, where man as-

sumes no obligations but is purely receptive in regard to it, in other words, where it amounts to a solemnly sanctioned promise or disposition on the part of God. Such are the berith made with Noah and that made with Abraham. Further the frequent equivalence of berith and "law" can only be explained on this same principle. The conclusion of the matter, therefore, is that the element of two-sidedness plays a very subordinate rôle in the Old Testament usage of the term berith, and where it does enter, it is very much restricted in scope. The characterization of the Old Testament God as a God making contracts quoted above from Deissmann derives its main support from the rendering "covenant", which, as we have seen, is a very inadequate rendering. If regard is had not to the modern associations of the word "covenant" but to the actual nature of the Biblical berith as ascertained by induction, no ground for criticism on that score exists.

But, although the charge of religious inferiority can not justly be brought against the Old Testament berith-conception, it may still be asked, whether the charge of linguistic conflict between it and the Greek diatheke-idea does not remain? The diatheke may not be something higher or more God-worthy than the berith, but is it not something specifically different, so that after all the Greek Bible places the idea in a false light and deflects it in a wrong direction? For the answer to this question all depends on what the Greek diatheke did actually mean or can have meant to those who equated it to berith. If it could mean and did mean nothing else but "a last will," then the conflict with the sense of berith lies on the surface and there is no use in trying to argue it away. Nor will it do to say that revelation in its progressive development has the right to modify a conception or even to empty it of its old and fill it with a totally new content. For the later Scriptures in this case are not conscious of such a modification or refilling of the form; on the contrary they profess to employ diatheke in such a way as to make it retain its full identity with be-

rith. If the identity does not exist, then it is a case of self-delusion such as can hardly be reconciled with the dignity of revelation. The only recourse, therefore, lies in maintaining that the understanding of diatheke in Hellenistic Greek was not so absolutely tied down to the sense of "testament" as we are asked to believe. This, we believe, can be maintained, without any stretch of the linguistic conscience. The facts appear to be as follows. *Διαθήκη* is a derivative of the verb *διατίθεσθαι* (in the middle voice). The verb means "to order for one's self", "to dispose for one's self". To this general meaning of the verb, the noun must at one time have corresponded in the sense of "arrangement for one's self", "disposition for one's self". But, as is frequently the case with general terms, the noun acquired in course of time a specialized, technical meaning which became so prevalent as to force the original unspecialized signification into the background and practically put it out of use. [†] *Diatheke* became a term of jurisprudence. In this capacity it had two meanings, the one very common, the other, it seems, more rarely employed. The common meaning was that of "testament", "last will", the rarer one that of "treaty", or "mutually obligating law". This specializing development had already run its course before the close of the classical era, so that in Hellenistic Greek *diatheke* had become monopolized by jurisprudence as a technical term. Now the question in hand reduces itself to this, whether in the face of a fixed specialized usage the Septuagint, and in its wake the New Testament writers, could attribute to *diatheke* any other meaning than that of "testament" and still have reasonable ground to believe that in doing this they would be understood by their readers. This question may confidently be answered in the affirmative. It is true that, so far as our knowledge goes, "testament" was the sense commonly connected with the word. But, as already stated, it was not absolutely the only sense; side by side with it, there existed the sense of "treaty" or "mutually obligating law". Even strict adherence to actual usage,

therefore, did not compel the translators or the readers to identify a diatheke in every case with a "last will". But, what is of more importance, it should further be remembered that the technical meaning acquired by a word may or may not kill the potentialities inherent in the word for reasserting its old use or making new growth in some other direction. A term can become so technical as to lose all adaptability for wider and freer usage. The Latin words "testamentum" and "sacramentum", and the corresponding English words "testament", "sacrament" are examples of this. In their case the memory of the native sense, which in virtue of their etymology they possessed, has been lost beyond all possibility of resurrection; if any new development occurs it will have to take its point of departure in the technical usage. But it is not necessarily so in every case. A word can become technical and yet a more or less clear consciousness of its original, plastic force and etymological sense may survive enabling the latter to spring into living use whenever the emergencies of expression require it. Now the word diatheke, it seems to me, belongs distinctly to this second class. While it had come to mean almost exclusively "testament", the older meaning of "disposition for one's self" "arrangement for one's self", which was the parent of the technical use, had only become momentarily non-active, but could by no means be counted dead and buried. The stock remained alive and capable of sending forth a fresh shoot. We must not overlook the important fact, that, while the noun *διαθήκη* became specialized, the corresponding verb *διατίθεσθαι* did not share to the same extent in this specializing development. Of course, it had to follow the noun into the field of jurisprudence; when *διαθήκη* meant "testament", *διατίθεσθαι* could not help acquiring the sense of "to make a testament". But there was this difference, that the noun practically dropped its other meanings whereas the verb had only gained a new technical adaptation without detriment to its other usage which remained precisely what it was before. To the Greek

mind *διατίθεσθαι* did not necessarily call up the idea of a testamentary transaction; it could express a disposition or arrangement for one's self in any other sphere uncolored by the associations of the law-court or the last will. This, however, could not be without retroactive influence upon the destinies of the noun. The etymology of the noun *διαθήκη* is so perspicuous that it could never be entirely detached from its parent-stock still living with unimpaired vigor in the verb. A *διαθήκη* is so clearly the result of *διατίθεσθαι* that whatever the latter signified, the former also must have remained capable of signifying anew when occasion called for it. If then the Septuagint translators for good reason thought it desirable to detach the term *diatheke* from the restricted contemporary meaning and revert to its original freer force, the technical usage can have presented no insurmountable obstacle.

The next question is, whether the Septuagint, self-interpreted, suggests anywhere that it wants *diatheke* to be understood as "testament." It is *à priori* extremely improbable that this should be the case. A "testament" always carries the implication of the prospective death of the person who makes it. How could such a thought have been applied to God who is throughout the maker of the religious *diatheke*? In the New Testament the *diatheke* as a "last will" is once brought into connection with the sacrifice of Christ, once with the promise of God to Abraham. The former case cannot be put on a line with what the translators of the Septuagint are charged with having perpetrated, because Christ, unlike God, is in His human nature subject to death and can appear in the rôle of testator. The other instance (that in Gal. iii.), which actually makes God the testator of the inheritance bequeathed to Abraham, is occasioned by Paul's desire to emphasize the subsequent unchangeableness of the promise. That Paul in an exceptional case and for a concrete reason gives this specific turn to the idea and discounts the element of a contemplated death cannot, of course, give plausibility to the

assumption that the Septuagint associated God with the idea of a "last will" on the broadest scale. It ought also to be noticed how in both these New Testament instances the writers do not content themselves with implying the testamental character of the *diatheke*, but take particular pains to call our attention to it so that the import of the word in the context cannot possibly be misunderstood. By accentuating this and using the technical terms of jurisprudence the writers reveal that they are conscious of using the religious *diatheke* in a meaning not normally associated with it. In the Greek Old Testament it is totally different. The translators here give no indication anywhere by their manner of rendering of their desire to have *diatheke* understood as "testament". It may be said that as translators they were precluded from doing this by their dependence on the original from which every allusion to a "last will" in connection with *berith* was absent. Still in other cases the translators of the Septuagint have not been restrained by strict adherence to the Hebrew text from injecting or suggesting their own theological ideas and it is certainly strange that in the numerous cases of their employment of *diatheke* they should have entirely failed to do so. All the more is this to be wondered at, since a direct temptation to underscore the meaning "testament" offered itself in the fact that the Hebrew Scriptures had already associated the two ideas of *berith* and inheritance. Jehovah in virtue of the *berith* gives the inheritance of Canaan to Israel. Of course in the original this combination has nothing whatever to do with the idea of the *berith* as a "last will". But it offered a splendid opportunity for a translator who understood *diatheke* as "testament" to make his understanding of the matter unmistakable. When nowhere a hint to this effect is given, we may safely conclude that the Septuagint had no special proclivity towards identifying the religious *diatheke* with a testament.

If not specifically "testament" what then did the *diatheke* of the Greek translators mean? Would we come nearer

to their intent by saying they meant it in the sense of "covenant"? In our opinion an affirmative answer may be given to this in so far as that which we understand by a "covenant" must have entered in a number of cases as a constituent element into their conception of the berith and of the diatheke, while it is entirely incapable of proof that the idea of a technical testament associated itself for them with these words. They speak sometimes of the diatheke in the same way that the Hebrew Bible speaks of the berith, as a *διαθήκη* *with* and *between* persons, and this certainly suggests that it appeared to them as a mutual agreement. There is reason therefore to believe that their idea of the diatheke was sufficiently wide and elastic to include the covenantal element. And yet the simple equation of diatheke and "covenant" might easily become misleading. The two above-named constructions are not the favorite constructions of the Septuagint. They prefer to speak of a diatheke which God makes *towards* men, and this already suggests that the covenantal idea, while not excluded, is in their mind subordinated to and delimited by another idea. This other idea is that of the sovereign prerogative of God to regulate without human interference the redemptive relation that shall exist between Himself and His people, even though this relation may in the outcome partake of the nature of a mutual fellowship and agreement. That the preference given to diatheke as a rendering for berith actually arises out of consideration for God as the principal factor in the transaction appears from the following: "where the berith is made between man and man and consists in a mutual agreement, the translators do not employ *διαθήκη* but *συνθήκη*, a word exactly corresponding to the word covenant; on the other hand, where the berith lies between God and man, even though it possesses equally the character of a mutual agreement, they never employ *συνθήκη* but always *διαθήκη*. Plainly then their avoidance of the former is due to the thought that it connotes something that cannot be properly predicated of

God. The preposition *συν* in *συνθήκη* expresses the coequality and coëfficiency of the persons concerned in the berith. Such a coëquality and coëfficiency cannot exist between God and man; even where God most condescendingly enters upon a relation of true friendship with man, it is still out of place to conceive of this as a treaty in the ordinary sense. God cannot forego the right of sovereignly framing and imposing the arrangement that shall control the religious intercourse between Himself and man, and that He exercises this right is admirably expressed by the preposition *διὰ* in *διαθήκη*. To this extent and to this extent only we are warranted in saying that the Septuagint shrinks from conceiving of the Old Testament religion as a "covenant." What it wants to avoid is the contractual character of the religious relation in its origin, not its reciprocal character in the outcome. The translators had no interest and could have no interest in representing God as the framer of a "last will" and the conveyor of property. All that they wanted out of *diatheke* was the emphasis which the word enabled them to throw upon the one-sided initiative and the unimpaired sovereignty of God in originating the order of redemption. And fortunately the linguistic usage did allow them to utilize the word for this purpose. Since the original etymological meaning of "a person's free disposition in his own interest" still clearly shows through the specialized sense of "testament", they could fall back upon it and were not compelled to take the technical associations of *diatheke* into the bargain. Had this been otherwise, had the word become so absolutely and irretrievably identified with the conception of a "last will", then the substitution of *διαθήκη* for *συνθήκη* in the sole interest of escaping from the synergistic, contractual implications of *σύν* would have been a desperate remedy. It would have meant for fear of misrepresenting the form to sacrifice the substance of the idea. Surely the Septuagint translators were not foolish enough to affirm, irrespective of all inevitable incongruities, that the berith was a "testament"

simply because in one important respect they could not properly call it a "covenant". Their procedure appears intelligent only on the supposition that they believed diatheke capable of retaining or reacquiring the sense of "disposition". And it should be emphasized that in making diatheke, so understood, the vehicle for conveying the content of the Old Testament berith the Greek translators evince the most exquisite tact. The rendering represents not one of their blunders but one of their most felicitous strokes. The supreme interest they attach to safeguarding the divine dignity and prerogative is not something of later origin and imported by them *ab extra* into the Old Testament world of thought. On the contrary it constitutes one of the ideas indigenous to the Old Testament revelation itself. Thence and from no other source the Septuagint derived it. They prove themselves in this case excellent craftsmen by reason of their faculty of sympathetic apprehension no less than by reason of their skill in faithful reproduction. In one respect they even improved upon the Hebrew original: for, while in the Hebrew Scriptures the divine sovereignty in regulating the religious life of Israel is uniformly recognized and prevailingly colors the representation, it does not find direct expression in the word *berith* itself. Such expression the makers of the Greek Bible first gave it. They for the first time made the word and the conception cover each other with approximate perfection. And by thus enshrining the concept in the word, they created the means for the conservation and faithful transmission of a great religious treasure to the later Church.

We now approach the question, what data the New Testament passages offer for determining the sense of diatheke. Of course, the answers cannot help being strongly influenced by the conclusion reached regarding the Septuagint usage. Still we must not forget that the New Testament writers lived in a new-created world of redemptive realities and apprehended this world with new-born forms of thought. The possibility should be reckoned with that

the ancient conception of the *διαθήκη* felt the effect of the powerful forces set free in the spheres of redemption and revelation. To what extent, we ask, do the facts show that such was actually the case? At the outset it may be well to moderate our expectation of fresh insight into the content of the idea to be afforded by the manner of its occurrence in the New Testament writings. As already stated, where it is not introduced in a purely retrospective sense but reinstated as a conception remaining permanently applicable to the new order of things ushered in by Christ, this is done largely in a comparative manner, that is to say, without much reflection upon the inherent character of the idea. The new order is a *diatheke* because the old order was. This is taken for granted rather than consciously realized through apprehension of the continuity of organic structure in both cases. Hence the difficulty of telling in many passages what conception the *diatheke* in such comparative statements actually called up to the writer's mind. It would be exegetically wrong to seek to elicit answers from such contexts on a question which probably was not present to the consciousness of the author at all. Still even so there are sufficient indications to enable us to affirm that the three senses, "covenant", "authoritative disposition", "testament", are all represented in the New Testament vocabulary. The idea of "covenant" in the specific sense, that is with positive reflection upon the community of interests, the intercourse and fellowship between God and man, is perhaps least in evidence. This does not necessarily mean that it was least familiar to the writers, only it so happens that it obtrudes itself less and its currency is therefore less easily verified. Outside of Hebrews the passages recording the institution of the Supper most clearly attest its presence. To be sure these are the very passages in which a number of modern expositors, Zahn, Deissmann, Dibelius, confidently claim that the meaning "testament" can be established with a strong degree of plausibility. Our Lord here brings the new *diatheke* into connection with the cup containing His blood,

that is with His death. This invites the interpretation that through His death the new religious basis on which it puts His followers is as a legacy bequeathed to them. In favor of this view a further argument is drawn from Lk. xxii. 29, where, immediately after the institution of the Supper, our Lord speaks of the provision He makes for His followers in the future kingdom and uses to describe this act the word *διατίθεσθαι*, the rendering proposed being: "I bequeath unto you, as my Father bequeathed unto me etc." If the technical use of the verb could here be substantiated it would create a presumption in favor of the technical sense of the noun *διαθήκη* in the immediately preceding institution of the Supper, the more so since the imagery of joint-eating and -drinking with Jesus at His table on the one hand and the eschatological outlook of the Supper, in which Jesus also speaks of the drinking of new wine in the kingdom of God, on the other hand, appear to draw the two statements very closely together. These two arguments, weighty as they may seem at first sight, on closer inspection lose much of their force. It is true our Lord establishes a connection between His death and the new diatheke inaugurated. But this by no means shuts us up to viewing the diatheke as a testament put into effect through the death. The true interpretation of the Lord's Supper is that it appears as a sacrificial meal, to which His death forms the sacrifice. If, therefore, the new diatheke is connected with the death of Jesus, the connection will have to be sought along the line of sacrifice, that is to say, the death must be assumed to give birth to the diatheke in the same capacity and for the same reason which make it the central feature of the sacrament. It is, therefore, *à priori* probable that the diatheke appears as something inaugurated by a sacrifice, and that is not a "testament" but either a "religious disposition" or a "covenant". The obvious parallel in which Jesus places the blood of the new *διαθήκη* with that of Ex. xxiv., where the blood is none other than the blood of sacrifice inaugurating the Sinaitic berith, also re-

quires this interpretation. And when it is said of the blood as exponential of the death that it is ὑπὲρ πολλῶν, "on behalf of many", this yields a thought utterly incongruous to the concept of testament, for a testator does not die in behalf of or with the intent of benefiting his heirs, whereas the benevolent intent of the death of a person fits admirably into the circle of sacrificial ideas. As to the passage from Luke, it is exceedingly doubtful whether the verb διατίθεσθαι can there have the technical meaning of "to bequeath" on which the force of the argument depends. Jesus, it will be observed, puts His own διατίθεσθαι for the disciples on a line with the Father's διατίθεσθαι for Himself. Now the Father's provision of the kingdom for Jesus, from the nature of the case, cannot be considered a testamentary act, since God does not die. This already compels the rendering: "I appoint unto you as my Father appointed unto me", with which we are familiar from our English Bible. To this must be added that the more plausible construction of the sentence makes the object of the διατίθεσθαι of Jesus for the disciples something that could hardly be the object of a testamentary disposition. The English versions construe: "I appoint unto you *a kingdom*, even as my Father appointed unto me *a kingdom*". But for reasons, which it is not necessary here to detail, the construction given by the Revised Version in the margin decidedly deserves the preference. It reads: "I appoint unto you that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, even as my Father *appointed* unto me *a kingdom*." If the object of Jesus' διατίθεσθαι for the disciples were a kingdom, as it is on the ordinary construction, this might properly fall under the rubric of a legacy, but the eating and drinking with a person in his kingdom do not naturally fall within the terms of a bequest. For these reasons we believe that the testamentary idea may safely be eliminated from the institution of the Lord's Supper. As to the choice between the two other meanings "disposition" and "covenant" the latter decidedly deserves the preference. The new diatheke appears from the

point of view of its valuableness to the disciples. This already points to the covenant-idea. More specifically, the benefit conveyed by it consists in the approach to God mediated by the forgiveness of sins. It is equivalent to a new basis of intercourse between God and the disciples. Finally the pointed reference to the berith at Sinai, which was to all intents a two-sided agreement, and to the prophecy of Jeremiah, which speaks of the future new berith as a supreme favor to be bestowed upon Israel shows that the emphasis rests upon the resulting covenantal fellowship rather than upon the divine sovereign initiative that lies back of the new order of things.

A careful study of the Pauline passages yields a somewhat different result. It is true where Paul speaks retrospectively of the *διαθήκαι* as forming part of the distinctions and prerogatives of Israel, as in Rom. ix. 4 and Eph. ii. 12, this might seem to favor the notion of "covenant" as involving a privileged relation to God. But in the passage of Romans the coördination of *διαθήκαι* with such terms as "the promises" and "the law" proves that a one-sided disposition of God could easily be viewed as a favor and distinction conferred upon Israel. In Eph. ii. 12 the phrase "covenants of the promise", in which the genitive is expegetical, yields positive proof that Paul regards the *διαθήκαι* as so many successive promissory dispositions of God, not as a series of mutual agreements between God and the people. Far more energetically however does the Pauline principle of the sole activity of God in the work of salvation draw the diatheke-idea into its service where the latter is considered not by manner of retrospect merely, but is applied on the comparative principle to the Christian system itself. Here every reflection on the covenantal aspect of the new religious relation is absent and the diatheke-idea is pointedly used to bring out how God sovereignly sets in motion and effectually organizes and carries through all that is necessary to securing the religious end contemplated in His purpose. Thus in 2 Corinthians iii. the two

διαθήκαι compared, that of the letter and that of the Spirit, represent two great systems and methods of religious procedure, working themselves out through two corresponding ministries, that of Moses and that of Paul, and thus inevitably shaping the result of human destiny and experience according to their intrinsic law of operation. The old diatheke is the system of legal administration: it issues into bondage, condemnation and death. The new diatheke is the system of spiritual procreation and endowment prevailing through Christ: it produces liberty, righteousness and life. The sense of contract is not only absent here: one may perhaps go so far as to say that the introduction of it would have jarred upon the singlemindedness wherewith the Apostle pursues the opposite element in the conception, that of the divine sovereignty and monergism of procedure. Only, over against Deissmann it should be observed that Paul pursues this principle in a thoroughly impartial way, with reference equally to the Old Dispensation, and to the New. In speaking of the order of grace as a diatheke in this one-sided divinely-monopolized sense, Paul is not conscious of imparting to the diatheke a different character from that which it bore previously. The legal order of things is as little a contract here as that which took its place: it was according to Paul a diatheke in the same absolute, sovereign way as the Gospel-order of things. The form is the same, the content poured into it differs; and the form as such is indifferent to the distinction between grace and works. Although there was an agreement at Sinai, in Paul's view it was evidently of such an origin and nature that it could be equally well represented as the result of a divine disposition and the name diatheke employed with exclusive reference to this its source in the activity of God.

The contrast between the Hagar-diatheke and the Sarah-diatheke in Galatians iv. 24 proceeds along similar lines. That the Hagar-diatheke here stands for the old Sinaitic system, not in its original divine intent but in its Judaistic perversion, creates no formal difference; the diatheke is

viewed here as in 2 Corinthians iii. as a project and organism determining religious status, bearing, propagating itself, as the figure strikingly expresses it, unto liberty as unto bondage.

The term is placed at the farthest remove from every association with "covenant" by Paul's way of handling it in Galatians iii. There can be little doubt that here the desire to throw the strongest possible emphasis on the supremacy of the principle of promise and grace in Old Testament history has induced the Apostle to compare the Abrahamic diatheke to a "testament". That Paul here has in mind a "testament" follows from two considerations: first, the legal terminology employed is derived from testamentary law and is such as was not used in connection with covenants or legal dispositions generally; second, in the context the idea of the *inheritance* is pointedly associated with the diatheke. The Apostle means to say, the gracious principle on which God pledged to Abraham and in him to all believers the inheritance of salvation was as absolutely immutable, as absolutely incapable of being modified or replaced by the subsequent law-giving, as if it had been a testamentary disposition: "A testament, though it be but a man's testament . . . no man makes void or adds thereto" . . . even so "a testament confirmed by God beforehand, the law which came four hundred and thirty years after doth not disannul so as to make the promise of none effect." To our minds it might easily seem as if the idea of a "testament" were poorly adapted to bring out the character of immutability which Paul wishes to emphasize. A "testament" as we know it might more easily be a figure for changeableness than the opposite, for until the testator dies it is subject to repeated modification or absolute recall. How then can Paul say: "*no one* maketh it void or addeth thereto." It has been proposed to take "no one" in the sense of "no one except the testator". But Paul evidently means "no one, not even the testator", and the purpose for which he employs the representation requires him to mean

it so, for the point is precisely this, that not even the testator, God, could subsequently through the giving of the law have modified the arrangement made with Abraham. It is plain, therefore, that here is a "testament" which, once made, cannot be changed. Professor Ramsay, I believe, has furnished the solution to this difficulty by calling attention to the difference between the testament of Roman law and a kind of testament possible under Syro-Grecian law.⁴ The Roman testament, as we know it, is changeable till the testator dies, but under the Syro-Grecian law a prospective disposition of property could be made during the lifetime of the possessor, frequently carrying with it adoption, which after having been once sanctioned in public immediately carried with it certain effects and was not after that subject to modification. Comparing the berith God made with Abraham to such a diatheke Paul could within the terms of the representation properly say that God could not have meant to change its fundamental character as a dispensation of grace and promise through the later giving of the law at Sinai, and that therefore the law may not be interpreted on a legalistic principle but must be subsumed under the Abrahamic arrangement as a means to an end. Perhaps it will be said that Paul by giving this turn to the diatheke has imported into it what the berith-idea of Gen. xv. did not contain, in other words, that in saying God meant it so when making the promise to Abraham, the Apostle is historically at fault. The charge would be warranted, of course, if Paul had used this peculiar testamentary conception for a different purpose than that for which in Genesis the berith-idea is introduced. But this is by no means the case. The purpose for which in the one case the form of the berith, in the other case that of the "testament" comes in, is absolutely identical. The berith with Abraham was not a covenantal berith at all. It was a disposition-berith in the strictest sense, intended exclusively by God for the purpose of binding Himself in the strongest

⁴ *Expositor*, 1899, pp. 57 ff.

possible way by His own promise, and so rendering the promise unalterably sure. It is for nothing else than for faithfully translating this import of the berith into the thought-form of his readers and so bringing it home to their understanding that Paul says God made with Abraham a testamental diatheke. Under the circumstances this amounted to saying: the berith God made with Abraham was as unchangeable as a diatheke is among you. It simply accentuates, in the most emphatic way, what to the narrator of Genesis himself is the salient point of the transaction.

Before returning to Hebrews, we must cast a glance at the use of the conception in the two cases where Luke records it. In the Gospel i. 72 the diatheke is equivalent to the promise given to the fathers; the parallelism in which it stands with the "oath" of God proves this: "to remember his holy diatheke, the oath which He swore unto Abraham, our father." In the other passage, Acts iii. 25, Peter addresses the Jews as "sons of the prophets" and "sons of the diatheke which God made with the fathers". "Sons of the prophets" of course does not mean "descendants of the prophets" but "heirs of what the prophets have predicted". Similarly "sons of the diatheke" does not mean "begotten by the diatheke", but "heirs of what the diatheke conveys in the way of blessing". This, of course, admits, though it by no means positively requires the construction of the diatheke as a "testament". "Heirs of a testament-diatheke" is a more suggestive, and more directly self-explanatory form of statement than "heirs of a disposition-diatheke". But it can not be said that the latter interpretation is in itself unnatural. "Sons of the berith" for "heirs of the promise of the berith" is as allowable a figure, as good Semitic idiom, as "sons of the prophets" for "heirs of the predictions of the prophets". But, whether the notion of "testament" be found here or not, it is at any rate clear that the Lucan and Petrine usage in these two passages agrees with the prevailing Pauline mode of representation. Peter, like

Paul, emphasizes the sovereign promissory source of God's dealings with His people and does not reflect in the present connection upon the reciprocal relation resulting from it. In passing it may be remarked that in Stephen's speech, Acts vii. 8, "the diatheke of circumcision" means nothing else but "the law, ordinance of circumcision". The reference is to Gen. xvii., where the word berith has the same sense. The author of Genesis, who in chapter xv used the term berith in the sense of a promise, here takes it as "law", "appointment". He did not mean that God in the same sense twice made a berith with the patriarch. First God gave a promise-berith, then He imposed a law-berith. So Genesis intends it and so Stephen quotes it.

✓ We are now ready to return to Hebrews and bring to bear upon it the light we have obtained from the remainder of the New Testament. In view of what has been found, it is not likely that diatheke bears in the Epistle the uniform meaning of "testament". Riggenbach's assertion to this effect is staked on the fact that in ix. 16, 17 the necessity of rendering "testament" is self-evident, and that this one passage must be considered regulative for the author's understanding of the term throughout. The major premise of this argument is unassailable. The wording of the statement in the passage named compels us to think of a testament: "where a diatheke is, there must of necessity be the death of him that made it, for a diatheke is of force where there has occurred death: for does it ever avail while he that made it liveth?" Besides this, the purposeful introduction of technical law-terms is just as noticeable here as in Galatians iii. Of course there have been exegetes who thought they could even here adhere to the meaning "covenant". Westcott is one of these.⁵ He thinks that the necessity of death dwelt upon in the passage has nothing to do with the legal decease of a testator, but relates to sacrificial death. According to him the thought is: a covenant cannot go into effect except a sacrificial victim have died. It does not, of

⁵ *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 265.

course, escape Westcott that the author, instead of saying this, makes the quite different assertion, a covenant cannot go into effect except the *covenant-maker* have died. How can that possibly be explained on the principle of sacrifice? Westcott appeals for explaining it to the idea of identification between the offerer and his sacrifice, so that when the animal dies the offerer, in this case the covenant-maker, dies with it. "He who makes a covenant is, for the purposes of the covenant, identified with the sacrificial victim, by whose representative death the covenant is ordinarily ratified. In the death of the victim his death is presented symbolically." In other words the author of Hebrews meant really to say: "A covenant cannot go into effect except in his sacrificial substitute the covenant-maker has first died." There can be no objection to the symbolical-vicarious interpretation of sacrifice in general or of covenant-sacrifice in particular. We believe most thoroughly in its soundness. But that does not answer the question why the author of Hebrews should in this passage have found it necessary to call attention to the fact that not merely the sacrifice but in the sacrifice the covenant-maker dies, and that only so the covenant can go into effect. Westcott himself feels the necessity of accounting for this peculiar form of statement, and therefore offers the additional explanation that the death of the covenant-maker in the sacrifice serves to express the idea of the subsequent unchangeableness of the covenant: "the unchangeableness of the covenant is seen in the fact that he who has made it has deprived himself of all further power of movement in this respect." The man is dead and can no longer act. On the impossibility of this explanation the whole exegesis breaks down. The idea of unchangeableness, irrevocableness of the covenant, on which Westcott would suspend it, is foreign to the context. What the writer wants to prove by the death of Christ is not the subsequent unchangeableness or irrevocableness of the diatheke but its sure effectuation. Herein lies precisely the difference between Gal. iii. and this ix. chapter of Hebrews. Paul says

no one *annuls* or *adds* thereunto; our author says: a *diatheke avails, is of force, goes into effect* when a person dies. Besides this, if the writer had actually wanted to express the thought of irrevocableness and unchangeableness, the representation of the *diatheke* as a testament in the Roman-law-sense would have lain far nearer to his hand and be far more suited to his purpose, than this tortuous, artificial appeal to symbolic suicide of the covenant-maker in his sacrifice. Still further, the full absurdity of the exegesis is felt only when the attempt is made to apply the principle in question to the death of Jesus. Can we say that the covenant inaugurated by Jesus through the sacrifice of Himself is now irrevocable and unchangeable because, the covenant-maker now being dead, the covenant is *ipso facto* exempted from all danger of change or annulment? The case of Jesus is precisely peculiar in this, that He does not remain dead; the whole ingenious device of proving the unchangeableness from the death would be a mere pretense at argument, lacking all cogency for the case in hand. We may, therefore, confidently dismiss this exegesis as impossible. The *diatheke* in Heb. ix. 16, 17 is nothing else but a "testament", and its testamentary aspect serves the single purpose of bringing out the certainty of its effectuation. Just as the death of a testator under the Roman law automatically puts into effect his last will, even so the death of Christ with absolute inevitability secures all the effects for which it was intended.

Now, Riggenbach's major premise being thus granted, are we bound to accept his conclusion, that *diatheke* must uniformly throughout the Epistle mean the same thing that it means here? We think not. There are several considerations that lead us to believe that the treatment of the *diatheke* as a "testament" is a peculiarity of this one passage and not representative of the author's ordinary view. The very fact that the author takes great pains by the use of legal terminology to call the reader's attention to the possibility of construing the *diatheke* as a "testament" operates

against the view that it should ordinarily have been so understood either by him or by the readers. Then there is the important phenomenon that the author immediately before and after the passage under discussion predicates things of the diatheke which do not properly belong to a "testament". In verse 15 the death of Christ is said to have taken place for the redemption from transgressions committed under a former diatheke. "Transgressions" do not naturally invalidate a "testament", but do have a disannulling effect upon a "covenant" or a "disposition." And in verse 18 the writer says: "Wherefore even the first diatheke has not been *dedicated* without blood". It is plain that here already the idea of "testament" has been again dismissed as suddenly as it had been introduced; the author has shifted back to his ordinary conception of the diatheke as a "covenant" or a "disposition", for to a "testament" the idea of "dedication" does not apply. Evidently the writer finds it difficult to keep himself well within the terms of the figurative, accommodating use to which for the moment he is led to put the conception. Finally it is still possible to point out what it was that first suggested to the author the rendering "testament" as a means of which he might avail himself to set forth impressively the effectiveness of the death of Christ. This was nothing else than the mention of "the inheritance" at the close of verse 15: "For this cause is He the mediator of a new diatheke that a death having taken place for the redemption from the transgressions that were under the first diatheke, they who have been called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance." The author in speaking of the inheritance is at first still unconscious of the train of thought which it may open up. But no sooner has he written down the word than all at once the possibility of attaching the inheritance to the diatheke in the sense of "testament" suggests itself to him and he is quick to see the striking use that may be made of it in furtherance of his argument. But the novel turn given to the word under such circumstances offers no indication of the meaning con-

nected with it elsewhere in the Epistle. To assume that it signifies "testament" elsewhere we need other evidence than this single passage. And such evidence does not exist. In none of the other contexts where *diatheke* occurs is there anything that even remotely suggests the idea of a last will. And against it speaks decisively the representation of Jesus as the sponsor and mediator of the new *diatheke*. Neither of these two functions that of a sponsor or that of a mediator appear among the legal accompaniments of a testament.

But if not the idea of a testament, what then is the idea which our Epistle ordinarily connects with the word *diatheke*? The answer is that both the other aspects of the conception so far found in the earlier documents are here represented with a fair degree of equilibrium. The usage of our Lord, who spoke of a "new covenant", and that of Paul, who practically everywhere views the *diatheke* as a divine disposition, both reappear in Hebrews, and they are not merely mechanically held together but organically and harmoniously united. The Epistle speaks the last word in the Biblical development of the *berith-diatheke* idea and that not only in point of chronology but likewise as giving the idea its full-orbed, consummate expression. And this is due to the fact previously alluded to, that the writer of Hebrews is positively interested in the conception, loves it for its own inherent character, finds it congenial to his own religious idiosyncrasy, and so is able to penetrate it with his thought and raise it to the highest state of doctrinal fruitfulness. The two aspects distinguishable in the *diatheke* correspond closely to the two poles between which the religious thinking of the author moves. His thinking would have partaken of this twofold character even if the *diatheke*-idea had remained unknown to him; the latter is by no means the source of his doctrine but, as a reagent, it has materially contributed to the strengthening and clarifying of the two great thoughts that existed and worked in the writer's mind apart from it. Let us look at each of these

two thoughts separately and at the corresponding elements in the diatheke with which they are found interacting.

In studying the Epistle it soon becomes clear that it deals with the diatheke from two different points of view. In a number of passages it appears as an institution established and set in operation for an ulterior end. This is in line with the understanding of the diatheke as a divine disposition, and leaves out of regard its character as a state of fellowship with God, in which latter respect it is not, of course, a means to an end, but an absolute end in itself. It is true the direction to an ulterior purpose admits of being combined with the idea of a covenant: a covenant between two parties can serve to realize some extrinsic end. As a matter of fact, however, while this may be so in the abstract, the concrete statements of the Epistle in regard to the ends which the diatheke subserves are such as to exclude the idea of their being reached by a "covenant" and fit in only with the idea of a system or disposition. The instrumental diatheke appears in the following ways. Back of the diatheke stand the promises, and it is for the fulfillment of the promises that the diatheke has been instituted. Hence it is said to have been enacted upon the basis of promises, inferior promises in the case of the first diatheke, better ones in the case of the second. The diatheke further appears as a means to the end of the *τελείωσις*, *i.e.* the attainment of the religious goal of approach to and communion with and service of God. Here, it will be seen, the fellowship with God, which we ordinarily associate with the covenant-idea appears as lying above and beyond the diatheke, as the end lies above and beyond the means.

Over against this we may place other passages in the Epistle which represent the diatheke as the realisation of the religious ideal and therefore as an end in itself. In viii. 10, in the passage quoted from Jeremiah, the diatheke is held to consist in this, that Jehovah is the God of Israel, and Israel to Jehovah a people. The life of the people of God is essentially an intercourse with God and this inter-

course appears in ix. 14, 15 as the very essence of the diatheke. The diatheke is also called a *διαθήκη αἰώνιος*, "an everlasting covenant", chap. xiii. 20, and this implies that in it the whole religious process comes to rest: for the predicate *αἰώνιος* in Hebrews expresses not only endless duration but inclusion among the eternal realities which have absolute value and significance in themselves. Now it is plain that in this second absolute aspect the character of the diatheke can only be expressed by the rendering "covenant". It is only as a "covenant" and not as a disposition that it lends itself to being eternalized after this fashion.

These two principal aspects of the diatheke answer perfectly to the two outstanding features of the Epistle's teaching. The first of these consists in the emphasis placed upon the absoluteness, sovereignty and majesty of God and the monergistic divine initiative and prosecution of the work of salvation. In various ways, altogether apart from the diatheke-conception, this finds expression. God is the Majesty on high (i. 3), the one for whom are all things and through whom are all things, whom it therefore behooves, even through great suffering with sovereign hand to carry through His saving purpose (ii. 10), the living God (ix. 15, xi. 31), a consuming fire (xii. 29). But in keeping with this the writer vindicates for God not merely the original planning and inception but also the further effectual carrying out of the work of redemption. There are various servants in the house of God, and Christ is even a son over the house, but the principle remains in force: "He that built all things is God" (iii. 5). And how this thought of the underlying divine initiative and energizing flows together with the diatheke-idea may be seen from the doxology in xiii. 20, 21: it is the God who omnipotently brought again from the dead the Lord Jesus, with the blood of the eternal diatheke, who also makes the believers perfect in every good thing to do His will, working in them that which is well-pleasing in His sight through Jesus Christ. On this principle it is further to be explained that

the new diatheke can be represented as a new species of legislation. God has enacted it. The reason is not that it is legalistic in content or import, but simply that God has instituted it with the same supreme authority with which He promulgates His law. How much weight the author attaches to this point may be seen from the change introduced in ix. 20 into the quotation from Ex. xxiv. 8. Here the Septuagint reads: "this is the blood of the diatheke which God *disposed* (*διέθετο*) towards you". The writer substitutes for this: "the blood of the diatheke which God *commanded* towards you." In line with this conception of the diatheke as a divine arrangement carrying the pledge of its unfailing effectuation in itself is also the function of *ἑλεμιστής* and *ἑγγυος* performed by Christ in connection with it. Of the latter term *ἑγγυος*, to be rendered as "sponsor", this is plain on the surface. Christ is the "sponsor" of the diatheke insofar as He guarantees the fulfilment of the promises to which the diatheke has reference. The term is not a technical term either in connection with a "testament" or a "covenant" and it most naturally attaches itself to the understanding of diatheke as a divine promissory dispensation. It forms the connecting link between the diatheke and the important rôle which the word "promise", "promises", plays in the Epistle. As for *μεσίτης*, the English literal rendering of the word by "mediator" is apt to lead to the premature conclusion that it goes with the diatheke as a two-sided covenantal agreement and marks Jesus as the one who brings the two parties together by mediating between them. While *μεσίτης* has this meaning in the Greek language of law, its legal use is by no means restricted to it and at least three other meanings have been fully established as equally current.⁶ We shall not weary

⁶ The other three meanings are: 1) the person with whom parties at law deposit the object in litigation until the suit has been decided; 2) the witness who vouches for the veracity of a statement; in this sense the verb *μεσιτεύειν* is used in chap. vi 17 God pledged Himself with an oath for the truthfulness of His promise; 3) the person who vouches for the execution of engagements made; in this sense *μεσίτης* becomes synonymous with *ἑγγυος*.

the reader with an account of the recent discussions on this point: suffice it to say that the trend of present scholarship is towards considering *μεσίτης* and *ἑγγυος* as entirely synonymous in the vocabulary of the writer of Hebrews. The *μεσίτης* is he who guarantees for God the sure accomplishment of what has been stated or promised in the *διαθήκη*. So taken the word, no less than *ἑγγυος*, becomes a witness to the prominence in the writer's mind of the sovereign, promissory aspect of the diatheke.

The other aspect of the diatheke, that of covenantal fellowship and intercourse with God appealed equally much, if not more, to the religious temperament of the writer. It has long been observed that the type of Christianity represented by the Epistle is peculiar in the almost exclusive emphasis it places upon the exercise of religion in the conscious sphere. The important subconscious processes, sometimes designated as mystical, which play so large a rôle in the Pauline teaching, are very little in evidence in Hebrews. Hence also the Spirit as the author and bearer of this hidden subconscious union with God and Christ is seldom referred to. Where the Holy Spirit is mentioned in Hebrews it is as the source of the extraordinary charismata, and even here His operation is highly personal, for He is said to distribute these gifts according to His own will (ii. 4). It would be foolish, of course, to attribute the absence of this specifically Pauline strand of teaching to the author's ignorance or denial of it. The many and intimate relations with Paul's type of doctrine in other respects forbid us to assume any conscious departure or opposition here. But without ignoring or denying the deeper and more mysterious underground of the religious process, the author could feel himself more strongly drawn towards exploring and cultivating the more advanced stage of the process, for whose sake all previous operations exist, its blossoming out into conscious Christian experience. The author of Hebrews is a great spiritualizer. The efflorescence of religion in the clear luminous regions of the believer's noëtic life evokes

his supreme interest. In several important connections we can trace the influence of this spiritualizing factor in the shaping of his thought. These will afterwards receive separate attention. For the present it suffices to observe that to a mind thus spiritually oriented the interpretation of religion in terms of the covenant was bound to offer a special attraction. For it is precisely in religion as a covenant-religion that everything is reduced to ultimate, spiritual, conscious values. The new covenant is the ideal covenant because in it the will and law of God are internalized, put on the heart and written upon the mind. Here its nature as a covenant can first freely and perfectly unfold itself.

The full significance, however, of this interlocking of the principle of spirituality in religion and the covenant-idea will not be perceived until we remember in the next place that the spiritualizing tendency of the Epistle is of a peculiar, God-centered kind, and that only in this specific form it perfectly fits into the covenant-type of religion. We do not hesitate to say that in hardly any New Testament writing is the essential character of the Christian religion as consisting in face to face intercourse with God, mediated by Jesus Christ, so clearly realized and so pointedly brought out as in our Epistle. The supremacy of the spiritual, when closely looked at, is only a result of drawing every religious state and act into the immediate presence of God, where nothing but the spiritual can abide. To be a Christian is to live one's life not merely in obedience to God, nor merely in dependence on God, nor even merely for the sake of God; it is to stand in conscious, reciprocal fellowship with God, to be identified with Him in thought and purpose and work, to receive from Him and give back to Him in the ceaseless interplay of spiritual forces. It is this direct confrontation of the religious mind with God which finds in the covenant-idea its perfect expression. To be in covenant with God,—what finer and what more adequate definition of the perfect religious life could be conceived than this? The classical formula in which already under the Old Testament

God Himself expresses His conception of the covenant and which through Jeremiah has descended to our author reads: "I shall be to them a God and they shall be to me a people", and "All shall know me from the least to the greatest." According to this the covenant means that God gives Himself to man and man gives Himself to God for that full measure of mutual acquaintance and enjoyment of which each side to the relation is capable. The highest concrete analogy for this is that offered by the prophet Hosea when he compares the berith between Jehovah and the people to the marriage-bond between husband and wife, which when perfect leaves no room for divided interests or possessions. Some of the Psalms also reach the same high altitude where the soul rises above every thought of self, even above the consciousness of its own need of salvation, and desires and receives God for His own sake.

Let us now endeavor to trace the influence which this covenantal understanding of the relation between God and man has exerted upon the theology of the Epistle. And first of all its doctrine of revelation must be considered here. The Epistle makes much of the fact that God has revealed Himself to His people. In part, of course, this is accounted for by the supernaturalism which the writer has in common with all the Biblical writers. No redemptive religion, however conceived, covenantal or otherwise, can dispense with the basis of divine, supernatural self-disclosure. But there are perceptible differences in the way in which the several types of Biblical teaching account for this necessity and in the statement of the supreme end which they make it subserve. Special, supernatural revelation is necessary for a soteriological reason, because man in his sinful, lost, helpless condition is dependent on the sovereign, gracious approach of God in word and act to recover his normal religious state. As such, revelation bears an instrumental saving character. This view of it also Hebrews shares with the other New Testament writings. Revelation, however, alongside of this, and even

through all its saving activity also serves the purpose of establishing as from God to man that train of personal communication in which the end of religion consists. In this aspect one might define it as divine speech for the sake of divine speech; God reveals Himself, because in His love for His own and interest in them it is natural for Him to open up and communicate Himself. Revelation in a sense is the highest that God has to give because in it He gives Himself. And while in the ordinary understanding of it revelation is in order to salvation, the reversed sequence also can lay claim to recognition: salvation is in order to prepare man for further, perpetual revelation carrying its right of existence in itself. Such speech of God existed in the state of rectitude; such will continue to exist in the eschatological state of the world to come, when all abnormality of sin and every need of salvation shall have been forever surmounted. And, as already intimated, even in the soteric process of revelation this higher and ultimate function of it finds simultaneous employment. All saving transactions are so many approaches, so many occasions of meeting between God and man in which the forces of help become fountains of love, God the great physician of souls making friends of all His patients. Now it is in the emphasis placed upon this specifically religious aspect of revelation that the influence of the covenant-idea can be clearly traced in our Epistle. It is not accidental, that the first sentence with which the writer opens his discourse reads: "God having spoken . . . spake." It is as a speaking God that he grasps Him and desires to bring Him in touch with the readers. And the word also that is employed in this first sentence and prevailing afterwards to describe the revelation-speech of God deserves notice in this connection. It is the verb *λαλεῖν*, a verb used in the New Testament with reference to the speech of God outside of Hebrews only in John and Acts and which brings out most strikingly the idea of familiar intercourse, denoting speech not primarily for the purpose of conveying information but for

the purpose of maintaining fellowship. Further the verb *διαλέγεσθαι*, expressive of the two-sided mutually responsive speech that takes place between God and man may here be mentioned as entering into the author's vocabulary. Because the divine word is not merely for instruction or salvation but brings God personally near to the believer, it becomes in itself an object of enjoyment, hence the Epistle speaks of tasting the good word of God (vi. 5). And it is further in agreement with this personal, practical view taken of revelation when, throughout, the direct provenience of the word from God is emphasized. In a very striking way God regularly appears as the speaking subject in the quotations made from the Old Testament. Where Paul contents himself with the formula, "as it is written", or "as the Scripture says", Hebrews prefers to make the affirmation of the divine authorship explicit and employs the formula "God says". That this is not the result of meaningless habit, but possesses doctrinal significance, appears from the cases, where, rhetorically considered, it would be unnatural to introduce God as the speaking subject, since in the passage quoted He is the Person spoken of. Even in such cases the author insists upon emphasizing that the statement about God came from the mouth of God Himself. It is God who said "the Lord shall judge His people (x. 30). And so vivid is the realisation of this supreme fact of the direct divine authorship of Scripture that what we call the secondary authors, that is, the writers of the Biblical books, are, again in distinction from Paul's custom, scarcely ever mentioned. The only case where the name of a Bible writer is introduced is chap. iv. 7, and even here the phrase is not "David saying" but "God saying in David." There are even passages where pains seem to have been taken to bring out the relative unimportance of the secondary authorship by more positive means than the mere omission of the writer's name. In a couple of instances use seems to have been made for this purpose of the indefinite pronoun "some one" and the indefinite adverb "some-

where": "*One* has *somewhere* testified saying" (ii. 6); "For He hath spoken *somewhere* of the seventh day on this wise" (iv. 4). By this manner of statement the impression is conveyed that in view of the authority wherewith God invests every word of Scripture the human instrumentality through which the divine word was mediated becomes a matter of little or no importance. As a matter of fact the word of revelation is so literally to the writer's mind the word of God that it is represented as having been spoken by God being locally present in His messengers: "God of old times spoke unto the fathers *in* the prophets"; "God said *in* David". The conception is not instrumental, as if "*in*" were a Hebraizing construction for "by means of"; it should rather be compared with the similar form of statement by our Lord to the disciples: "it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you" (Mat. x. 20), and by Paul who offers to the Corinthians a proof of Christ speaking in him (2 Cor. xiii. 3).

But, while this immediateness of the approach of God to man through His word is made a characteristic of all revelation, and found illustrated in the Old Testament Scriptures, the writer evidently associates it in the highest degree with the New Covenant. Over against the many portions and the many modes in which the ancient speech of God came to the people in the several prophets, he places that uniform and undivided revelation that was concentrated in Him who is a Son. The purpose for which the author draws this contrast is precisely to exalt the New Covenant by reason of the absolutely unmediated and most intimate union with man upon which in it through Christ God's revelation-speech has entered. Revelation in a Son is superior to that in prophets and superior to that in angels because as Son of God Christ is the effulgence of the divine glory and the expressed image of the divine substance, in no wise differing from God Himself, so that to hear His voice is to hear in the most literal sense God's own voice and to come in direct touch with the divine life expressing

itself in the divine word. It is characteristic of the Epistle that, in connection with the revealing office of Christ, it places all the stress upon His divine nature, whereas in connection with His priestly office, the reality of His human nature is strongly emphasized. Both features are explainable from the covenant-idea. In regard to the priestly function we shall have occasion to show this later on. At this point it may be observed that the ideal revelation, if it is to fulfill its covenant-purpose of establishing real contact between God and man, can have no other than a strictly divine Mediator. Otherwise the bearer of the divine word would intervene between the covenant-God and the covenant-people and stand as a barrier to the close union contemplated. The perfect identification of Christ with God, therefore, is necessary to the belief that the Son has brought the highest and final revelation and raised the covenant-intercourse to a point beyond which it cannot be perfected. This can be observed most clearly perhaps on the negative side. Repeatedly the readers are warned in the Epistle that unbelief over against the New Testament revelation and rejection of its Gospel are a far more serious offense and must be followed by far more tremendous consequences than a similar line of conduct under the old dispensation. "Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things that were heard, lest haply we drift away. For if the word spoken through angels proved steadfast and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation (ii. 1-3)?" And "A man that hath set at naught Moses' law dieth without compassion on the testimony of two or three witnesses: of how much sorer punishment, think ye, shall he be judged worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith He was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace" (x. 28-30)? "See that ye refuse not Him that speaketh. For if they escaped not when they refused Him that gave oracles

on earth, much more shall not we escape, if we turn away from Him that gives oracles from Heaven" (xii. 25, 26). In such passages the revelation mediated by angels and by Moses and by the prophets is represented as imposing a lesser degree of responsibility than that mediated by Christ. Now the reason for this cannot lie in the fact that the angelic or Mosaic or prophetic message was insufficiently authenticated as to its divine origin or less completely derived from God. On the contrary the author explicitly states that the word spoken through angels proved steadfast, *βεβαιος*, and the same thing is emphasized regarding the Mosaic revelation at Sinai: neither of these could be disobeyed with impunity. But neither of these two, nor even the prophetic word, could be placed on a line with the revelation in Christ because here the word spoken comes invested with the divine majesty which it derives from the unique organ of its transmission, the Son of God. The measure of responsibility here evidently is not the truthfulness of the message, for that is alike in all true revelation, but the closeness of contact with God that is effected. Under the Old Testament there was not that immediateness and directness which the author claims for the self-disclosure of God in Christ. Between God and the people there stood the angels and Moses; between God and us stands only the Son. And, strictly speaking, even this is an incorrect form of statement which fails to reproduce the author's intent at its most vital point: as regards Christ, no intervention between God and us in the matter of revelation can be affirmed. By Christ's activity in this sphere absolutely nothing is detracted from the immediacy of the divine approach to man. Hence "the word of Christ" (vi. 1) is spoken of in precisely the same sense as is ordinarily connected with "the word of God", and in which "the word of Moses" or "the word of the prophets" could never be referred to. A stronger proof of the author's belief in the deity of our Lord than this whole representation that God spake under the Old Covenant through inter-

mediate organs but under the New Covenant in Christ directly cannot be conceived.

But the practical character of revelation as a covenant-speech shows itself in still another way. The Epistle conceives of the divine word as not merely proceeding from God originally, but as also remaining in living contact with God ever afterwards. God continues to stand back of His revelation, nay abides immanent in it. The Scriptures of the Old Testament and the word spoken in Christ are as personal an address from God to the later generations as they were to those who first heard the divine voice proclaim them. The author is at the farthest remove from considering the word by itself as a detached deposit of truth separated from the mind that conceived or the mouth that spoke it, having its own objective existence. It is significant that all his statements on this subject refer to revelation in terms of speech and not in terms of writing. The speech is an organic, living process, a part and function of the speaking person, whereas the written communication is only a picture or symbol of the life-process it reproduces. But God's word, even when written, has this peculiarity that it retains the character of inspired, vitalized speech, opening up the depths of the divine mind and addressing itself in the most direct face-to-face way to the inner personality of the hearer. So vividly does the author realize this, that in a well-known passage it leads him to a formal personification of the *λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ* in which attributes and activities are predicted of the word, belonging, strictly speaking, to God Himself only, and in which a remarkable transition is made from the word to God as co-ordinate subjects in the same sentence: "The word of God is living and active and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit, both in their joints and marrow, and quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart. And there is no creature that is not manifest in *His* sight; but all things are naked and open before the eyes of *Him* with whom we have to do"

(iv. 12-14). Misled by the vividness of the personification some have thought that the author here speaks of Christ as the personal Logos after the manner of the Johannine teaching. But of the Logos-Christ it would have been unnecessary to affirm with such pointed emphasis that in His operation He is living and active and incisive, because His personality is self-evident, and what the writer by means of these predicates here wants to affirm of the word of God is nothing else than that it works as a personal agent upon the soul of man as a personal reagent. God acts in and through His word and thus the word has the same power and effect that belong to God Himself. Especially the figure of the sword searching the vitals and laying bare the inner attitude and disposition of man is very striking. Because the word of God confronts man with God personally he cannot in the presence of it remain neutral and treat it after an indifferent, disinterested fashion; it is a challenge to his soul that must provoke reaction and incite to faith or unbelief according to the inner disposition of the heart with reference to God.

Owing to this permanent identification of God with His word, the lapse of time is not able to detract aught from the freshness and force that belonged to the self-disclosure of God at its first historic occurrence. It is not necessary to project one's self backward through the interval of the ages in order to feel near to the source of the revelation. The fountain of the living water flows close to every believer. The author might have said with Moses and Paul: "Say not who shall ascend into heaven, or who shall descend into the abyss? The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart: such is the word of faith which we preach" (Rom. x. 6-8; Deut. xxx. 12-14). It is true, the Epistle speaks not only of the *καινή* but also of the *νέα διαθήκη* and the latter phrase represents the new covenant as fresh and recent in comparison with the more remote Mosaic revelation. It should, however, be observed that, although the Epistle is addressed to Christians of the second generation,

it none the less conceives of its readers as in the most immediate sense made recipients of the divine word spoken by Christ and through that word brought into no less direct communion with the supernatural world than the contemporaries of the earthly life of Jesus. God spake unto the fathers in the prophets: He spake in a Son unto *us*. And through this speech they have come unto Mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, nay unto God and Jesus the mediator of a fresh covenant Himself and, as we have seen, the danger incurred by disregarding this speech of God in Christ is for them no less but greater than it was for those who refused a hearing to the terrible voice of the Sinaitic legislation. The word remains what it was at the beginning when it fell fresh from the lips of Christ, a signal of the presence of God and a vehicle of approach for the world of the supernatural.

(To be continued.)

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE BAYAN OF THE BAB.*

It is pleasing to see members of the consular service taking interest in the antiquities, history, literature and religions of the countries in which they reside. America has had many literary Consuls who have brought honor to our country and fame to themselves. English diplomats, like Sir John Malcolm, Sir Henry Rawlinson and James Morier have added to our knowledge of Persia. At present Mr. Minorsky, of the Russian service, late of the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission, is making a first-hand study of the Ali-Allahi sect. Mr. A. L. M. Nicolas has followed his illustrious predecessor, Count Gobineau, Minister at the Court of Mohammed Shah, in investigating the religions of Persia and enlightening the western world about them. Count Gobineau published *Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale* and collected manuscripts which have been a valuable mine of information, especially about Babism. Mr. Nicolas has investigated the modern sects of the Shiahs and has published not a little regarding the Sheikhis and Babis. Among these are *The Science of God*, an essay on Sheikhism, translations of the Bab's work, *The Seven Proofs*, *The Arabic Bayan* and a *Life of the Bab* from original sources. Mr. Nicolas has special qualifications for this work, having been born in Persia where his father was in the diplomatic service, and having lived many years in the country. At present he is Consul at Tabriz. As a near neighbor, it has been my pleasure to converse with him and Mr. Minorsky regarding the religious conceptions and conditions of the Persian people. Now Mr. Nicholas has completed a difficult and laborious task in giving to the world the translation of the *Bayan of the Bab*. It will enable the western world to form

* *Le Béyan Persan* traduit du Persan par A. L. M. NICOLAS. Consul de France, Tauris (Geuthner, Paris). *Kitab-i-Nuqtat-ul-Kaf*. The Earliest History of the Babis, compiled by HAJJI MIRZA JANI of Kashan, edited by EDWARD G. BROWNE, professor in Cambridge University, England.

a truer conception of Babism, the source of Bahaism, of which Americans hear considerable and whose new prophet Abdul Baha visited America in 1912.

The other work before us is the *Nuktatul-Kaf* by Mirza Jani. This is published in the Persian text from a unique manuscript preserved and brought to Paris by Count Gobineau. It is an invaluable treatise on the early history of Babism. With this is published in English an Index of the Bayan. Professor Browne is a high authority on Babism, having investigated in Persia its history and conditions and spent a lifetime in the study of its literature. He has published besides the above, the *Episode of the Bab, or the Traveller's Narrative*, and *The New History*, both translations from the Persian, with copious and valuable notes, *A Year among the Persians* and extended articles on Babism in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*. These all contain information about the Bayan.

I. THE AUTHOR OF THE BAYAN

In considering the Bayan, I must content myself with a brief reference to its author; for any adequate consideration would occupy a whole article. Mirza Ali Mohammed, a Sayid, was born at Shiraz in 1819, 1820, or 1821. He was educated in the Sheikhi sect of the Shiah under the influence of Haji Kasim of Resht, the successor of Sheikh Ahmad of Ahsa. These were regarded as divinely inspired guides. At the age of twenty-four M. Ali Mohammed put forth the claim to be the Bab or Door of Communication of Divine knowledge. Afterwards he advanced his station, claiming to be the Kaim or Mahdi, the return of the twelfth Imam. Still advancing he took the title of Nukta or Point of Divinity. He proclaimed his Manifestation at Mecca. On his return to Persia he was arrested and confined at Shiraz and Ispahan. Owing to the activity of his propagandists and the consequent agitation, he was taken to the extreme northwest of Persia and confined at Maku, under the shadow of Ararat, and

later at Chirik near Salmas. Thence he was taken to Tabriz in 1850 and executed.

The Bab made known his "revelations" in a number of books. His writings¹ are said to comprise five hundred thousand verses. Some of these were *Commentaries* on the Koran, one was on the Surah-i-Yusuf, others were on Surah-i-Kawsar, Surah-ul-Asr, Surah-ul-Bakara. Besides there were the *Seven Proofs*, the *Names of All Things*, Prayers, Communes, and especially the Bayans. Many of his writings are lost; some may have remained hidden in Persia; others were taken by the Babi exiles to Turkey and may be in manuscript at Acca. Others have been collected at the Institute of Oriental Languages at St. Petersburg, in the Nationale Bibliotheque at Paris, and at the British Museum. Most of the Bab's writings are in Arabic, but some important ones are in Persian. The term Bayan is applied to all the writings of the Bab in a larger sense, meaning the "explanation" of the Truth. In the narrow sense there are two Bayans, one Arabic and one Persian. A third is mentioned by Gobineau, a summary in Arabic of the other two. But Mr. Nicolas² and Professor Browne³ believe that some general work must be referred to and not a book technically called the Bayan. The Kitab-ul-Ahkam, Book of Precepts, was translated into French by Gobineau. A French translation of the Arabic Bayan by Mr. Nicholas has been followed by this rendering of the Persian Bayan. This is in four volumes, the text comprising 630 pages, besides prefaces and valuable tables of contents. In connection with it may be used the *Index of the Persian Bayan* which occupies pages liv-xcv of Professor Browne's volume. The Bayan in the original has never been printed.

¹Lists of these are given in Mr. Nicolas' *Life of the Bab*, pp. 20-47, by Professor Browne in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889 and in his *Traveller's Narrative*, p. 335-340.

²*Life of the Bab*, pp. 1-7.

³*Traveller's Narrative*, p. 346.

II. THE TIME AND PLACE OF ITS WRITING

The Bayan was written during the Bab's imprisonment at Maku, ⁴ a frontier fortress of Azerbaijan, off from the centers of Persian life. There⁵ the Bab's imprisonment was light. He was allowed to write treatises as well as correspond with his followers. This was 1847 to 1849. When he was removed to Chirik, his confinement was stricter.

After the great persecutions of 1846-1853, the Babis were fearful and scattered. Babi books, including the Bayan, were prohibited. Soon (1867) the Bahai "revelation" abrogated and superseded them. The Bahais neither cared to preserve nor to circulate them. The manuscripts became scarce and hard to procure. Professor Browne says,⁶ "The Babi books ceased to be renewed and for the most part reposed undisturbed and forgotten on shelves and in boxes." They were "buried in an oblivion most profound and most complete. They have been almost utterly unknown to the European world."

III. STYLE AND LANGUAGE

Many of the writings of the Bab are in Arabic and in the form of "verses." These verses were regarded as the highest proof of the truth of the Manifestation. As Mohammed pointed to his Surahs as the proof of his mission, so the Babi converts with profound admiration for the "verses" declared them to be the inspiring cause of this faith. Yet to unbelievers, whether Persian Mullahs or foreign savants the language and style of the Bab's writings are not inspiring but are positively distasteful. Professor Browne says,⁷ "The Arabic treatises are of interminable length, at once florid and incorrect in style, teeming with grammatical errors the most glaring,

⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 230, 274, 292, also *Life of Bab*, p. 71, and Abdul Fazl's *Bahai Proofs*, p. 43.

⁵ The writer has visited Maku. It is strongly situated for old time warfare.

⁶ *New History*, xxvii.

⁷ *New History*, xii, xxvi.

iterations the most wearisome, and words the rarest and most incomprehensible." Again, "They were voluminous, hard to comprehend, uncouth in style, unsystematic in arrangement, filled with iterations and solecisms." Of the Surah-i-Yusuf, he says,⁸ "It is obscure and ungrammatical"; of the Book of the Pilgrimage, "It has the faults of grammar and obscurity of all the Bab's books." Baron Rosen of Petrograd, another eminent student of Babism, agrees with this. He says:⁹ "As to the innumerable grammatical errors which abound in the Arabic text and in the Persian Commentaries, they are the result without doubt of the author himself, and it would be ridiculous to correct them." He calls them jargon and adds, "The reader should throw off all logic and good sense, then he will be successful in understanding the literary monuments which adepts of the faith call with unconscious irony "the clear exposition."

The Persian Ulema likewise criticized them. At his trial in Tabriz, when the Bab repeated "verses," they said,¹⁰ "We do not undersand such verses." Mirza Abul Fazl, the Bahai apologist, discusses the subject in his book *Farayad*.¹¹ He admits the criticisms and says that the Bab silenced his opponents by showing similar examples of bad grammar in the Koran. In truth the Bab seems to have been fully aware of the weakness of his grammar for the Persian Bayan¹² says that by "Harut and Marut," the imprisoned angels, are meant two habits,—*accidence* and *Syntax*, from which, in the Bayanic Dispensation, all restrictions have been removed. The Bayan¹³ prohibits the criticizing of its grammar and also the study of grammar except in so far as it is necessary in order to understand

⁸ *Journal, Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, pp. 907, 900.

⁹ Nicolas' *Beyan*, Vol. II., Preface, and *Life of Bab*, p. 56.

¹⁰ *New History*, p. 287.

¹¹ *Bahai Proofs*, p. 262-263. He adds that objection was afterwards made to Baha Ullah that "his words contain no grammatical errors, so they do not resemble Divine Words."

¹² *New History*, p. 22.

¹³ *Bayan*. Unity II. chap. 1. IV, 10.

the Bayan. In accordance with this, Browne says that the Bab and his earlier followers entertained a profound contempt for grammar. Mr. Nicolas¹⁴ on the other hand, maintains that the errors of the Bab's writings are attributable to imbecile copyists, who, frozen with fear of persecution and in secret, copied the manuscripts. He says; "As to the grammar, can we really believe that the author of an infinity of volumes, written in Arabic, did not know that language? Did the Bab voluntarily fill them with mistakes? The Koran contains errors which they have attempted to justify, in entire grammars written to prove that rules ought to be taken from revealed books." He quotes testimony to show the admirable language of the Bab's writings from one who had seen faultless manuscripts and others that were faulty and declared that the original documents were inerrant and are corrupted by the crass ignorance and stupidity of the copyists.¹⁵ He pleads that critics should not crush the Bab with disdain on account of faults which he has not committed, seeing it is quite impossible to conceive of the Bab having such a profound influence on learned men of Persia so that they lost their heads and were ready to prostrate themselves before him as the Manifested Imam Mahdi, if his "verses" were so incoherent and faulty! Anyhow it is well that the translator tries faithfully to understand and interpret the text, and does not do as others who, he says, "allow themselves to twist the text with scandalous fantasy, and act towards the book as towards a conquered city."

IV. THE CONTENTS IN GENERAL

The Bab's writings he divides into five classes. (1) The Verses, written in the poetic style of the Koran. (2) Supplications and Prayers. (3) Commentaries and homilies. (4) Scientific Treatises. (5) Books in the Persian

¹⁴ *Bayan Persan*. Vol. II, Preface, and *Life of Bab*, pp. 57-60.

¹⁵ It is interesting to read of a modern instance of appeal from a text as found to an original inerrant text.

language.¹⁶ In general character they are metaphysical, allegorical, almost whimsical. To one acquainted only with strict Mohammedanism, they seem to be a farrago of heterodox imaginations. But in reality the beliefs are found in the Shiah sects of past ages and many of them among the Sufis, Sheikhis, Ali Allahis and others of the present time. Professor Browne finds the greatest resemblance to the Ismielis, Hurufis and Ghulats. Of the doctrines,¹⁷ "there was hardly one of which he could claim to be the author," and "fascinating as they were to the Persian mind, they were utterly unfitted for the bulk of mankind." They set forth a "new religion designed to replace and supersede all existing creeds—visions of a New Creation, of a Reign of God's Saints on Earth, and of a Universal Theocracy conformed in every detail to a mystical Theosophy, wherein are blended, under the guise of ultra-Shiite nationalism, theories of numbers more fantastic than those of Pythagoras or Plotinus, with theories of the Divine Names and Attributes more intangible than those of the Cabbala or of Spinoza."

To arrive at an understanding of the doctrines is no small task for "percepts have but a small proportion to dogma and dogma a still smaller proportion to doxologies and mystical rhapsodies of almost inconceivable incomprehensibility." "Great conceptions, noble ideals, subtle metaphysical conceptions exist, but they are lost in trackless mazes of rhapsody and mysticism, weighed down by trivial injunctions and impractical ordinances." Count Gobineau says, "The Bayan is enigmatical and circuitous, and needs a commentary." Mr. Nicolas acknowledges its obscurity but says,¹⁸ "It needs a key as do the books of philosophy of the Sufis. The majority of Persian readers would not understand it. It is written in a special language of the savants, under a profound sense of the intimate world of appearances. These savants do not show any

¹⁶ *Unity*, VI, 1., III, 17, *Traveller's Narrative*, pp. 343-345.

¹⁷ *New History*, xii, xiii, xxvi.

¹⁸ *Life of Bab*, p. 3.

desire to make known their knowledge of God to the people and the reader of their works needs a long apprenticeship. They turn the words to a different sense." Both the bad grammar and unintelligibility may be largely accounted for by what Abul Fazl, with pride, refers to when he says:¹⁹ "Although the Bab had not studied the Arabic language yet the verses flowed from him without pause or reflection." It is their boast²⁰ that the Bab was not educated in the schools and wrote without meditation or correction as many as a thousand verses in three hours.

The Bayan is the last form of the doctrine of the Bab. His adherents claim²¹ that had he lived longer he would have developed it more fully. Mr. Nicolas doubts this, but it is quite possible that he would have announced himself as "He whom God should manifest." We can not dogmatize on this point, but there had previously been a development, if not in the Bab's conceptions, at least in his promulgations of doctrine. His first books are but little removed from Shiah doctrine. Thus in the *Commentary on the Surah-i-Yusuf* and the *Ziarat-Nama* he does not break with Islam nor declare the Koran abrogated. Ramazan is still the fast. He is simply the Bab—the door of communication with the Imams. So, Mr. Nicolas says, "His first book *Risala-i-Fiqqiya* is essentially Mussulman. The Bab hid his ideas for a time and restrained his disciples from publishing them." To this purpose of concealment, Mr. Nicolas attributes part of the obscurity of his style, in that he envelops his thought in metaphors and in folds of rhetoric yet not so but that those not blind could see it. He had to act like a teacher of infants—using sugar-coated pills—giving out truth step by step, for people were more fanatical than the Jews of Christ's time.

¹⁹ *Bahai Proofs*, pp. 29-30, 67-68.

²⁰ *New History*, p. 112.

²¹ See Writer's "Claims of Bahaism" in *The East and the West*, July, 1914.

V. THE CLAIM OF THE BAYAN TO AUTHORITY

What is the witness of the Bayan to itself. It claims divine origin and inspiration. God says,²² "This is my Word by the tongue of the Person of the seven letters, the Bab of God." The proof of this is the "Verses" (*ayat*, signs), which like the Koran, can only be produced by divine power, and are the essential, appropriate and permanent evidence of a prophet's mission. While in popular esteem the eloquence and poetic diction of these verses is higher, yet wisdom which shows adaptation to men's minds and the needs of the age is said to be the criterion in the new Dispensation. One Bayan was revealed in Arabic to be a more cogent proof to Moslems. The Bayan is incomparable, inimitable like the sun, of such excellence that "all creatures working together could not produce the like of it." It proceeds from the same Tree of Truth as the Koran and, though identical in substance of teaching, surpasses it as the Koran excels the Gospels; and henceforth it demands obedience in place of the Koran, and will continue to be the standard till the next Manifestation. Without divine aid, it is incomprehensible. It must be transcribed in the best calligraphy. It should be read morning and evening to the amount of seven hundred verses, but cannot be committed to memory. He who believes it is in Paradise. The proof in the Bayan is thus stated (II, 1): "One who recites verses without thought or hesitation, who in the course of five hours writes a thousand verses without pause of pen, who produces commentaries and learned treatises of so high a degree of wisdom that the Ulema (Doctors) could not comprehend . . . there is no doubt that all this is from God."

VI. EXTERNAL STRUCTURE

The external structure of the Bayan is peculiar. It is arranged according to the symbolism of numbers to which I shall again revert. The Bayan was designed to comprise

²² *Bayan*, II, 1. Index, s.v., "Revelation," "Verses."

nineteen Books (*Ṭahids* or Unities) of nineteen chapters (*Babs* or Portes). In its present form it extends to the tenth chapter of the ninth Book. Mirza Jani,²³ the Hasm Behashu²⁴ and Subh-i-Azal²⁵ all imply that eleven Books had been completed by the Bab and eight were to be written by his successor, Subh-i-Azal. If so, this portion has been lost. Some of the Books (Unities) expected from Subh-i-Azal were completed.²⁶

VII DOCTRINE OF THE BAYAN CONCERNING GOD AND HIS MANIFESTATIONS

God is incomprehensible, inscrutable, inaccessible. "The way is closed and seeking is forbidden." None can approach God or know his Essence. "There hath been and is no way to the Eternal Essence." "None but Himself knoweth Himself." Yet God says; "I was a hid Treasure; I desired to be known, therefore I created." First of all and eternally He created the Primal Will. This Primal Will is the *Nakta* or Point, the Mirror of God. By it and through it were created all things. It is the cause of all worlds. First of all were created (or emanated) as from its very being eighteen spirits or letters, which with the Primal Will form the "First Unity" or "The Letters of the Living." These are eternal, for "there never was a time when God did not have slaves to adore Him." The world is eternal, life is eternal. Eternally God gave life.

The Primal Will has been manifested in all the Great Prophets, the Lords of Dispensations. Through them alone God is known. The first Manifestation in this Cycle was Adam, 12210 years before the Bab. There have been cycles before Adam and there will continue to be world without end. No Revelation is final. All the Manifestations as Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed and the Bab are identical. They are like the same sun, rising

²³ *Ṭaḥ History*, p. 381.

²⁴ *Ṭaḥ History*, p. 353.

²⁵ *Ṭaḥ History*, p. xix and xxiii.

²⁶ *Ṭaḥ*, p. xiv.

on different days and from different dawning points. But each succeeding one was superior and more excellent than his predecessor, comparable to a child in his successive stages of growth, so that if Adam represents a boy of one year the Bab would be as one of 12 years. The present Manifestation includes all the preceding ones, and whosoever believes in him, believes in all the preceding ones, and potentially in all the succeeding ones. If a believer in a previous Manifestation refuses to follow the present one, his faith is null and void. Knowledge of the Manifestation is knowledge of God; refuge with the Manifestation is refuge with God. The only way is through the Prophet of the Age and belief in God without belief in him is of no avail. All actions performed for him, and only those, are done for God. The time of the coming of a new Manifestation is known only to God.

As manifested in the Bab; the Primal Will, the Nukta or Point, has two stations: one of divinity and one of servitude or humanity. In the former station the Bab says: "In truth I am God and there is no other God than me, the Master of the Universe." "As for me, I am that Point of God, whence all that exists has found existence." He is the Point of Truth, the Tree of Truth, the Name which guides all men to the Kingdom of all Power. By earlier and later Persians this Primal Will is called the Word. Browne and Nicolas both use the term in this connection, though I have not found it so used in the Bayan. As the Point all things emanate from the Bab and return to him and to none other. He has a position before all, can do as he pleases, and is the power through whom men act. He produces the Revelation in the Bayan which points to God and has its source in Him. He is identical with Jesus, with Mohammed, with Imam Husain; yet as the Point of the Bayan he is superior to all others in such a degree that if the previous revelations be represented by two letters of the alphabet, the Bayan is equal to the remaining twenty-five.

With the Manifestation there is a "Return" of the chief believers of the previous manifestation. The first Book of the Bayan, is devoted to this doctrine. Jesus, inferior to Mohammed, foretold him and returned in Mohammed. Those who believed in him returned in the following ages to believe in Mohammed and in the Bab and will return to believe in succeeding Manifestations. Specifically, "Mohammed has returned to the world with every one who believed in him truly or otherwise." In the first group of Letters of the Living are Mullah Husain Bushrawayi,²⁷ the first believer who was the "return" of Mohammed, and Kûrat-ul-Ayn who was Fatima. Others of them were the twelve Imams and the four Babs of the Minor Occultation, called also the four Lords, four Lights or the supporters of Creation, Provision, Life and Death. Attached to the first nineteen, are nineteen other groups of spirits or disciples returned to complete the perfection of all things. This doctrine is explained to mean not metempsychosis, but rather the appearance of persons similar in character, spirit and attainments to those of the previous dispensation as John the Baptist is said to be Elijah, that is, come in his spirit and power. Yet no one can feel in reading the history of early Babism that this interpretation suffices. Rather is it explained in the words of Professor Browne:²⁸ "These ultra Shiah sects do but reassert like the late Ismielis, Batinis, Carmathians, Assassins and Hurufis, the same essential doctrines of anthropomorphism. Incarnation, Reincarnation or Return and Metempsychosis, which doctrines appear to be endemic in Persia and always ready to become epidemic under a suitable stimulus. In our own day they appeared again in the Babi movement, of which especially in its earlier forms they constituted the essential kernel."

It should be noticed that this Babi doctrine reduces the Imams to the rank of the apostles of Jesus, or of the Bab's

²⁷ *New History*, p. 334.

²⁸ *A Literary History of Persia*, Vol. I, p. 311.

own preachers. This is not Shiah belief. The Bab in his first books as the Ziarat-Nama taught,²⁹—as the Shiah, that the Imams are effulgences of the Divine Glory, Manifestations of God's attributes and Intercessors and he himself approached their shrine with fear and contrition. But he lowered their rank. So Mr. Nicolas says,³⁰ "The Bab has an opinion of the Imams entirely different from that of the Shiah. He considers them high personages but not as having access, behind the bars, to the divine secrets. They are commentators on the Koran and as such they can make mistakes." The exaltation of the office of the Great Prophets and of the Bab's own dignity and personality appears in his later claims. The Surat-ul-Tauhid says, "I bear witness that if any one believes in the Imams" so as to interfere with "his pure and simple adoration of God, or if any one thinks that their rank is comparable with that of the great prophets, that one has error." Mr. Nicolas rightly judges that this idea so hostile to the Imams and the belief of the Shiah, if declared, would have caused the immediate death of the Bab, before he had had opportunity of publishing his doctrine, and that even his best disciples would have turned away from such teaching as blasphemies.³¹

A striking characteristic of the Bayan is the emphasis put upon the coming of "Him whom God shall manifest." He is to be expected. He will certainly appear before the number of Mustagas is completed which equals 2,001 years (or possibly 1,511, Browne). The day of his advent is known only to God. In view of it none must injure another lest they injure the Manifestation unknowingly nor even beat a child; in every assembly a vacant chair is to be left for him. He will be the fulfilment of the verse, "There is none like unto him." He is the Most Great Name, eternally pure, independent of all and dependent only on

²⁹ *Journal Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, p. 900.

³⁰ *Bayan Persian*, Vol. I, Preface.

³¹ The Bahais have restored the Shiah idea of the Imamate and conferred the dignity and office upon Abbas Abdul Baha.

God. His commands are equivalent to God's commands and none is to ask him, "Why?" He has a right to all things and the best of everything should be presented to him. It is impossible that any one should claim falsely to be he. No one should reject him as they have the Bab. He will be self-evidencing. Those who do not accept him cease to be believers. He will be the "speaking book"; one verse revealed by him will be better than a thousand Bayans; to understand one verse of his is better than to know the whole Bayan.

VIII. ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATIONS AND SYMBOLS

The Bab, following the Ismielis, interprets allegorically many of the fundamental teachings of Islam. These are explained in the second Unity (Book) of the Bayan. The General Resurrection is the rising or appearance of a New Manifestation and lasts till his departure. The resurrection of the dead is man's receiving spiritual life by faith on him. Man has two bodies, the "essential or material" and the "inner or astral." The former returns to dust at once and forever. The "astral" body departs with the spirit at death. The "Questioning in the Tomb," taught by Islam, means the summons by the angels or messengers of the next Manifestation to those in the tomb of ignorance to accept him and believe, and the return of the angels to God is the report of the missionaries to the Bab. The "Bridge of Sirat" is the severe testing at the call to faith. The one who accepts passes over the bridge into "Paradise" which is the condition of belief and assurance and the perfection it brings. Professor Browne affirms³² that Mirza Jani teaches that "a material heaven and hell and the like are mere figments of the imagination." Yet in the Bayan a future heaven and hell are taught. Mr. Nicolas shows³³ that the Bab was not much concerned with eschatology but cites various passages regarding heaven. The strongest

³²*New History*, p. 335.

³³*Beyan*, Vol. I, pp. xxvi-ix.

settles definitely that the Bab taught the existence of a future paradise.³⁴ "As to what passes after death, no person but God knows what it is. God has created in his Paradise all that men desire of his kindness and they find the things which eye has never seen and ear has never heard, nor has been conceived in the heart of any one.³⁵ If the seas of heaven were ink, if all the things were pens, and every one a writer, no one could make known the things of Paradise after death. He who enters the Paradise of the Manifestation of God will enter the other Paradise after death." Hell is ignorance of or rejection of the Manifestations; its fire is unbelief. Yet devils take the souls of the unbelievers to the Treasury of Fire, though the worst fire is grieving or denying the Beloved. Hades is the interval between two Manifestations. The Last Judgment for the people of the Bayan will be the coming of Him whom God shall Manifest. The "Day of God," "Day of Judgment," "Day of Resurrection," is the Day of the Manifestation and is externally like any other day.

Much is made of the symbolic significance of letters and numbers. The *abjad* counting in Persian and Arabic gives a numerical value to various letters of the alphabet. A word of the same numerical value is often substituted for the name of an adherent either by concealment or with spiritual significance. Thus³⁶ a name of God is put, as *vahid* for *Yahyá*, the name of *Subh-i-Azal*, *dayyan* for *Assad* is 'Mirza Assad Ullah etc., and they are entitled the *Ismullah*, the Names of God. The mystical meaning of letters was a science to be diligently studied; 70,000 angels watched over each letter. For example, in the Moslem formula, *Bism Ullah* etc., "In the Name of God, the compassionate,

³⁴ *Beyan*, II, 16, p. 125.

³⁵ This indicates an acquaintance with the New Testament. This appears from other quotations as, "The first shall be last and the last first"; Hour coming "as a thief"; "cup of water to a believer"; Believers are "to do as they are done by"; Selling in temple, etc., *Index*, LXVIII.

³⁶ *Bahai Proofs*, p. 43.

the merciful," the first letter "b" represented the Bab. It is formed with a dot under it which represents the Point or Nukta. Each of the others letters, 18 in number, was assigned to a disciple and they were called the Letters of the Living (hayy, living, equals 18)³⁷ So Mullah Husain Bushrawayi was "sin" or "s". He and his 18 were the "First Unity."³⁸ Each "Letter" presided over a month and over a day of each month. Among them was at least one woman, Kurrat-ul-Ayn, who was in Fatima's stead or that of Mary Magdalene.³⁹

Again the Kalima-i-Shahadat, "There is no God save God," was divided into two parts. The first had five "letters of negation," "no God," and the second part seven "letters of affirmation," "save God." From the first are derived the "Infernal Letters"; from the second the "Supreme Letters." Only these and the "First Unity" are allowed to make commentary on the Koran. In the Bayan the Bab is often spoken of as "He of the seven letters"⁴⁰ because of the affirmation and because his name, Ali Mohammed has seven letters. Moslems are designated "Letters of the Koran" and Christians usually "letters of the Gospel." Cities and provinces are referred to by their initial letter, as land of Fa = Fars. Nineteen is the sacred number. As early as the twelfth century this number was used as symbolic by Sheikh⁴¹ Mukkuyya Din, a Sufi leader. Possibly it arose from 19 years being a complete cycle of the moon. The letters in Vahid (Unity) count 19 (v = 6, a = 1, h = 8, d = 4). So does vujud, absolute existence, 19 x 19 or 361 is the number of all things (Kuli Shey). The year was divided into 19 months of 19 days each, the Bayan was to be 19 books of 19 chapters each. Every one should write monthly 19 tables of 19 names of God. The Bab's "Book of Names" is also divided into "Unities" con-

³⁷ The chief disciples of Hakim, the Druse Incarnation, were called "Letters of the Truth."

³⁸ *Traveller's Narrative*, p. 399.

³⁹ Abdul Baha greatly praises Mary Magdalene.

⁴⁰ *Traveller's Narrative*, p. 425.

⁴¹ *New History*, p. xiii.

taining 19 chapters each. The Koran was (by chance!) 6 x 19 Surahs, and had 19 Angels. Nineteen was to be the basis of fines and measurements. The miscal was to be divided into 19 parts, one-nineteenth or nineteen per cent of the income was to be donated to the Letters or their descendants. Sets of 19 were to take the place of dozens. Nineteen rings inscribed with the names of God with 19 papers were to be left to heirs. Every one must do 19 days service to the Point. There were to be 19 shrines, 19 doors of Paradise, 19 gates of Fire, 19 gates of light, 19 kinds of the new writing, the Khatti Badi. The dowry was 5 x 19 or 95 miscals, the rosary 95 beads, the King's Palace with 95 doors. Every one who acquired 6,005 miscals must give 95 to the Point. To the Manifestation also must be given 19 precious stones (3 diamonds, 4 topaz, 6 emeralds, 6 rubies). The teachings of the Bab were to be 19 volumes (3 Verses, 4 Prayers, 6 Commentaries, 6 Philosophy). There were 19 letters in the new Bab formula, Bism Ullah il Amna ul Akdas, as there had been in the old one. Such is wisdom! Such is divine truth!⁴²

IX. RITES AND CEREMONIES

The Bab followed the rites of Islam with some changes. Prayer retains its important place, but public congregational prayer is abolished. Believers will assemble for worship, but there must be no leader, Imam or Peeshnamaz.⁴³ Only at funerals there may be public prayers, but even then no leader. The greater the assembly at a funeral, the more pleasing to God. In the mosque no one should mount a pulpit. Chairs should be used there as well as in schools and homes, even for children. Mirrors are a suitable decoration for mosques because they suggest to believers that they should reflect God. Special mosques are to be erected in honor of the Bab and the Letters of

⁴² By a curious coincidence, Mormonism also invented a new alphabet called the "Deseret Alphabet," and divided Salt Lake City into nineteen Bishoprics; Brigham Young's fortune was willed to nineteen classes of his wives and children. Ann Eliza who sued for divorce, was his nineteenth wife."

⁴³ *Bayan*, Vol. IV, p. 165.

the Living. These are to be Houses of Refuge. Refugees are not to be impeded, and are recommended to be pardoned. The income of these shrines is to be expended exclusively for them. Land for God's house may be taken by right of eminent domain. Merchandising must not be carried on in its precincts. Old shrines are abolished. If one prays in the house of an unbeliever he must pay one misal in penance. Postures, like those of the Moslems, are continued. Ceremonial impurities do not invalidate prayer, for example, wearing clothing made of the hair of animals or touching animal excretions. Yet the worshipper must be clothed in an *Aba* (cloak); a *jubba* (coat) is not sufficient. A special form of call to prayer (*Azan*) is prescribed for each day, as is the manner of paying the Muezzin. Special forms of invocation are prescribed as for the beginning of any work, or on reading the Bayan. At the birth of a child the word Mustagas is to be used. Instead of reading the Bayan, there may be substituted the zikr, saying, "Allah izhar," or the seven names of God derived from Vahid, repeated 100 times. Each day of the month has its ejaculation which must be repeated 95 times as the first day, "Allah Abba," the second day, "Allah Azim," etc. Four prayers are specified for the lights of the throne, and one for sunrise on Friday. For example, a salutation to the sun is; "The brightness of thine aspect is only from God, O rising sun! and bears witness unto that which God hath witnessed concerning Himself, that there is no God but Him, the precious, the beloved!" On the evening of Friday,⁴⁴ mention of the Name of God should be made 202 times. Prayers may be in Persian as well as Arabic. They should not be long and wearisome. The Fast requires abstinence from eating, drinking and indulgence from sunrise to sunset. Smoking is at all times under the ban. Warning is specially given against anger, complaint against God and the Bab or doing anything which is not of God. The fast is to be a remembrance

⁴⁴ By Meeting Day may be meant the first day of each month, every 19 days, as the week is abolished by Babism.

of God. It will last a month of 19 days; is fixed in the first of March and is enjoined on all from the age of 11 to 42 except the sick, travelers and some others.

Pilgrimage is continued. One of the first Books of the Bab contained directions for visiting the shrines of the Imams at Kerbela,⁴⁵ but later old shrines were abolished. The new substitutes were the house of the Bab at Shiraz, the Tomb of the Martyrs at Sheikh Tabarsi and the Mosques of the "Letters." Only the well-to-do should go on pilgrimage, and each one on arrival should give four miscalis of gold to the shrine.

Begging is prohibited. Giving is enjoined for the cause of God, to the Bab, the "Letters" and their descendants. Little is said about the poor, but some fines are assigned to them. Circumcision is not enjoined, as it was not in the Koran. The custom is kept up. The only feast, as far as I have learned, is the old Persian Noruz, the vernal equinox. It is called the day of the Nukta or Point, the Day of God. On it there are to be rejoicings with playing of music. The solar year is established instead of the Moslem lunar year. Afterwards, the anniversary of the declaration of the Bab, May 23, 1844, was made a feast. The care of the body of the dead is minutely prescribed.⁴⁶ It is to be treated with great respect. It is to be washed three times with rosewater and camphor, saying certain words. While washing the head say, "Ya fard," the breast, say, "Ya Hayy" and so while washing the right side, left side, right foot, etc. It is to be shrouded in five garments of different stuff, first silk, last cotton. A cornelian ring is to be placed on a finger of the right hand, inscribed with a verse in recognition of God. The words inscribed are not the same for a man and a woman. Coffins are to be of solid substances as glass or stone. Transporting bodies of the dead for burial at the shrines is forbidden. Nevertheless the Bab's body was twice transported and over hundreds of miles.

⁴⁵ Ziyarat-nama, see *Journal Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, p. 900.

⁴⁶ *Beyan*, Vol. iv., pp. 100-106. (viii., ii.)

Other ceremonial laws descend to trivial details. Legal purifications are not required, yet it is directed that one wash completely every four days, go to the bath and take off the hairs of the body with depilatories every eight or fourteen days. Men are permitted to shave the beard or the head. They must write on their breasts with henna *ar-rahman*, and the women *allahoume* or *bism*. Henna should be used to stain or dye the body and hair. Bathing should be by pouring, not by plunging in a tank. A mirror may be used night and morning. Perfumes, especially rose-water and attar, are strongly recommended, whether in the toilet, or for a corpse, among one's books or in the house of God. Garments of pure white are to be preferred. After white which corresponds to the highest spiritual principle, colors in the descending scale of purity are yellow, green and red.⁴⁷ Silk, ivory, gold ornaments and utensils are permitted. Doors are ordered to be made high,⁴⁸ and the King is told how many doors to have in his palace and surely to make one mirror-room. The rate of silver to gold is fixed at 1:10; a new calendar is introduced with new names for days and months and a new script; inheritance and divorce laws are formulated. A new style of salutation is enjoined; men are to say, "Allah Akbar," and to reply "Allah Azam," women, "Allah Abha" and to reply "Allah Ajmal." Traveling is only permitted for trade; the study of the sciences is discouraged as unprofitable, and especially of foreign and dead languages and grammar. The study of philosophy, jurisprudence and logic are prohibited, and their books are to be destroyed, as well as all books of the Moslems except the Koran. On the other hand sciences bearing on the construction of talismans are recommended as they will enable the wearer to recognize the Manifestation. The six names of God are to be used as talismans.

⁴⁷ *Index*, LXII, *Beyan Persan*, Vol. ii, p. 41, note.

⁴⁸ This is a good point as many a traveler with a bruised pate can testify.

X. MORAL LAW

Here we come to a striking feature of the Bayan,—not only the absence of a moral code but even of moral principles, and precepts. With all the multiplicity of ceremonial rules there is an amazing lack of enforcement of right conduct. I will mention all I have found. Children should honor their parents. They should not be maltreated, made to stand till weary at school or beaten, and should be encouraged to play. Animals should not be cruelly treated. Gentleness in general is enjoined, and oppression and the injuring or enchaining of another condemned. The Gospel command to love one another and the Golden Rule are stated. Carrying arms, except in the Jihad, is prohibited, as are tobacco, wine,⁴⁹ asafoetida, opium and all drugs except in the industries. Merchants must not read each others correspondence and must pay their debts. This is the sum total of moral instruction. I do not find that theft, adultery, murder, lying, profane swearing, false-oaths, sin and guilt are mentioned in the forty pages of Browne's *Index*. A moral system is conspicuous by its absence.

Finally regarding the family, the Bayan announces no great principles. Marriage is made obligatory on all. The wife must be content with her husband and love her children. The parents should show love for each other before the children. All should have children to continue the worshippers of God. If the first wife is childless, the husband can take another. If the man is powerless, the wife must leave him and marry another. A believer should marry only a believer. One who becomes a believer should separate from the unbelieving partner, or if one perverts, the other should separate. Divorce is limited as to its rapidity, but not as to its cause. If they quarrel or are incompatible, they may separate. They should wait 19 Babi months (one year) before remarry-

⁴⁹ "The prohibition of wine appears to be less absolute than in Islam, *Journal Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, p. 501.

ing, that possibly their desire for each other may return. Within the year they may arrange a reconciliation and 19 days afterwards be reunited. If the year passes the divorce is completed and both may remarry. But a limit is put. The man may not divorce his wife and remarry more than 19 times! The dowry, which is paid as alimony in case of divorce, is 19 miscals of gold (\$300) in cities and 19 miscals of silver in villages. Woman's privileges are but slightly enlarged, notwithstanding the Bab maintained Kurrat-ul Ayn when she broke through the conventionalities of Islam.⁵⁰ There is no foundation for the statement of Bahais that the Bab taught the equality of the sexes. Women may not go on pilgrimage, but may go to the mosque at night. In the mosques a special place must be set aside for the women's chairs. Their manner of worship is prescribed. They are excused from the offering of gold more than once. A woman's face may be looked upon by the members of the family in which she grows up. She may even talk with a man outside of her household, if necessary, but "if they limit themselves to 28 words, it is better for the woman and the man."

Such is the system of religion which lies at the foundation of Bahaism—which our faddists in America are propagating as a new universal religion. For, with little change, Babism is Bahaism, transferred without due credit and promulgated by Baha Ullah in the Kitab ul Akdas. Do we not marvel that American Bahais can see in the Bab's books and system the "marvellous wisdom of the true prophet, with intuitive power, making light to gleam in a dark world," "with remarkable knowledge of science, unequaled utterances, marvellous literary power as the messenger of God"?⁵¹

SAMUEL G. WILSON.

Tabriz, Persia.

⁵⁰ Professor Browne says: "The sermon preached at Badasht by Janab-i-Kuddus lends some color to the accusation that the Babis advocated communism and community of wives."

⁵¹ See Writer's *Bahaism and its Claims*, Revell & Co., New York.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

Ethics and Modern Thought: A Theory of Their Relations. The Deem Lectures, delivered in 1913 at New York University. By RUDOLPH EUCKEN, Professor of Philosophy, University of Jena. Translated from the German Manuscript by Margaret von Seydewitz. G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press. 1913. Pp. 127. \$1.00 net.

These lectures on ethics were delivered before the War and before our philosophical teachers had left the study and the lecture-hall to enter the arena of international politics. While intended for the cultivated lay public rather than for the professional scholar, the lectures will be found to contain the essentials of Eucken's philosophical message. We find in them, eloquently expressed, an appreciation of the regenerating power of Christianity in past ages; a close approximation to the Christian doctrines of grace in the recognition of man's inability to reach the moral ideal, and of his need of aid from a source higher than himself; and a clear insight into the moral needs and discords of the age in which we live, with an admission of the inadequacy of modern culture to meet these needs.

Eucken believes that the ethical systems now in vogue fail to meet the present situation. Religious Morality is too mild and subjective and lacks sufficient breadth to transform the whole of life. The Morality of Reason addresses itself to the select few and has too little influence upon the man of to-day. The Morality of Work has inner limitations; men become only parts of a structure and nothing at all in themselves, and civilization develops great power without providing for its moral guidance. Social Morality offers strong motives to the individual, but is too optimistic in its conception of man, too superficial to offer a foundation for morality which it presupposes rather than creates. In his search for an ethical principle Eucken has recourse to his familiar conception of the Spiritual Life, a comprehensive whole embracing all the departments of man's activity such as science and art, and inclusive of the whole of human society. "The centre of life and its ruling motive lie in man's relation to a superior spiritual life, which is at the root of his own being and yet has to be acquired by his own action and effort." The duty of man is at once to discover and to create a new spiritual world. Just how the "Spiritual Life" is related to the God of religion is not indicated with entire clearness either here or in the author's larger works.

It will be seen that Eucken's proposed system of ethics has close

affinities with religious morality and the morality of reason, both of which it was designed to supplement. While the Spiritual Life is supposed to be broader than religion, including the domains of art and science and industry, it is recognized that "it is a loss for morality that religion no longer maintains its former ruling position"; and the historical instances of the triumphs of morality are taken from the history of the Christian Church: "It was moral earnestness and moral strength that were above all instrumental in causing early Christianity to overcome the pagan world. . . . It was moral energy that gave the Reformation its power to advance and conquer, while the soft and beautiful Renaissance perished because it lacked morality." Eucken belongs, again, with the Kantians in ethics rather than with the utilitarians. Utilitarianism, he believes, does not change its character by becoming social utilitarianism, and all inner values are destroyed where the sole aim of life is to provide the *means* of life.

Eucken's lectures were, not inappropriately, first delivered from a church pulpit, and in tone and substance they are sermons upon the text, "Fight the good fight of faith."

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

The Soul of America. By STANTON COIT. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1914.

It would be difficult to find four hundred pages more full of both truth and error, of vision and utter blindness. The book is more suggestive than satisfying. The purpose of the writer is nowhere better stated than in the concluding sentence . . . "We must attack supernaturalistic theories of the spiritual life, for the hastening of the Kingdom of Righteousness, without denying the untold benefit which the world has derived from the spiritistic religions of the past." The method of the author is implied in the latter part of the quotation; for not only would he not deny the "benefit," but would borrow the paraphernalia and about all else that is incident to the reality. The book is really an attempt to read a superimposed social theory into the history and genius of America. It is a fine instance of the impossibility of identifying the purely academic with the throbbing actual. The intellectual conceit of the author in the earlier chapters is unbounded.

The book can best be reviewed from the back cover forward as indeed the last sections were written first and the earlier parts were afterthoughts. Much that Doctor Coit has to say of America falls far short of an adequate interpretation. That our author is lonely even among his own humanistic brethren is indicated by the following (p. 363), "I have given this elaborate analysis because, as it seems to me, ninety-nine persons out of a hundred who hold my fundamental views in regard to the principles of ethics, religion and politics incline to disbelieve in ritual altogether." This is no small matter in the conception of things in the book as it has taken quite a hundred pages to discuss 'ritual' and it is declared (p. 262) that in refusing to naturalism,

democracy, and national idealism a system of signs by which the deepest personal responsibilities of social life might be announced and established among the many" "they are unwittingly robbing humanism of indispensable organs." Despite the crystalized feeling (p. 364) that "nobody must wear a garment which shall stand to the community as a sign that he who wears it is one who repudiates supernaturalism, miracles, presumptions of an aristocratic priesthood, and the like", Doctor Coit would have the propagandists of his type of belief (or rather of disbelief) wear a garb as distinctive as that of the Salvation Army Workers with the words printed on their caps and bonnets, "Democracy in Religion" and "The Religion of Social Justice" and he would have the preacher or lecturer wear a distinctive robe. Doctor Coit does not disclose in the many pages devoted to the psychological aspect of the situation, the real explanation which is that the less a man believes the more likely he is to feel the need of being identified by something distinctive in his garb or maner, just as many a man in high position has no considerable respect for himself apart from his position because he has no consciousness of power within himself, nor does he feel the power of the ideas and ideals which ought to be the very breath of his life.

The discussion of the "Drama and the Ritual" and of the "Ritual and the Fine Arts" is interesting but far from enlightening. In the last chapter, devoted to "Democratic Forms of Public Worship" we find the philosophy of our author's position. Doctor Coit holds that the new non-conformists, that is the humanists, emphasize too strongly the mere logical appeal to reason. Doctor Coit would have the appeal made through the ritual. He is in perfect harmony with most of the reformers of the present day who incline to discard the more definitely and deliberately intellectual and to rest their case upon the emotional, the experiential, the religiously pragmatic, in fine, as in this case upon ritual rather than upon reason, much less upon revelation. The remarkable sale of the book would seem to indicate the public taste just now, else it is because the title is misleading, or because there are so many now ready to grasp at anything which even suggests a solution.

In the heated debate in the Assembly a few years ago when the book of "Common Worship" was approved, Doctor Henry Van Dyke distinguished a ritual as a *required* form of worship. The vast majority of American protestants would agree with Doctor Van Dyke and disagree with our author. Our author must, however, in the nature of the case use "ritual" as a voluntary form of worship if he is to use it at all.

Doctor Coit's revolt against the supernaturalistic is not because it is irrational but because he sees that it at least recognizes, if not emphasizes, the individualistic and, as he would and no doubt does hold, would be destructive of the socialistic. We must not forget that the book is sent out as a "constructive essay in the sociology of Religion." The

revolt against the unsocial in Religion is quite in order. If one has experienced the suppression of religious emotion, and the "expulsive power" of a vast emptiness, incident to being the only worshipper not in an official robe, in a regularly appointed service in a great Church of England cathedral, then one will readily sympathize with any reasonable attack which Doctor Coit or any one else might make on the unsocial in religious services. The too common failure is not to see that one purpose of ritual is to add to the social in religious service by enabling all to take active part. Doctor Coit does well to employ all the power to be found in ritual forms in the humanistic services. To recognize the value of ritual whether in gentile or Jewish services does not mean that one can take the position that ritual is the only thing in Christianity worth saving and that ritual is the sufficient explanation of Christianity which our author seems to assume. At all events he is very sure that the humanistic religion can not be made a "going" religion without ritual.

This book is special pleading for the two volumes, long in preparation, and published since this book. The reviewer has examined the newer volumes which constitute a Bible for the humanistic religion. It is the belief of at least some of the leaders that the "Religion of Science, Democracy, and Personal Responsibility in the Service of Humanity must become, like Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, a Religion of a book." This compilation is likened to the work of the compilers of the New Testament and to the work of the editors of the Old Testament. It is at once an authority and a manual for social worship. The second volume takes care of the musical part of social services. Doctor Coit and his associates are not pioneers but have followed Comte who renounced faith in God and immortality and deified ideal humanity and transformed his positive philosophy into a cult of humanity.

So much for the end aimed at and the chief means in the method of procedure. There are three parts in the book. Part One, "Religion and Nationality" is in nine chapters. Part Two, "Christianity to be reinterpreted in the Light of Science and American Idealism" is in fifteen chapters. Part Three, "Christianity to be Expressed in Scientific Language and Democratic Symbol" is in five chapters. Much of Parts Two and Three appeared in "National Idealism and a State Church" published seven years earlier. Part Two would have needed but little change. Part One was written as an introduction to make Parts Two and Three seem to fit American conditions, but it utterly fails. In attempting to show how to conserve American Spiritual Resources there is a section on "America the Living Church of All Americans." This is where the book leads. It would seem all but absurd for a man who has spent the major part of his adult life in Europe to attempt to interpret America, and to lead it. The book is academic in atmosphere and artificial in argument, but it has slain its thousands.

Princeton, N. J.

CHAS. M. CANTRALL.

The Rediscovered Universe or the Power of Right Thinking and Righteous Living. By DANIEL CONRAD PHILLIPS. Sherman, French and Co., Boston, 1914.

The reviewer is in perfect agreement with the opening statement of the Preface, "This book was never planned". The author was fifty years collecting the material and has written out of the bitterness of a life of resentment against the restraint of Christianity; for whatever be the direction taken, he arrives at the door of Christianity with a big stick in his hands. There is much smug complacency and unpardonable conceit. The author appears to think himself to have possessed unusual acumen and from the days of his youth to have known, all but intuitively, the errors incident to, the inherent evils of, and the fraud perpetrated in all religions and especially in Christianity. Much of his criticism might be well characterized in the language he uses in describing others—"The fulmination of inflated vanity, irrelevant and immature" (279). In the introduction the book is spoken of thus: "Its pages are fearless, full with positive assertion, regardless though human selfishness be stung and though beliefs entrenched in six thousand years of imperious dogmatism be rudely reversed" (V). The Bible is described thus, "Its history was a recital of unremitting crimes; its descriptions revolting; its ethics an offense to intellect, a shame to refinement, an outrage upon modesty." There is much respect for Jesus and for John the Baptist (p. 326) but all the message of Jesus is eliminated which does not fit with the author's scheme. Jesus is said to have taught "self-assertiveness" and the people under His teaching to have "learned to hearken back to Nature" which is news to most of us. "In this volume it is only political demagogism veneered with religion that is criticised, a religion itself a debasing idolatry reflected from ancient heathenism" (p. 316). The pulpit is the machine of worship, and worship is idolatry" (331).

The book is not philosophical enough in its phraseology to employ the word "Monism" but uses the word "Nature" to account for everything. A bit of history, philosophy, and theology or any one of the three would have prevented many a blunder if not have made the book impossible. The great achievement of life is "Get right with yourself." It is not "Behold the lillies *how* they grow" but "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you" (p. 319). Jesus prayed to the Father *within* Himself. "For aid, retire to the solitude and in its silence commune with the infinite—the Father within you" (p. 314). "Pray to your own divinity which is the Father within you. And when you pray retire to a cosy room (p. 316). This is the road to poise and power and to the "Rediscovered Universe."

Of the twenty-eight chapters those on "Evolution," "Testament Building," "The Reformation," and "Thomas Paine" received the greater effort. We are told of the parallel lines in the lives of Jesus and Paine, and a line is quoted from the fifty-third of Isaiah to describe Paine. "Back to Nature and her righteousness is our only slogan"

(p. 59). Enough has been presented to show why the Chapter on "Christ" exhausts itself in less than two pages. Jesus is presented as an imitator of Gautama. Surely this book ought not fall into the hands of the uninformed. The reviewer has failed to find in these pages "The Power of Right Thinking and Righteous living."

Princeton, N. J.

CHAS. M. CANTRALL.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

Die Beicht im Zusammenhange mit der sakralen Rechtspflege in der Antike. Ein Beitrag zur näheren Kenntnis kleinasiatisch-orientalischer Kulte der Kaiserzeit. Von FRANZ STEINLEITNER, Dr. phil. Leipzig: Kommissionsverlag der Dieterich'schen Verlagsbuchhandlung, Theodor Weicher. 1913. 8vo; pp. 135.

"The following essay," says the author, "moves in the frontier region between philosophy and theology, in the field of the history of religion."

Hermann Usener and his school have led the way to the study of the problems in the history of religion presented by that period "when young Christianity entered upon its victorious course in the slippery field of the religious syncretism and theocracy of vanishing antiquity, and introduced into the history of mankind a completely new epoch of its spiritual life." Franz Cumont in his great Mithras-works and, after him, Hugo Hepding in his studies on the Attis-worship, have shown us how to illuminate dark subjects by collecting the scattered material from every quarter and subjecting it as a whole to intelligent scrutiny. The road having been opened by such competent hands, it has been diligently walked in; investigation into "the chaos of ideas and religious usages of that period of strong religious agitation" has been pushed steadily on. We need recall but such leading names as A. Dieterich, Anrich, Reitzenstein, Wendland, and the essays published in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, in the *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuchen und Vorarbeiten*, and, in part, in the *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde des Urchristentums*. As a result we understand as never before the vital contact in which the world of antiquity, which was passing away, and the rising world of Christianity stood with one another; how "the two worlds, however inimicably they envisaged one another and bitterly struggled with one another, were nevertheless inseparably bound together"; how "the Christian spirit, liberated from Judaism, formed a new body for itself out of the members of dying antiquity, and thus the spirit of Greece and the religiousness of the Orient, stamping themselves on Christian ideas and usages, won new life for themselves and lived in Christian clothing".

When we remember, however, that the earliest Christianity gained its adherents largely from the lower classes, and afterwards established itself preëminently in the region in which the old popular

religions most flourished, it will be perceived that in the investigation of the process of the Hellenization of Christianity, the study of the popular religions can least of all be neglected. "Along with the popular religion of Greece, whose usages were concentrated in the Mysteries, the Oriental religions come into consideration, and not least among them the Phrygian worship, which was spread throughout the whole of Asia-Minor, and whose inscribed and sculptured monuments are found scattered over the whole of the Roman Empire." In these circumstances it has seemed to the author eminently worth while to attempt to gain a better knowledge of the popular religious ideas and usages of the Phrygian and Lydian cults. As a contribution to that end, he has selected a particular element in their religious usages for investigation, the institution of Confession. "Whether and how far this sacrament of the church is to be considered an inheritance from old Oriental piety and beliefs may be left meanwhile out of consideration. The fact is that this cult-institution existed in the Oriental religions which strove with Christianity for the dominion of the world, and everywhere in the Roman Empire set themselves in the longest and most lasting opposition to its victory."

The material for his investigation Dr. Steinleitner finds in a considerable body of Lydian and Phrygian inscriptions of the class commonly called Votive or Expiatory Inscriptions, coming from the second and third Christian centuries, supplemented by some inscriptions from Knidos of the first or second century before Christ, and a few literary notices. This material he gathers together from all sources, reprints, and re-edits with an adequate commentary. This constitutes the first part of his work (pp. 7-74). The second part (pp. 75-123) is an essay, founded on this collected material, on "Confession in Antiquity". This essay really constitutes a very interesting exposition of the theology of the inscriptions and gives us a valuable insight into the religious ideas which ruled the minds of the people of Asia Minor near the opening of the Christian era. The first chapter treats of "the relation of man to deity in the Lydian-Phrygian religion"; the second of "sin and punishment according to the Lydian and Phrygian Expiatory-Inscriptions"; the third of "religious administration of justice in Lydia and Karia"; the fourth of "Confession in the cults of Asia Minor"; while the fifth adds a section on "a confession in the mysteries of Samothrace and the Isis-worship".

When Dr. Steinleitner comes to sum up at the end (pp. 121 ff.), the results of his discussion he naturally lays his stress on the chief object which he had in view, namely, the establishment of the existence of a regular institution of Confession in the primitive religion of Lydia and Phrygia, "in which the sinner confessed his sin before the priest as the representative of the deity in order to propitiate the deity and thus to become free from sickness and want, the consequences of the sin." Other elements of the old religion, however, interest us more: most of all its conception of deity as both all-powerful and as intimately concerned with human life in all its manifestations. "If we sum up

briefly what has been said," remarks Dr. Steinleitner at the end of the discussion of this matter, "the religion and life of the Lydian and Phrygian people in its lower strata appears as dominated by the belief that the deity is the absolute lord and owner of His worshipper, but no ruthless tyrant, like, say Baal in the Syrophoenician religion, but certainly the *τύραννος* or *κύριος* and yet also the greatest benefactor and the righteous judge, from whose hand the believer receives blessing and calamity as a child receives its mother's caresses and its father's chastisements." Dr. Steinleitner seems to consider this conception of deity one-sided in its emphasis on the power and all pervading activity of God. It seems to us a conception which does great credit to its sharers.

One of the results of it was to develop a series of epithets for the deity which expressed its power and rulership, and among these epithets *κύριος* was prominent. "The title *κύριος*, which meets us in this inscription," says Dr. Steinleitner on one occasion, "is a divine predicate, conceived in a genuinely Oriental fashion and thoroughly intelligible in the Eastern world, that occurs in Thrace, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt, and that found also its way into the religious language of Christianity." Christianity did not derive its employment of *κύριος* as an epithet of God—or as a standing designation of Christ—from the folk-religions of the Orient: it is well to know, however, that the heathen converts to Christianity could find no difficulty in catching the high implications of the term as used by Christians.

Another result of this conception of God was the highly supernaturalistic coloring given by it to the whole view of life. "A further characteristic of the Lydian-Phrygian religiousness and of its view of the relation between God and man," writes Dr. Steinleitner, "is the belief in epiphanies of the deity in which the deity reveals its might suddenly and unexpectedly to believers, a belief, shared no doubt with the Lydians and Phrygians by other stocks of Asia Minor. The notion of the epiphany of a god or demonic being is primitive Greek, and was possessed also by other peoples. But between the idea and significance of the *ἐπιφάνεια* of the deity or of a demon in the popular belief of the Greeks and divine appearances in the belief and conception of the peoples of Asia Minor and the Orient, this difference exists—that the appearance of the deity for the pious oriental on the ground of his belief in an absolute dependence on the deity, extending to all situations in life, and of its constant care for the health of his soul, which shows itself in atonements, expiations and all kinds of asceticism, means not only a beneficent intrusion into the life of the individual or the establishment of a community, but also an *experience of religion*, in the mystical sense, in which he lives and moves." Dr. Steinleitner wishes, it is true, very illegitimately to apply this point of view at once to the conversion of Paul in a naturalistic psychological explanation of the supernatural features of the narrative. Paul was anything but a cold casuist, like his Pharasaic companions; his religiously readily excitable character, his inward faith, his vital

mysticism can at bottom find its roots only in the Anatolian inheritance of the former tent-weaver of Tarsus. We must consider also the whole mystical nature of the Apostle: he experienced other ecstatic conditions and could relate "visions and revelations of the Lord". "Out of these psychological and religious foundations, which Paul had brought with him from his Anatolian home with its old traditions of visible epiphanies of the deity, and its ever new experience of the *δυνάμεις* of gods and demons in ecstasies and visions, we may perhaps explain his experience of Christ before Damascus as an ecstatic, visionary occurrence." But even such a bizarre use of it as this does not destroy the value to the student of the New Testament of the fact here made evident that "*ἐπιφάνεια* is in this religious language the *terminus technicus* for a sudden and unexpected appearance of the deity, in order to help its worshippers in time of need and misfortune". When Paul speaks of the glorious epiphany of our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ, he was using language which had a perfectly determinate meaning for his readers.

It is perhaps natural that in inscriptions of this kind the only sins which are mentioned are breaches of the rules of the cult, by which breaches the deity is supposed to be offended, and it may not be quite justified to infer from this fact that the Lydian-Phrygians had no consciousness of distinctly ethical faults as sin. There is a tendency apparent to extend the responsibility for acts of sin beyond the individual who actually commits them to his group; and there is an instance of vicarious satisfaction for a fault—a brother undertaking the task for a sister. There is even an instance in which the sin appears to be carried back of the sinful act to the sinful wish. On the whole, however, we get little help to the understanding of New Testament language from this section. We note only that the word for sinning is *ἁμαρτάνω* (*ἁμαρτία* occurs, but not frequently). We lay no stress on the mention of an "unpardonable sin". And we do not find ourselves particularly interested in the treatment of sickness (*ἀσθένεια*) as the punishment of sin, or of the use of *κολάζειν* and *κόλασις* with apparent preference for the notion of punishment.

The most valuable contribution which these inscriptions make to the interpretation of the New Testament is due to the appearance in one of them—perhaps in two others—of the term *λύτρον*, to express the means by which immunity from the consequences of a fault was secured from the deity. For naturally the confession of the fault to the priest did not complete the making of satisfaction for it. The climax and completion of the expiatory process was formed rather by the erection of a tablet on which the sin and its punishments with the name of the sinner were notified, and that by requirement of the god. The ordinary expression for this command to make expiation in the Lydian inscriptions is *ἐπιζητεῖν*, although sometimes *ἀπατεῖν* also occurs. In the case of the particular inscription which we have mentioned, however, we read *λύτρον κατ' ἐπιτάγην Μηνὶ Τυράννῳ καὶ Διὶ*

Ὁ γμηνῶ καὶ τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ θεοῖς. The interpreters have puzzled themselves over this λύτρον. Sir William Ramsay and Perdrizet take it in the sense of εὐχή; Buresh leaves to it its sense of "ransom" but scarcely knows what then to do with the inscription. Steinleitner with too great deference to A. Deissmann, as we think, starts with the idea of the price of emancipation for a slave, and thinks that we must assume that a man was supposed to come into bondage to the deity by sin and required to be ransomed out by this expiatory offering. We see no reason why we should travel so roundabout a pathway to so simple a conclusion. The λύτρον simply indicates the expiatory tablet as the price paid to the god for immunity for the fault committed. And thus we have before us a special use of λύτρον, parallel to the special use of it which Deissmann has so fully illustrated as the emancipation-price of slaves, in which it is used as the immunity-price of faults in the service of deity. The point of interest is that we have here a usage of λύτρον very closely akin to the sense in which it and its derivatives are employed in the New Testament—in our Lord's great saying in Mk. x. 45, Mt. xx. 28, for example, and in the Apostolic doctrine of "Redemption". When we read for example in Heb. ix. 15 of a "ransoming of transgressions" we are moving in the same circle of ideas as when we read in this inscription: "Artemidorus the son of Diodotus and Amia, together with his six kinsmen, knowing and unknowing, a ransom according to command, to Mên Tyrannus and Zeus Ogmenus and the Gods with him." This is "a ransom of sin": it is a price paid (though not of silver or gold) by means of which is obtained "the remission of sin" (Eph. i. 7, Col. i. 14).

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The History of Religions. By GEORGE FOOT MOORE, D.D., LL.D., Professor of the History of Religions in Harvard University. I. China, Japan, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, India, Persia, Greece, Rome. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. xiv. 637.

This volume is one of the latest issues of The International Theological Library, and fully sustains the standard of scholarship set by its predecessors. The work is a compendium of separate studies on the different religions in each country named on the title-page. A second volume is promised on Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. The plan of the treatise embraces the religions of civilized peoples only, and therefore the so-called primitive religions are omitted.

To write such a book as Professor Moore has given us is a large task. No one writer can have first-hand information on so many religions; he is compelled to base his statements on those of other men who are the original investigators in each individual religion. The author frankly admits this, but points out that a work of this character secures unity in the method of treatment and in the point of view better

than could be obtained by a collection of independent treatises by different authors—which would be merely a series of monographs between the same covers. This assertion of Professor Moore is doubtless correct, and there is probably no man in America who could have accomplished such a task better than he.

It would have been more satisfactory in our judgment if the author had indulged more freely in references to well-recognized authorities for many important statements. There are some such references in the volume, but it would probably have been better if they had been more numerous. There is an appendix in which the literature pertaining to each particular religion is admirably presented, but this does not altogether compensate for the lack of references in the body of the work.

Professor Moore has very wisely treated the different religions in a broad fashion in their *milieu*, or, as he expresses it himself:—"In the presentation of the several religions, the endeavor is made, as far as the sources permit, to show their relation to race and physical environment and to national life and civilization, to trace their history, and to discover the causes of progress and decline and the influences that have affected them from without." This conception of his task has led the author to produce a book not only more accurate in its broad presentations of the religions, but more lifelike and realistic.

The principle of division in the classification of the religions is geographical,—that is, according to the countries in which the religions have firmly established themselves. These countries are named on the title-page, already given. It is a convenient arrangement, and has some advantages. It affords for example, an opportunity to describe the influences in any country of the religions on each other. One disadvantage is that it occasionally breaks up the unitary treatment of a particular religion into a consideration of its manifestations in different lands, and does this occasionally even at the expense of chronological sequence. Thus the treatment of Buddhism is divided into three parts, separated from each other by a consideration of other religions. The Buddhism of China is first studied, then that of Japan, and finally that of India; although Buddhism was, of course, introduced into China some centuries after its origin in India.

The religions of China are discussed very fully under the heads of The Religion of the State, Moral and Political Philosophy (Confucianism), Taoism, The Religion of the Masses, and Buddhism. The religion of the country in general the author defines as a union of nature worship and of ancestor worship, the latter constituting the private religion of all classes. The Emperor himself (when there was one) offered public worship for the entire Empire. Professor Moore describes minutely the celebrated imperial sacrifice to Heaven, but does not draw any inference as to whether it was an indication of a primitive monotheism, although he declares that "Heaven is in the ancient Chinese religion a personal god." The author hesitates to express an opinion as to the religious views of Confucius, though he thinks his

ethical rationalism was not incompatible with a real religious faith. An interesting account is given of Neo-Confucianism, which is declared to be probably not so much materialistic as pantheistic. The treatment of Chinese Buddhism is not very extended, though probably sufficient. The writer studies the religions of Japan in two chapters, one on Shinto, the other on Buddhism. The former as the worship of the gods of nature and natural forces is generally supposed not to have any ethical aspect, but Professor Moore thinks it must be credited with some kind of ethical sanction. There is a full account of Japanese Buddhism, including its many schools or sects. The religions of Egypt are adequately treated in chapters on the Religion of the Old Kingdom, and that of the Middle Kingdom and the Empire. The history of Egypt given in connection with this is excellent. For some reason the religions of Babylonia and Assyria have not quite as much space as some would have desired. There is an admirable discussion of the religions of India in four chapters, viz., the Religion of the Veda, the Great Heresies, the Philosophical Systems, and Hinduism. In the Rig-Veda, Professor Moore declares, the gods are in the main great powers of nature, but nevertheless the following striking statement is made as to a potential monotheism: "It is, however, not the varying forms these speculations take that here concern us, but the fact that in many, and to our feeling often grotesque, forms, the poets and thinkers of this period are struggling to express mythologically, theologically, or metaphysically, after their ability, the idea that at the origin of all things, before heaven and air and earth, above the whole pantheon of nature deities, there is one ground of being—one god, some would say, and call him creator; to others it is the nameless One. The antecedents of monotheism, pantheism, monism lie crossed and tangled in these early ventures at the riddle of the universe." (p. 271). A brief account is given of the religion of the Jains, and its similarity to Buddhism is recognized. The author states at this point a fact about Jainism which is paralleled in other religions: "The primitive atheism of the sect did not satisfy the religious needs of the masses and the veneration of the founder grew in the course of time into a worship." The account of Buddhism in India is quite concise, but nevertheless most excellent. Professor Moore thinks that Nirvana could be attained in this life, and exhibits clearly Buddha's agnosticism as to life after death, as well as the existence of a personal God, and other religious tenets. The presentation of the philosophical systems of India is perhaps too meager to be of great value. The treatment of Zoroastrianism impresses us as especially good. The religions of the Greeks are considered under chapters headed; Religion in Early Greece, From the Age of Colonization to the Peloponnesian War, Poetry and Philosophy, and Later Greek Philosophy. These chapters, especially the one on Poetry and Philosophy, we have found among the most interesting in the entire work. The relation to religion of later Greek philosophy from Epicureanism to Neoplatonism is well presented. The last two chapters are devoted to the religions of the Romans,

first that of the city of Rome, and then Religion under the Empire. These religions are very fully treated, and many of the topics, *e.g.*, the Mysteries, are presented in an attractive way.

There is nothing in this work of Professor Moore bearing directly on the science or the philosophy of religion since the subject did not call for it, but the material here presented will serve, as in all similar works, as the basis for these other studies. It is of interest perhaps to note that one of Professor Moore's Harvard colleagues, Professor Toy, has published synchronously with this volume a History of Religion. The latter, of course, can be successfully written only after such a study as the one before us—as well, we may add, as after the investigation of the so-called primitive religions likewise.

Because of its conciseness of treatment this work is not easy reading. We do not know any volume on the subject in which so much information is packed into so small a space. It is as a rule, however, written in a clear style, and should be invaluable to all students of the religions that are treated.

An excellent index enables the reader to study special religious doctrines topically, or in cross-sections through the different religions; as for example pantheism, incarnation, resurrection, retribution after death, etc.

BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON.

McCormick Theological Seminary.

The Facts of Life in Relation to Faith, by P. CARNEGIE SIMPSON, D.D.,
New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1914. 8vo; pp.
x-294.

This work is a sequel to the author's well and favorably known, *The Fact of Christ*. Through the correspondence which this earlier work brought to the author, many difficulties were presented to him by perplexed minds, and the present volume is in the nature of an answer to these inquiries. Dr. Simpson considers Christian faith as standing not only amid the facts of life, but as facing those facts especially that are supposed to be antagonistic to it. An introductory chapter treats of The Creed of Experience as the Christian makes proof of it, and rightly regards this as the best test of truth and reality. The great facts of life which cause every thinking man perplexity are: The Indifferent World, (*i.e.*, indifferent to ethical and religious ideals); The Problem of Pain; The Atheistic Fact (sin); The Reality of Christ (which is taken as a fact of life); The Claim of Humanism (whether its claim to be the real and rich way of living over against the Christian life is true); The Veto of Death; The Comment of Today (the verdict of the centuries on the claims of the Christian faith). It will be seen that the writer is handling the world-old problems which have perplexed the human mind, distressed the human conscience, and been a trial to Christian faith. These problems are treated by Dr. Simpson in a very simple yet helpful manner, and the book should be

of service to every soul that finds itself facing these difficulties. We cordially commend the work to this class of readers.

BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON.

McCormick Theological Seminary.

Christian Psychology. By the REV. JAMES STALKER, D.D., author of "The Life of Christ", "The Life of St. Paul", etc. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo; pp. 281.

The third series of lectures on "The James Sprunt Foundation" is presented in this volume. The lectures were given before The Union Theological Seminary in Richmond, Va., and, in accordance with the conditions of the foundation, they are now published.

They are not a treatise on general psychology. Neither do they discuss the psychology, either of religion in general or of the Christian religion in particular. Nor yet do they deal with the difficult subject of Biblical Psychology. On the contrary, their aim is the almost unique one, to set forth the relation of psychology to Christianity, to indicate the ways in which the science of psychology can help the propagation of Christianity and especially the development of the Christian life.

This is done in a succession of lectures or chapters entitled "From Individuality to Personality"; "Body, Soul and Spirit"; "The Five Senses"; "The Memory"; "The Imagination"; "Habit"; "The Reason"; "The Heart"; "The Will"; "The Conscience." Two very valuable appendices close the book; one, on "The Temperaments"; the other, by Prof. C. A. Beckwith, D.D., of Chicago, on "Psychology and Evangelism."

These lectures are in the author's well known style which, as regards simplicity, clearness, strength and, above all, winsomeness and grace, leaves nothing to be desired. To take up the book is to read it through; and to read it through is to comprehend, to appreciate, to remember and to apply it. Few, indeed, are the writers who have Dr. Stalker's gift of style.

He does not claim to be a professional psychologist, and he never parades his learning. Yet he cannot conceal his familiarity with all that is valuable in modern as well as ancient psychology, and his expression is so perspicuous because of the vast mass of digested learning out of which he writes.

Here and there we cannot quite agree with him, as when he holds that the Bible in speaking of man as "composed of body, soul and spirit" advocates a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy; but even then, and perhaps specially then, we recognize the fruitfulness and the truth of the interpretation which he bases on the division.

When everything is excellent it is hard to discriminate. Yet we cannot but refer to the chapters on "The Heart," "The Will," and "The Conscience" as of very striking value.

As might have been anticipated, Dr. Stalker does not, like most of the psychologists of religion, try to explain all the phenomena of the Christian life as only psychological and so necessary processes. On

the contrary, he holds most decidedly, that these phenomena presuppose the supernatural facts and doctrines of the Christian religion; that human consciousness is not simply a stream of expression, but that this expression postulates a substantial soul; and that while the force of habit, especially in the old, is practically omnipotent, it may be overcome, even in the old, by the real omnipotence of divine grace: and none of his discussions are so illuminating and convincing probably as those in which he illustrates and vindicates these positions. It is particularly at these points that he makes a genuine contribution to psychology itself.

In his Preface, Dr. Stalker remarks that "it has long been his conviction that much more use than is common might be made by preachers of the materials furnished to them at college." The book that we have been reviewing is meant to be a proof of this, and it is so cogent a proof that we are constrained to ask him if he will not go on and give us other proofs of the same kind.

Princeton, N. J.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus, herausgegeben von LIC. DR. HEINRICH HOFFMANN UND PROF. LIC. LEOPOLD ZSCHARNACK.

9 Heft. Spinozas Stellung zur Religion. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage des theologisch-politischen Traktats. Nebst einem Anhang: Spinoza in England (1670-1750). Von Dr. Georg Bohrmann. Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann vormals J. Ricker. Giessen. 1914. S. 1-84. M. 2.40.

4 Quellenheft. John Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity (Vernünftigkeit des Biblischen Christentums) 1695. Uebersetzt von Prof. Dr. C. Winckler in Berlin. Mit einer Einleitung herausgegeben von Prof. Lic. Leopold Zscharnack. Idem. S. I-LXVI, 1-140. M. 5.

The series of which these two volumes form part, is intended to afford material for use in seminar work in systematic theology. The first mentioned is an exceedingly clear and interesting presentation of the religious views of Spinoza as contained in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* first published anonymously in 1670. Spinoza's attitude towards religion has always been somewhat of a puzzle. The *Ethics* presents him as a pantheist who denies revelation; his letters reveal a deep respect for the Bible and its contents. Which is the true Spinoza? Dr. Bohrman decides the question by a careful examination of the contents of the *Tractatus* with the result that Spinoza is found to occupy the usual rationalistic attitude towards the religion of revelation. In things outward the church is entirely subordinate to the state; in things inward the individual's piety must not be disturbed. The Bible (here Spinoza confines himself to the Old Testament) must be subjected to a thoroughgoing historical criticism before being accepted. The foundation of revelation is not reason but imagination. Its certitude is therefore, merely moral. It does not yield theoretical knowledge but practical. Christ is the man in whom God has revealed his plan of salvation; he is therefore more than a prophet. Miracles as a

basis of faith are an *asylum ignorantiae*. There is nothing specially new in this presentation of Spinoza's religious attitude, but it is put into clear and convenient form and if accompanied by the reading of the *Tractatus* would shed great light on much of the present day rationalizing criticism of Christianity. The appendix contains an interesting account of the English hostility to Spinoza during the 17th and 18th centuries, a hostility that did not abate until the time of Coleridge (1772-1834).

The other volume is a source book. During the Winter Semester of 1911-1912, in Berlin, the editor used "The Reasonableness of Christianity" together with Locke's "Essay", Book I and IV, as material for seminar work and found abundant material for discussion in the problems historical, philosophical, and dogmatic, there presented. The translation is of course intended for German students, but the introduction, containing an analysis of the argument of the treatise, its relation to Locke's other writings, its rationalistic tendency, Locke's religious attitude, etc., will be found profitable reading by all who are interested in the genesis of the "newer" Protestantism.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

Mind and Spirit. A Study in Psychology. By THOMAS KIRBY DAVIS, D.D. Boston, Sherman, French & Co., 1914. Pp. VI, 1-115. \$1.

This book, written by a member of the Class of 1850 now in his 89th year, explains and defends the conviction that not "mentality" which man shares with many of the animals, but "spirituality" imparted to those who hear the Gospel, believe it, and receive the Saviour, is man's most important endowment. The opening chapter is autobiographical, telling how Dr. Davis, while a student at Yale in the 40's, influenced by Dr. Channing, lost his faith in evangelical Christianity and how he won it back again. In successive chapters he then explains his views of Revelation: a restatement of the usual reasons for holding the Bible to be authoritative: the "True Psychology" that man according to the New Testament is composed of Body, Mind, and Spirit, and that most of the evil in the Church and out comes from the undue use of mind; the Second Birth and the New Life; the Holy Spirit of Promise. Like the ancient hero, Dr. Davis *ferrum cingitur ac densos fertur in hostes*. His attack is fearless but he is at his best not when he defends the faith but when he commends it.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Ideals of the Prophets. Sermons by the late S. R. DRIVER, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Together with a Bibliography of his Published Writings. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 8vo; pp. xii, 239.

"Before his death on the 26th of February, 1914, Dr. Driver left

instructions that a volume of his sermons should be published, and even chose a certain number for the purpose." His "own selection has been considerably enlarged with a view to forming a group, both representative of his ordinary teaching and connected together by a certain unity of subject and treatment." "He took a special delight in preaching about the ideals of the Old Testament prophets; accordingly most of these sermons will be found to bear on this topic. All of them were delivered in Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford, of which he was a Canon in virtue of his office as Regius Professor of Hebrew; he was never connected with any other church; so that the present volume will serve, in some degree, as a memorial of his thirty-two years' ministry there, from 1882 to 1914" (Preface, p. vii. by G. A. C[ooke]).

The twenty sermons which make up the volume are academic; being addressed to the intellect without appeal to the emotions, and with no attempt to lead men to action, though not without "application". They are expositions of great texts of the Old Testament. Too often in past times these texts have been wrested from their setting and interpreted as though their primary reference is to Christ. It is the evident purpose, and the laudable endeavor, of Dr. Driver to rescue these great passages from abuse and recover their true exegesis. And he has good success. In clear language and straightforward manner he gives his exposition; an exposition which will command respect, and in the large will be recognized as indubitably correct.

"One point in particular Dr. Driver frequently discusses in these sermons—the fulfilment of prophecy" (Preface, p. viii); and in doing so he constantly alludes to a lack of correspondence between the details of the prophecy and the fulfilment, between the prophet's expectation and the actual event. For example, in Dr. Driver's opinion the author of Is. xxxv. expected that a highway would be made through the desert for the ease and comfort of the exiles returning to Jerusalem, an avenue shaded by stately trees, with cool water gushing forth at intervals by the wayside "for the refreshment of the redeemed of the Lord as they journeyed homeward (p. 83 f.; and on passages in Is. xl-lxvi., p. 86). Such is the literal interpretation of a part of the prophecy contained in Is. xxxv. But on extending this method to other parts of the same prophecy and to kindred prophecies strange results follow. It then appears that the exiles in Babylonia are suffering from grievous bodily defects and from harsh imprisonment; they are blind, deaf, dumb, lame, and are in bonds and languish in a dark dungeon (vs. 5 f.; xlii. 7; xlix. 9; lxi. 1); but the prophet expects that they shall recover sight, hearing, speech, and the use of their limbs; the chains shall be stricken from them and the doors of the prison-house opened; and a highway shall be made in the desert, every valley being exalted and every mountain and hill made low, in order that the road may be level (xl. 3 f.). Then in the latter days the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established on the top of the mountains, and

shall be exalted above the hills (ii. 2); and shall become, as Ezekiel thought it would, a very high mountain, with the city and temple on its summit (Ezek. xl. 2 ff.); and from under the eastern threshold of the temple a stream of water shall issue, which at the distance of fifteen hundred feet is ankle-deep, at three thousand feet has become knee-deep, at forty-five hundred feet waist-deep, and at six thousand feet is unfordable (Ezek. xlvii. 1-5; *cp.* Zech. xiv. 8). But as for the neighboring country of Edom, whose inhabitants were the bitter foes of Israel, the prophet expected that its streams would be turned into pitch, and its dust into brimstone, and its ground would become burning pitch, never quenched by day or night, its smoke ascending forever (Is. xxxiv. 9-11). Such is the expectation of prophets, if the literal interpretation of chapter xxxv. of the book of Isaiah is consistently applied throughout that chapter and to other passages similar in theme. It is incredible that the prophets had such a crude conception of the glory of Zion and the shame of its foes. Nevertheless interpreters have not hesitated to place such a meaning on passages like the opening verses of the second chapter of Isaiah. And when one calls to mind the convulsion of nature, physically possible of course, which has been suggested to elevate mount Zion until it overtops all other mountains of the world, then one can indeed conceive of interpreters in this manner despoiling the glowing prophecies of their poetry and demanding a fulfilment which would make the hills in amazed delight leap about like lambs and all the trees of the forest clap their hands in glee. It would be well for expounders to remember that when Isaiah speaks of a highway from Assyria for the remnant of Jehovah's people, like as there was for Israel in the day that he came up out of the land of Egypt (Is. xi. 16), the prophet has mainly in mind for the moment how God in his providence opened a passage through the arm of the Egyptian sea at the time of his people's dire need (Ex. xiv. 21); but the history, so familiar to the prophet and his people, taught them all that, though the Lord did lead them, yet the entire way from Egypt to Canaan was beset with terrors and hardships and enemies. And when the prophet declares that there shall be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria, and adds that the Egyptians shall worship as the Assyrians; and the Egyptians shall be Jehovah's people, and the Assyrians the work of his hands, and Israel his inheritance (Is. xix. 23 ff.), the prophet is not foretelling the continuance of the roads that already connected the two countries, nor of the construction of yet another, but is merely announcing the change from present enmity and exclusion to easy communication from one nation to the other, and friendly intercourse, and admission to the privileges of Jehovah's people.

As stated in the preface, in words already cited, the fulfilment of prophecy is frequently discussed in these pages. But the volume is not a treatise on this subject, and does not profess to be. The sermons are fugitive discourses, not even collected by Dr. Driver himself, and

do not include all the great texts of the Old Testament which bring out the various aspects of the teaching of the prophets. The discussion is necessarily fragmentary. And these fragments must be gathered up, taken from their setting sometimes, and supplemented, if one would even begin to understand the prophets of Israel aright. It may be quite true, as Dr. Driver asserts, that the anticipations and expectations of the prophets have not been, and never will be, exactly realized (pp. 6, 89, *et passim*); but even so that is apart from the essential facts. It is an irrelevant matter. The outstanding fact is that although the prophecies of the glory of Zion were not fulfilled immediately, but the years passed by and all things continued as they were, though the ultimate goal of human history was not reached so soon as the crisis was passed which the nation was facing (p. 88), though the exiles did not return from Babylonia over an avenue miraculously leveled for them through the desert, and promises were not always "realized in the form in which they were expressed" (p. 147), yet the prophets themselves, their successors, and the godly Israelites generally never thought that the event disproved the prophecy, and never lost confidence in him who had uttered it. They preserved the predictions as the word of God, and nourished their souls upon them in firm faith in their trustworthiness. Evidently from the first they knew the manner of prophecy and understood that 1. The prophets "write often as poets" (p. 87), and (1) there "are cases in which it may reasonably be supposed they are using figurative language" (p. 89). It is the truths underlying the figures upon which we must concentrate our attention, if we would understand aright such prophetic passages as Is. ii. 2 f.; xix. 23; xxv. 6; lvi. 7 (p. 147 f.). A striking example, not alluded to in these sermons is the vision of the prophet Ezekiel, where the Israelites in exile are pictured as dead, buried in Babylonia or their bones lying scattered unburied on the great plain (Ezek. xxxvii). But God will cause the bones to come together, lay sinews and bring flesh upon them, cover them with skin, and put breath in the bodies and make them live and stand upon their feet (vs. 6-10); and God will open the graves and cause the dead to come forth, and will put his Spirit (or breath) in them, and they shall live and be brought into their own land (vs. 12 ff.). (2) The prophets employ types and symbols and emblems. Sometimes "Egypt or Assyria, Tyre or Philistia, are not named for their own sake, but as representative of the heathen world generally" (p. 148). The actual Zion "was the prototype of a wider and greater community of the future" (p. 146). And (3) the prophets "construct ideals" (p. 87). "Zechariah's ideal picture [of the coming king] is modelled upon the life and doings of the Israelite king: and in so far as Christ was not such a king literally as David and Solomon were, an agreement in *every* detail is more than we have a right to expect" (p. 161). In the same manner the psalmists, for example in Pss. xlv. and lxxii., set forth the glory of the coming King of Israel by ascribing to him all qualities of mind

and grandeur of court and tokens of wide dominion which made royal greatness at that period of history. The best and highest that can be conceived regarding a king will be true of him. Universal sway is expressed by naming as tributary the peoples of the geographical districts, or the remotest of them, into which the world in that age was divided. "The great ideals of the prophets . . . must be read, and interpreted, as ideals: the imaginative form in which the prophets' thoughts and aspirations [under the "influence of the Spirit"] are set forth must be recognized as such, and not regarded as necessarily, in all its details, a prediction of the future" (p. 91). 2. The pictures of the future are frequently drawn upon the canvas without perspective. The events depicted appear together, their relation to each other in time not being indicated or being revealed merely as successive. Often a prophecy is like a constellation in the sky, in which the beholder sees the constituent stars as though they were set in the same plane, all at an equal distance from him, whereas he is looking through a vista of shining suns. Perhaps an example is Is. x. 25; xi. 1, 10, 11 f. It may be that "the prophets foreshortened the future", if by that statement one means that "they did not realize the length of period which must elapse before corrupt human nature could be so transformed as to constitute a perfect or ideal society". Perhaps they conceived the Messianic age as beginning immediately after the troubles were past to which the nation in their own time was exposed (p. 172). Whatever their "anticipations" were, it was their common practice to speak quite indefinitely, and announce the event as belonging to "the latter days", occurring "in that day", or coming "afterward" (Is. ii. 2, 12; iv. 2; Joel ii. 28, iii. 1, 18 [English]; Amos ix. 11; Mic. iv. 1, 6). They searched "what time or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did point unto" (1 Pet. i. 11). And each generation looked forward to the latter days, expecting them, and looking for the consolation of Israel. 3. As the prophets understood and taught, it was the purpose of God, as revealed in the promise to the line of David, which guaranteed Zion's security to each generation and every age. Even when Assyria or Babylonia is threatening and destroying; even then the promised King is the guarantee that God's kingdom will ultimately triumph over these and all other foes (Ps. ii.; Is. vii.; Mic. v.). 4. "The prophets almost uniformly see the future through the forms of their own social and religious organization; their own times, their own surroundings supply the figures under which they represent it" (p. 160). Many prophecies, clothed in this garb, announce not a single event, but a long course of developing history. The process generally begins under the form in which it is first described; and as the fulfilment proceeds, when the old dispensation gives place to the new dispensation, the prophecy continues to unfold in forms appropriate to the new order of things. When the time for the completion arrived, "the forms and ideas and truths of the Old Covenant had only to be reapplied: the principles by which the Church

was constituted and governed were an extension and readaptation of those of the Jewish theocracy. The reality, however, transcended even the far-seeing anticipation of the psalmist" and other prophets (p. 149). These various phenomena of prophetic literature are so many lights which illumine the method and meaning of the prophets, lights flashed by Dr. Driver here and there in these sermons, and yet others which are not exhibited in this collection.

Only occasionally do the person and work of the Messiah require mention in these discourses. At such times Dr. Driver speaks of the Christ in no uncertain terms. For example, in a sermon on Lam. i. 12, he says: "In the poet of the Lamentations and in those like-minded with himself on whose behalf he speaks, we see . . . the innocent suffering with the guilty, the innocent so associated with the guilty by ties of kindred and other relations that they can not escape from their punishment. In the Passion of our Lord we have more than this; we see the innocent not suffering *with* the guilty, but suffering *for* them, and taking upon Himself not merely the sins of His own nation, but those of the whole world" (p. 58). "The Ascension of our Blessed Lord marks a significant stage in the triumph of His glorified and risen life: it is the initial step in His exaltation and session at the right hand of God, the place of highest honor, to which He is exalted, and where He reigns as King, destroying by the virtue of His death and by His ever-present grace the power of sin over those already incorporated into His kingdom, and extending by means of His Church His dominion throughout the world" (p. 173). To those who have become acquainted with the inner spiritual life of Dr. Driver, this triumphant confession of his faith in Christ is no surprise.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

The British Academy. The Philistines: Their History and Civilization.

By R. A. STEWART MACALESTER, M.A., F.S.A., (Professor of Celtic Archaeology, University College, Dublin). The Schweich Lectures, 1911. London: Published for the British Academy by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, Amen Corner, E. C. 1913. Royal 8vo; pp. viii, 136. 3 shillings net.

This book represents the latest studies into the origin of the Philistines and their history while settled on the sea-coast of Palestine. Mr. Macalester brings to the task his own intimate acquaintance with the topography and archaeology of the maritime plain, and lays under tribute the discoveries and discussions of the last twenty years, which bear upon Philistine matters. He indulges in much speculation and allows free play to fancy, but along with this perishable material he constructs the substantial framework of Philistine history. The statements in ancient writings, and various traditions, indicated that the Philistines were related to the early inhabitants of the island of Crete. The facts brought to light in recent times, and marshalled by Professor Macalester, confirm this conclusion.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

The British Academy. The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples. By the REV. C. H. W. JOHNS, M.A., Litt.D., Master of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge. The Schweich Lectures, 1912. London: Published for the British Academy by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, Amen Corner, E. C. 1914. Royal 8vo; pp. xv, 96. 3 shillings net.

The author of these lectures is a specialist in the literature of Hammurabi's times. He treats his subject in the spirit of an archaeologist, which seeks evidence and regards mere speculation as serving a useful purpose, but not to be taken too seriously. His interpretation of the laws, both Babylonian and Hebrew, is acute, and cannot wisely be neglected by students of either of these national literatures. An extensive descriptive "bibliography of the literature relating to the code of Hammurabi" is appended, occupying pages 65-91.

Three matters which lie in the background of Dr. Johns' discussion may be mentioned. The lecturer seems to assume that the Israelites when they entered Canaan were a nomad pastoral people, unacquainted with settled life and with the laws and customs of settled life; and that they had already become the dominant race in Canaan "in the period when the Mosaic laws were instituted" (pp. vi ff.). This theory is, indeed, fundamental with a certain school of criticism, but Dr. Johns treats critical speculations lightly. Now, the earliest traditions of the Israelites, current among the people almost or quite as early as Moses' own day according to general critical opinion, knew that the ancestors of Israel, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, whether these names be regarded as denoting persons or tribes, dwelt originally and later for long periods of time in the midst of civilized settled communities, in Mesopotamia and Canaan and Egypt, were herdsmen yet did not entirely neglect agriculture, intermarried with town-dwellers, adopted into their own tribe numerous servants from these peoples, and conformed to customs of their neighbors. The Israelites borrowed practices from the Canaanites after the conquest, it is true; but a trace of Babylonian, Canaanite or Egyptian law or custom among the Israelites is not evidence that it entered Israel after the conquest of Canaan or even in preparation for the invasion of Canaan. Long before that date it may have been habituated among the Israelites. Dr. Johns perhaps nowhere definitely asserts that these things waited for adoption by Israel until the conquest. Moreover, besides this intercourse which the Israelites had with other peoples during the centuries before the conquest, there was another avenue through which ancient laws may have been introduced into the legislation of Israel before the conquest. Dr. Johns himself says: "A leader in the position to which tradition assigned Moses could perfectly well promulgate a code of laws as full and complete as the whole Mosaic law, even for a people in the primitive state of society in which Israel is often supposed to have been at the Exodus. . . . He had only to avail himself of the knowledge of

cuneiform, available at that time both in Canaan and in Egypt, and import copies of the Hammurabi Code from Babylonia if they were not at hand where he then was. He could exercise his judgment as to what would be suitable for his people, add what he chose, and reject what he disliked. That he did this or anything like it is not asserted, but it would be so natural for any one in his position then that we have no excuse for surprise if we should find indications of his having done exactly that" (p. 21).

A second matter. The author does not distinguish between revelation and inspiration, and accordingly ascribes to the church opinions which have, indeed, had vogue in certain quarters, but do not represent the teaching of the great theologians. At the very end of his closing lecture, however, he makes a statement which is thoroughly consonant with the doctrine of inspiration. To explain the correspondence between the ancient code of Hammurabi and the later Hebrew Book of the Covenant, and speaking of such men as Philo and the author of the Acts of the Apostles, who tell of the acquaintance of Moses with the wisdom of Babylonia and Egypt, he asks: "Did not these learned men, who themselves knew much of that knowledge, recognize in the Books of Moses many startling parallels to the wisdom of Babylonia? Was it not the only acceptable way to account for such parallels to assert boldly that Moses did know these things, but in such a way that, guided by God, he used them so far as they were in accordance with Divine revelation?"

A third matter which Dr. Johns once, and then quite incidentally mentions, is really a method of legislation familiar in ancient law, but foreign to modern enactments. It explains arguments and measures which have sometimes mystified readers of the Bible. According to Deut. xv., the law of the Hebrew bondman, Ex. xxi. 2 ff., covers the bondwoman as well. "It may, indeed, be contended," says the lecturer, that this enactment of the Book of the Covenant "was intended to cover only one special case, but it is more reasonable to suppose that it takes a special case as a norm for all" (p. 45). This casual remark of the lecturer has a wide application. The modern legislator seeks to frame a general statement which shall include a whole class; the ancient legislator sometimes named a particular case and used it as a type to represent the class. This method is found employed even in so basal a document as the Ten Commandments.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des jüdischen Hellenismus. Von FRIEDRICH FOCKE, Dr. phil. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments. Neue Folge. 5. Heft.) Pp. 131.

Dr. Focke in this monograph takes his stand with the writers who in recent years have revived the theory of the composite character of

the *Sapientia Salomonis*. The unity of the work had been denied as early as the middle of the seventeenth century by Houbigant, and towards the close of the following century by Eichhorn, afterwards also by Bretschneider, Bertholdt, and Engelbrecht not to speak of the phantastic view of Nachtigal, who regarded Wisdom as a mosaic to whose composition no less than seventy-nine wise men, divided into two assemblies, each of which had held three sessions, had contributed. These earlier denials of the unity of the book seemed to have been permanently disposed of by the commentary of Grimm which appeared in 1860, and under whose influence the later discussions of Deane, Farrar, Bois and Siegfried felt warranted in setting aside every idea of compositeness without further refutation. Since the beginning of the present century, however, the question has been reopened and there are indications that the tide is setting the other way. Lincke in 1903, Weber in 1904, Kohler in 1906, Gartner in 1912, though widely differing as to the component parts, all agreed in the verdict that the book is composite. Focke is of the same opinion, only he finds himself unable to support the arguments advanced and the concrete conclusions reached by these recent writers, and comes forward with a new division, based on a new method of analysis. While both the earlier and the later dissectors thought to discover the principal seam at the beginning of Chap. XI or XII or XIII, Focke locates it between Chapters V and VI. He argues at length that the insertion of the treatise on idolatry contained in Chapters XIII-XV is so carefully led up to in the immediately preceding and so naturally linked with to the immediately following context, that all doubt of the original unity of authorship is here excluded. Wendland and Geffcken have shown that there existed a fixed scheme for the apologetic and polemic treatment of idolatry on the part of Jewish writers, the identical outlines of which can be pointed out in Philo, Josephus, the *Oracula Sibyllina* and *Sapientia*, so that on this score also no ground whatever exists for assigning the treatise on idolatry to a separate author. The writer has in this section simply followed a traditional model which furnished him not merely with the form but practically also with the substance of his digressions. The insertion of the treatise on idolatry at this particular point was caused by the emergence of the principle repeatedly stated in the closing verses of Chapter XII and carefully taken up again in the opening words of Chapter XVI, that the object of sin is made by God the instrument of punishment of the sinner, for the illustration of which the fate of the Egyptian idolaters was particularly adapted. But the same idea of retaliation already appears in Chapter XI, 15, and proves the coherence of what lies between this verse and Chapter XIII. Apart from this the unity of Chapter XI, 5 ff. with the entire sequel of the book is established by the consistent method of contrasting with a calamity inflicted upon the Egyptians a blessing bestowed upon the Israelites. This method called by the rhetoricians *σὺγκρισις* is first introduced in XI, 5 and afterwards applied till the end of the book. And inasmuch as

Chapter VI ff. are obviously continuous with the sequel, Focke considers the literary unity of everything following Chapter V, 24 demonstrated.

The problem of the book lies according to him in the relation of Chapters I-V to the remainder of the book. On the one hand the linguistic phenomena are to such a degree identical that the author of the later chapters must have had a hand in writing the introductory part. On the other hand the doctrinal contents and the historical situation are so different in the two sections that they cannot possibly have the same provenience. And side by side with the fundamental sameness a measure of linguistic peculiarity also appears in the first five chapters. Focke thinks that justice can be best done to these divergent features by assuming that Chapters I-V are of Palestinian origin, were originally written in Hebrew, had reference to the persecution of the Pharisees by the aristocratic Sadducean party during the reign of Alexander Jannaeus 102-75 B.C. The Alexandrian writer translated this treatise into Greek and prefixed it to his own discourse written with reference to the persecution of the Jews in Egypt by Ptolemy VIII Lathyrus, about the year 88 B.C. In this way both the linguistic and the doctrinal differences are believed to become reconcilable with the plain signs of a uniform redaction of the whole.

We must confess that this part of the author's argument appears less convincing to us than the preceding one. None of his reasons for finding a different author in the first five chapters carries conclusive weight. It is true the figure of wisdom is not equally in prominence in these chapters as in the later section, Chapters VII-IX. Neither, however, is it actually absent, and after Chapter IX it again goes into relative abeyance, although this part of the book is assigned by Focke to the same writer who composed the panegyric on wisdom of VII-IX. That a different conception of God is found in each of the two parts, we cannot admit in the sense that the two aspects, that of the mercy and that of the justice of God, could not have coexisted in the same mind and colored in succession two parts of the same discourse. Two stages in development of the conception of God at any rate can hardly be represented here, since, as stated above, the author places the two documents united in Wisdom in the closest contiguity as to their origin. The ethical and the national element in the divine character, the former of which Focke finds in Chapters I-V, the latter in the sequel, could also lodge together and find successive expression in the same work, the more so since it is not excluded that the various parts of the treatise may have been written at different times and under the influence of different moods. The motivation of the mercy of God from His omnipotence seems to have been a characteristic feature of the later Judaism, but its prominence in the second part and absence from the first part cannot prove anything, since this is clearly connected with the emphasis on the divine mercy in the later and the emphasis on the divine justice in the earlier chapters. The

main weight is thrown by the author on the eschatological difference: the outlook of the pious in the first part of the book is towards the future recompense after the resurrection, whilst in the second part everything is staked on the immortality of the soul. This could have force only if the first section had on the author's own view been composed at a time when the intermediate state was to the mind of Palestinian Judaism a blank, and the idea of the relatively blessed state of the souls of the pious previously to the resurrection unknown in that quarter. But the contemporary apocalyptic literature of that date proves the opposite. And there is nothing to show that the writer of Chapters I-V ignored or denied the pre-resurrection blessedness, no more than it can be proven that the writer of the following chapters was opposed to the resurrection-hope. The whole difference is a relative one of emphasis, and Focke himself is compelled to admit that the resurrection itself is not explicitly referred to in Chapters I-V. But the whole contention that the atmosphere of the two sections is so different as to postulate difference of origin is weakened by Focke's own assumption of a sufficient degree of likeness in the two situations to make the earlier one adaptable to the later one in the view of the Alexandrian writer. If such great doctrinal divergence existed, how did the second writer come to overlook this or to put up with it? If his mind was sufficiently eclectic for this, we can scarcely doubt that it may have lodged the alleged divergencies from the beginning within itself.

To the linguistic argument in favor of difference of authorship, we suppose the writer himself allows only secondary weight. Its force also is broken by the admission that the second writer has through his translation of the first document left his literary stamp upon this. This renders it *à priori* difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate difference of origin from the language. Of course if it could be proven that a Hebrew or Aramaeic original shines through, the case would be different. Focke actually attempts to make this plausible in a few instances. In none of these the evidence is clear enough to amount to linguistic demonstration. It is far less illuminating than the phenomena to which Wellhausen has called attention as evidencing the Aramaeic background of the Synoptics.

As to the historical situation to which Wisdom addresses itself, we do not think the author has succeeded in definitely overthrowing the traditional view, according to which the enmity and persecution reflected in the first five chapters, as well as that of the later section, arose from the Egyptian authorities. Focke thinks this impossible for Chapters I-V, because, in part at least, as he correctly observes, the enmity and persecution are from Jews against Jews, and moreover moved on lines apparently identical with the party-lines drawn between Sadducees and Pharisees. Both features, however, can be explained, on the common view. Especially if the date of the writing be put at the time of Caligula and during the troubles caused by this emperor's provocation of the religious sensibilities of the Jews, there is reason

to believe that the writer was confronted not merely with pagan enemies but also with apostate paganized Hebrews, who joined in the persecution of their own race. That the difference between the parties coincides more or less with that between Pharisees and Sadducees, need not cause wonder, for to a considerable extent the Sadducaic position approximated that of paganism.

Attention should be called to two special conclusions of the author which are interesting from a theological point of view. Focke combats the almost commonly-accepted view that Wisdom marks an earlier stage in the development of that Alexandrian Hebrew-Greek religious philosophy of which Philo is supposed to be the consummate representative. A philosopher the author of Wisdom was in no sense. The Hellenistic coloring and the few philosophical phrases that have entered into his work he derived not from the study of the schools but from the common atmosphere of culture in which he lived. As to Philo he cannot have back of him such a continuous development as nowadays is frequently assumed, because in that case his isolation at the time and subsequently becomes unintelligible.

The second point relates to the alleged influence of Wisdom on Paul. The author devotes considerable space to a close examination of the evidence adduced in support of such dependence by Grafe and others. His conclusion is that in no case can direct dependence be demonstrated. The cases most frequently adduced appear to be largely cases of common borrowing from the Greek Bible and show, as *e.g.* the handling of the figure of the potter, side by side with the unavoidable similarities, such differences of application, as positively to exclude the thought of Paul having borrowed from Wisdom.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Zur Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Religion in ihrer universalen Bedeutung. Zwei akademische Reden von Wolf Wilhelm Grafen Baudissin. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke. 1914. Pp. 56.

The common title under which the author has joined these two rectoral orations describes more accurately the purport of the second than that of the first. In the first entitled "Old Testament Science and the History of Religion" the problem of universality emerges only towards the end. The larger space is given to a retrospect of the development of Old Testament science in the direction of a history of the Old Testament religion and to a review of the more modern discussions concerning the influence of other religions upon that of Israel. In regard to the former point the author calls attention to the predependence of theology in this field. Classical science made the transition from the study of mythology to a scientific treatment of religion as a historical growth later than and perhaps in partial dependence on the pursuit of this new method by biblical scholars with reference to the Old Testament. To be sure in its older form this method was vitiated by the rationalistic misconception that the historical development to be

traced was a matter of doctrine, a misconception to which the name Biblical Theology still bears witness. Even under the wrong name, however, much was done to clear the way and lay the foundations for the work which now under a better nomenclature the History of the Old Testament religion may take in hand. In his discussion of the comparative problem Baudissin evidently means to make a generous allowance for the elements that the religion of Israel had in common with the religions of the surrounding nations and for the influence exercised from various quarters upon the Old Testament religion. On the latter point his statements are not so much along the line of positive opinion as of a mere objective review of possibilities. Even on so fundamental a question as to whether the primitive Semitic religion of Israel was like that of the Arabs, or partook of the astrological character of the Babylonian religious system, he remains non-committal. And, what is most important, he refuses to admit that the key for our historical understanding of the biblical religion can be found in anything that was borrowed from outside. The specific character of Israel's religion must be due to something indigenous. Baudissin finds the source of this first of all in the intense Semitic consciousness of the greatness of the deity and in the unique position and prestige enjoyed by the deity in consequence of the intertwining of religion and tribal organization. This reminds of the view developed some decades ago from a more positive standpoint by Grau in his book "*Gottes Volk und sein Gesetz*." Next to monotheism, and far outweighing it in religious importance, stand the ethical conception of God and the unique estimate put upon personal spiritual communion with Him as the highest possession of man. These two features the writer derives from the inner religious experience of the heroes of Israel's religion, the prophets. It will be noticed that thus the monotheism and the ethico-religious spiritualization are made to appear as two coördinate strands in the development, whereas the representatives of the Graf-Wellhausen school generally represent the monotheism as the result of the ethicizing of the prophetic conception of God.

In the second oration entitled "Nationalism and Universalism" these two aspects are not merely considered in their contrast but also as to the dependence of the latter upon the former. Baudissin subscribes to the paradox of Kuenen, that Israel has given to the world the most universalistic religion, because its religion was most intensely national in character. This is affirmed on the principle that in the most national and specific traits, the universal and generic is apt to find its strongest expression. It is not made clear, however, how in the concrete case of Israel, the element which chiefly made for universalism, the ethico-religious conception of religion, is connected with the national consciousness. For this element according to Baudissin himself was born in the inexorable depths of the prophetic consciousness. It is true the prophet did not lack the national spirit. Only, by taking recourse to the region of psychological mystery, as a sort of modern substi-

tute for the old factor of revelation, the writer at the outset surrenders the possibility of historically explaining the unique prophetic consciousness either from national factors or otherwise.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Das Antisemitische Hauptdogma, beleuchtet von EDUARD KÖNIG, Dr. Phil. et Theol., Ord. Professor und Geheimrath in Bonn. Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Weber's Verlag. 1914. Pp. 64.

The doughty Bonn Professor, who has fought for the good rights of the Old Testament on so many fronts, in this brochure takes up its defense, and incidentally also the defense of Old Testament science, against the attacks of a certain type of Antisemitism. There is one extreme wing of the Antisemitic propaganda which does not hesitate to decry and reject the biblical religion, including Jesus and Christianity, in toto, on the plea of its being so typically Semitic as to be irreconcilable with and injurious to the national Germanic aspirations. Others however go less far in their condemnation of the biblical teaching. Loath to cut themselves loose from the Bible and Christianity after so radical a fashion, and yet desiring to put the social, political and economic objections raised to the influence of the Hebrew element in modern civilization on a broad basis, they distinguish between two strands in the biblical development, one of which they attack as the root of all that appears to them at the present day offensive and dangerous in the activity of the Jews, whilst from the other they derive all that is good and noble in the Old Testament religion and in Christianity. In part the distinction is drawn between Judaeic and Israelitish elements, in which case the northern tribes are idealized at the expense of Judah; in other cases, and alongside of this, however, the claim is made that Aryan elements were present and influential among ancient Israel, and that to them is due the production of what it is still possible to cherish as a valuable inheritance from that ancient source. Dr. König is, as usual, very methodical in his presentation of the polemic material that has been advanced along both lines and in the reply to its main arguments. It is amazing to learn what shallowness of biblical scholarship, what cheap, journalistic credulousness in regard to the wildest and most baseless speculations, the rabid Antisemites display in their writings. One cannot help suspecting that to a considerable extent it is not with them a case of honest conviction but of unscrupulous use, regardless of historical support, made of any material that may suit the purpose of their propaganda. An amazing feature of the situation is that the anti-Semitic writers do not hesitate on their part to accuse Old Testament scholars of incapacity in understanding the true trend of the biblical development and introduce themselves as discoverers and liberators in a field enslaved to blind traditionalism. In exposing the fatuousness of all this the author renders a valuable service. At the same time his work, although of small compass, gives a good summary of what has been written of recent years in support

of the theory of non-Hebrew or non-Semitic influence in the development of the biblical ideas, from a more reputable quarter, though in most instances with little more historical foundation. Especially the sketch of the modern controversy, if it may be dignified by that name, about the Aryan or semi-Aryan descent of Jesus is helpful. Not only those who are interested in the question of Anti-Semitism, but also the general theological student will find Dr. König's pamphlet well worth careful perusal.

Princeton,

GEERHARDUS VOS.

New Testament History: A Study of the Beginnings of Christianity. By HARRIS FRANKLIN RALL, Ph.D., President and Professor of Systematic Theology: The Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colorado. New York; Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press. (Copyright, 1914.) Pp. 314. \$1.50 net.

"The Abingdon Press", we are informed, is a trade name adopted by the Methodist Book Concern, and Dr. Rall is president of a divinity school of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The *New Testament History* is one of a "Bible Study Text-book" series, prepared to meet the needs of college students, and projected, as the publisher's announcement says, "by a joint committee representing the Eastern and Western sections of the Associations of College Instructors in the Bible, the departments of colleges and universities and of teacher training of the Religious Education Association, the Student Y. M. C. A. and Y. W. C. A., and Sunday School Council." The present volume, the author tells us in his advertisement on the cover, is written "frankly from the modern point of view and assured results of critical study are used", but it "does not deal primarily with critical questions nor obtrude critical processes. It aims to set forth positively and reverently the great facts of these writings." The final aim is said in the introduction to be "to secure the study of the Bible itself".

It is a pleasure to note that the material which the author uses has been studied with thoroughness and care, that it is well organized and presented in a clear and interesting style. Following the suggestion of the sub-title, Dr. Rall gives a brief but admirable summary of conditions prevailing in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman worlds at the time of the Advent, and traces the rise of Christianity from its beginning as a Jewish sect to its establishment as a universal religion. Some of his generalizations are striking and illuminating. Paul, a Hebrew of the Hebrews and a Roman citizen, carried through the empire in the Greek language the message of a Jewish Messiah. The story of the life of Jesus was used to make converts, while the words of Jesus were used in the teaching of disciples thus won. In Stephen's speech the attack upon the temple stirred the Sadducees and what he said about the law aroused the Pharisees. Luke tells us how the churches were founded; Paul's letters tell us how they grew and what was their life. The result of Paul's work was "a Christianity made conscious of its

independence and its power, of its world-saving message and its world-embracing fellowship, and established on firm foundations throughout the empire".

The author's interest is directed avowedly to the broad features and the spirit of the Christian movement rather than to the details of chronology. His chronological conclusions, however, seem to require more elaborate defense, as when, on the basis of Galatians, he places Paul's first missionary journey after the council at Jerusalem, and compresses the Apostle's leadership in active missionary work within the seven years from 59 to 59.

Of more importance is Dr. Rall's attitude toward the supernatural facts which underlie the Christian history, and the transcendent elements in the consciousness of Jesus. His position here may be said to be faintly depreciatory or non-committal. The virgin birth was "evidently not essential for the faith of the early church" (p. 35). It is significant that the resurrection is discussed not in Part II, "Jesus", but in Part III, "The Jerusalem Church"; and no post-resurrection utterance of Jesus is quoted as authentic. Paul, it is admitted, believes in a bodily resurrection, but will not dogmatize about the nature of the resurrection body, and "lays no stress upon the physical" (p. 141). In modern fashion the question of the empty tomb is ignored, and the conviction that Jesus "was living" is quietly substituted for the conviction that he had risen from the dead. The historical question of the nature (or fact) of the resurrection and the appearances is, it is implied, unimportant. "The actual issue is whether we believe in the reality of the spiritual world" (p. 141). "The conviction of the living Christ is central for Christian faith to-day. But the foundation of that conviction is not primarily the story of the appearances. It is, rather, the personality of Christ itself, etc." (p. 142). When Dr. Rall says that "the conviction that their Master was living was what brought together the scattered disciples" (p. 148), he allows himself, as do many other modern writers, a certain looseness of language. The conviction that Jesus was living was doubtless held from the first by the disciples, as a similar conviction was held by the disciples of Socrates. If "living" means no more than this, it does not explain the facts; if it means risen from the dead and reigning, this should be stated without ambiguity. Clearness of thought and precision of language are certainly much to be desired at this point.

Dr. Rall gives us in the main an admirable and sympathetic study of the apostle Paul and of his work in spreading Christianity through the Roman empire. Less adequate is his treatment of the apostle John and of the Johannine writings. After the year 70 it is said, we have a good many New Testament writings, "but they do not give us history". The Gospel of John bears eloquent witness to Paul's influence, and is far more of a sermon than a biography. Its author is a "preacher" (p. 288). It was John's "great service" that he joined together "the Jesus of Nazareth whom the Gospels set forth with the divine Christ whom Paul proclaimed." It is not clear just why Dr. Rall admits the other

Gospels as historical sources and yet dismisses the fourth Gospel in so summary a fashion. In a previous chapter he had said that "the fourth Gospel states what is the common purpose of all. The Gospels are sermons rather than biographies" (p. 46); and, on the other hand, he himself uses the Gospel of John in at least half a dozen places to correct or supplement the statements of the other Gospels and of the Acts. The call of the four disciples, the crisis at Capernaum and the day of the crucifixion are examples. Dr. Rall, in fact, unconsciously illustrates two tendencies observable in the course of present-day criticism, and it would be well if these tendencies were brought to the attention of the college students whom he wishes to instruct. There is, if we mistake not, a growing recognition of the historical value of John's Gospel, and a growing perception of the fact that we must accept as historical the Jesus of all four of the Gospels or else find an historical Jesus in no one of them.

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

Popular Lectures on the Books of the New Testament. By AUGUSTUS H. STRONG, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., President Emeritus of the Rochester Theological Seminary. Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Toronto, Can.: The Griffith & Rowland Press. 1914. Pp. xxiii, 398. \$1.00.

Dr. Strong is best known to the religious public by his elaborate treatise on Systematic Theology, but his other writings and his addresses have given him an enviable reputation as a scholar of wide outlook and a master at once of thought and of expression in his treatment of philosophical and religious themes. The present volume, with the exception of the eighth chapter, "is a stenographic report of lectures delivered to a large Sunday-school class, which at times numbered as many as three hundred". The style of the lectures is colloquial, but, while they are not burdened with the citation of critical authorities, they aim to be representative of the best modern scholarship. In these Popular Lectures is presented an "Introduction" to the New Testament in the best sense of that term. They give not only a well-considered account of the externals of date, authorship, occasion of writing and analysis of contents, but they reveal an insight into the essential meaning and spiritual message of each book which could only come with a life-long and enthusiastic study of the New Testament. The clearness and simplicity of style will commend the volume to the lay reader, while the professional student will be newly impressed with the fact that the New Testament is a wonderful book, wonderful not only in its constituent parts but in the balance and relation of these parts to one another. Dr. Strong's Introduction will prompt the reader to turn with new zest to the New Testament itself in the hope that he may discover for himself some of the treasures that the author has found.

Some of the dates given by Dr. Strong for the New Testament books are as follows: Matthew 58, Mark 55 or 56, Luke 59, John

before the end of the century, Acts before the close of 61, 1 and 2 Thessalonians 51, Galatians 54, Romans, 56. Philemon 61, Ephesians, "the most wonderful of the letters which were written by Paul", Colossians and Philippians 63, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus 64 or 65, James 47, 1 and 2 Peter 66, 1 John 96 or 97, Jude 64-66, Hebrews 66, Revelation, "an inspired commentary upon Christ's apocalyptic discourse before he suffered", 67 or 68. It will be noticed that Dr. Strong is operating with two different systems of chronology, one of which places the close of Paul's first imprisonment in 61 and the other in 63. There are several other slips in the matter of dates, showing the need of more careful revision or proof-reading. Thus Paul's ministry in Ephesus is said to have begun in 54 (p. 217) but in 57 (p. 189); and 66, instead of 61, is given on p. 89 as the date of the close of the first imprisonment. Chapter VIII on "John's Gospel the Complement of Luke's" is based on Gumbel's *Das Johannes-Evangelium eine Ergänzung des Lukas-Evangeliums*, 1911 (not 1900 as stated).

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

John Huss—His Life, Teachings and Death—After Five Hundred Years. By DAVID S. SCHAFF, D.D., Professor of Church History, The Western Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 8vo; pp. xv, 349. \$2.50 net.

De Ecclesia: The Church, by John Huss. Translated, with Notes and Introduction, by DAVID S. SCHAFF, D.D., Professor of Church History, The Western Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 8vo; pp. xlvi, 304. \$2.50 net.

One of the most obvious things to say about these two books is that their appearance in quick succession in the early summer of 1915 is most timely. July 6th was the five hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom of John Huss; and though the first half of the year has already brought forth many addresses, lectures, and articles in honor of the famous Bohemian theologian, reformer, and patriot, the second half will no doubt witness even more services of commemoration in our churches and a broader popular interest in the man and his work. But it is not only with reference to their usefulness for such purposes but rather also in the wider historical sense that these notable volumes are most opportune. Good books in English on Huss have been remarkably scarce: a single digit could express the number, even when we include several translations of important German works; while of his own writings, only his letters—on the whole, the most interesting and satisfactory expression of himself he has left us—have been made available for the English reader (Workman and Pope, London, 1904). Dr. Schaff has, therefore, rendered a valuable double service in publishing this biography of Huss

and this translation—the first, apparently, ever made into any language of Huss's most important doctrinal treatise. Mutually complementary as the volumes in large measure are, they together give the reader a fairly adequate knowledge of the career, teachings, and personality of the man whose name is to this day the outstanding fact in the history of his native Bohemia.

The first chapter of the biography is a brief but comprehensive presentation of "The Age in Which Huss Lived", special attention being given to the various types of criticism that had been, or were being, levelled at the papacy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. After this introductory survey of the general historical background, the author devotes nine chapters to the portrayal of Huss's early life, his academic career, his revolt against the archbishop of Prague, his opposition to the pope, his withdrawal from Prague, his trial and death at Constance. Ever and anon the stream of the narrative broadens beyond the narrow confines of the strictly personal aspects of the story and affords the reader a pleasing glimpse of some of the many historic features of the surrounding landscape. The narrative style is not of uniform excellence, but at its best it is impressive in its vividness. Almost every page bears witness to the author's skill in using the original sources—excepting those in Bohemian, with which he acknowledges only a slight acquaintance; and much of the tragic pathos of the last scenes is due to the judicious citations from the prison letters.

The phrase used in the title, "After Five Hundred Years", is to be understood in the light of the statement in the Preface: "This biography is intended not only to set forth the teachings and activity of John Huss and the circumstances of his death but also to show the perpetuation of his influence upon the centuries that have elapsed since he suffered at the stake." This purpose is realized, though only to a most limited extent, in the last two chapters, dealing with "Huss's Place in History" and "Huss's Writings and the Hussites"—chapters which because of the historical judgments they contain are in some respects the most valuable in the book, but which because of their heterogeneous materials make a confused impression.

The caption of the third chapter, "Huss's Debt to Wyclif", is scarcely suitable. It leads the reader to expect much more than he receives. Nor would this early stage of the narrative have been the proper place for the discussion of this problem of the relation of the Bohemian to the English reformer. As to the author's final verdict—for he comes back to the matter in his closing chapter—he has no doubt struck the safe middle course between the two extreme views that have been held concerning the dependence of Huss upon Wyclif: that of Neander, who, writing before the publications of the Wyclif society began, had no means of determining the extent of this dependence, and rather unduly magnified the claims of Matthias of Janow as Huss's chief spiritual antecedent; and that of Loserth, who conclusively proved that Huss adopted not only many of the ideas of Wyclif but also whole sentences and paragraphs of his writings. But since the publication

in 1905 of Huss's commentary *Super IV. Sententiarium Petri Lombardi* there is substantial agreement among the experts—even Loserth concurring in the revised estimate—that however slavishly Huss may at times have followed Wyclif, he was a man of much more extensive learning and greater independence in thought and expression than was commonly supposed before this last named work appeared. Count Lützw, one of the best of recent biographers of Huss, repeatedly emphasizes Huss's knowledge of Augustine and of Gratian's *Decretum*, and Dr. Schaff in his Introduction to the *De Ecclesia* calls attention to the fact that Huss made independent use of the Scriptures, and contributed original arguments, for the support of his principles of ecclesiology.

The book is furnished with a good index. The Preface contains a helpful bibliography. There are two appendices; the first being a "Chronological List of Events in Huss's Life or Bearing Upon It", and the second dealing with a spurious account of Huss's journey to Constance, his trial and death at the stake, alleged to have been written by Pogius, a member of the Council of Constance.

We have noted two typographical errors in dates: p. 47, 1306 for 1406; and p. 299, 1415 for 1215.

The *De Ecclesia*, which Dr. Schaff in the second of the volumes before us presents in an English translation with notes and introduction, is of the highest order of importance for the understanding of Huss's teachings. It was from this writing that the authorities at Constance drew the fatal charges of heresy. It dates from the period of Huss's self-imposed exile from Prague, 1412-1414, and belongs to the latter rather than to the former half of the period, as appears from the fact that it makes frequent references to the views of eight doctors of the theological faculty of the University of Prague published in February 1413. The treatise may fairly be regarded as a deliberate and unimpassioned *apologia pro vita sua*—the maturest and most comprehensive expression of his doctrinal teaching and his conceptions of ecclesiastical reforms.

Some of the most important ideas set forth in the course of the twenty-three chapters into which the work is divided are the following: the church is "the totality of the predestinate, including all, from the first righteous man to the last one to be saved in the future"; Christ is the only head of the church; prelates may be reprobate; the Roman pontiff and the cardinals do not constitute the church; the church is founded on the rock Christ (Matt. xvi. 16-18 is the basis of an extended discussion); belief in Christ is the only necessity for salvation; the pope is, or rather "may be" "the vicar of Christ and may be so to his profit, if he is a faithful minister predestined unto the glory of the head, Jesus Christ"; the church is not infallible either in its members or in its rulers; only those prelates are to be obeyed who live in accordance with the precepts of the Gospel; diverse popes have been heretics; the church may be ruled without pope and cardinals; the pope is apostolic when he follows the apostles; both clerics and laics are to scrutinize and test the commands of superiors in the light of Scriptural teaching;

capable priests ought to make much of their duty as preachers; only those whom God has already excommunicated should be excommunicated by the church; interdicts wrong the innocent members of the community and are not sanctioned by the example of Christ or his apostles.

The Scriptural references are very numerous. Dr. Schaff mentions 347 quotations from the New Testament and 72 from the Old.

The translation itself seems to be all that could have been desired. It is at least thoroughly readable. At the same time the use of dashes instead of parentheses for the insertion of an occasional Latin original is awkward, and the appearance of some of the pages would have been improved if the matter contained in brackets in the text had been put into footnotes.

The headings of the chapters—which we assume the translator has furnished—do not always seem the best possible, as, for example, that of the seventeenth chapter, "Huss's Resistance to Papal Authority."

The "Notes" are valuable so far as they go. They throw much light upon obscure, doubtful, and sometimes erroneous statements in the text.

One of the most useful services Dr. Schaff has rendered in this editorial work is the locating, in the writings of the fathers and the doctors of the church, of the many excerpts made by Huss.

The Introduction gives brief sketches of the life of Huss, of the circumstances under which he wrote this treatise, of its contents, and of his debt to Wyclif, and closes with a sober estimate of the historical importance of this work: "Its pages will enable him who reads to feel some of the pious and heroic spirit of its author, the preacher of Bethlehem chapel, and at the same time to appreciate more fully what was the doctrinal and hierarchical system handed down from the classic period of the Middle Ages to the age of Wyclif and Huss. According to the letter of this system these two men were justly pronounced heretics, but not according to the Scriptures to which they appealed."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Life of Andrew Martin Fairbairn, D.D., D. Litt., LL.D., F.B.A., etc., First Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. By W. B. SELBIE. New York: Hodder and Stoughton. 1914. 8vo; pp. viii, 456. \$3.00 net.

Principal Fairbairn was born in 1838 and died in 1912. His life was one of such varied and distinguished achievements that any worthy account of it could not fail to make interesting and profitable reading. His is one of those careers of marked representative significance which can impart to biographies something of the dignity and value of cross sections of contemporaneous history. Born of humble Scotch parents; reared in the strictest traditions of the United Secession Church; earning his own living while yet a boy at school, and

then preparing himself, with his mother's aid, for entrance at the University of Edinburgh; as a student earnest and diligent, and, though slow in attaining his intellectual maturity, self-reliant and independent in judgment; early reacting against the prevalent type of Calvinism and becoming a minister of the small but increasingly influential Evangelical Union (popularly called "Morisonian") Church,—he began his life-work by becoming a pastor of this denomination first at Bathgate, Scotland (1860-1872), and then at Aberdeen (1872-1877). In both of these charges he made a name for himself not only as a highly gifted and edifying preacher but also as a popular lecturer and a scholarly and forceful writer on philosophical and theological themes. In 1877 he accepted a call to the Principalship of Airedale College, Bradford, England, a Congregational theological training school. His influence as a teacher and as an organizer of theological education was epochmaking throughout the Free Churches of England; and when, from about the year 1880, largely under the leadership of the Congregationalists, a plan was being matured for the establishment at Oxford of a non-residential, post-graduate, and purely theological school for Nonconformists as such, the tacit understanding among the leaders of the enterprise was that Dr. Fairbairn must be the head of the new institution. Mansfield College, of which he thus became the first Principal, was opened in 1889. His term of service in this office lasted until 1909, when, owing to the infirmities of his age, he resigned. It was in this position that his largest and best work was done. His own contributions to the intellectual life of Oxford, and likewise those of his colleagues—many of whom were former pupils of his—from the outset commanded the respect of scholars at home and abroad, while the changes made under his guidance in the curriculum and in the methods of instruction gave him a commanding position in the realm of theological education in England. Dr. Sanday, indeed, goes the length of saying: "If it is possible to speak of British theology as a whole, if there is something of a common spirit and of common aims running through it, no single institution has done so much for this as Mansfield."

We have only hinted at a few of the elements that contribute to the interest and value of this biography. We must refer the reader to the book itself for the many other engaging features in this man's character and career—his simple and earnest piety; his beautiful home life; his broad humanitarian sympathies—for twenty-one years he was President of the Mansfield House University Settlement in the East End of London; his political activity, especially in behalf of the Free Churches; his charming letters; his reflections on his extensive travels on the Continent, in India, and in the United States; his wide acquaintance and intimate friendship with distinguished contemporaries; his brilliant successes as a lecturer, as an occasional speaker, and as a theological writer; his care and affection for his pupils, his ability to help them in their intellectual difficulties and inspire them with his own noble ideals.

Dr. Selbie, the author, a former pupil of Fairbairn's, later his colleague at Mansfield, and now his successor in the principalship of the College, was well qualified to prepare this biography. His pages breathe the beautiful spirit of a disciple's devotion to his master and friend, but avoid all exaggerated praise. The reader is left with the impression that the book furnishes a true portrait of a man who lived an exceptionally large, useful and good life.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

A History of American Baptist Missions. Revised Edition with Centennial Supplement. By EDMUND F. MERRIAM. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1913. Pages xxix, 288. 50 cents net; postpaid 60 cents.

A large part of this story of Baptist missions deals with the history and labors of the various missionary societies at the home base within the Baptist fold, the first eleven chapters being confined to this feature. Then follow accounts of the actual founding and growth of the missions themselves, beginning with the work of the Judsons in Burma. Notable among these reviews is the ever-inspiring story of the Telugu Mission in Southern India (Chap. 14).

Of dogmatic interest is the author's reply to the objection that the three thousand on the Day of Pentecost could not have been immersed, because so many could not have been thus baptized in a single day (Acts ii. 41). He points out that at Vilumpilly, in this (Telugu) mission, in a single day, July 3, 1878, from 6 to 10 a. m., and from 2 to 6 p. m., 2,222 candidates had been immersed in a perfectly orderly manner, with only two clergymen officiating at any one time (pp. 141-142). And again, on Dec. 28, 1890, in the baptistry of Dr. Clough's mission compound at Ongole, 1,671 were immersed "in all decency and good order in four hours and twenty-five minutes" (p. 147). This of course would not establish the whole Baptist contention as to the mode of Baptism. At best it can only weaken an extreme objection sometimes urged against it. The author is pretty thoroughly convinced that immersion is the only Scriptural, and therefore essential form of this rite (pp. 11, 190, 194, 258). But this is never made so prominent as to become an embarrassing intrusion to readers outside his own denomination. Indeed, the Church at large can only rejoice with Mr. Merriam in the century of Baptist missionary achievement that has made his book a possibility and a necessity.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

John Hus, The Martyr of Bohemia. A Study of the Dawn of Protestantism. By W. N. SCHWARZE, Ph.D. Professor of Church History in the Moravian College and Theological Seminary, Bethlehem, Pa. Illustrated. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1915. Pp. 152. 75 cents net.

Of the contributions to the five hundredth anniversary of the death of the Bohemian Reformer, this little study will assuredly have a

welcome place. It is of course a mere outline, but a good one. It is written for the average reader who may be unversed in the technical controversies which constitute the historic background amidst which John Huss emerged. The illustrations are modern and wisely distributed. Though the account is unburdened by historical detail, the circle which it represents is large. A long approach,—geographical, racial, theological,—is made to Huss, and after we leave him by the stake on the Brühl outside the city of Constance, his influence is swiftly traced in the Hussite wars, on to the modern Moravian Church, in which review the omission of even the name of Count Zinzendorf is inexcusable. Outside of Huss himself, was not he almost the patron saint of the Moravian Brethren?

Huss' trial at Constance, like Luther at Worms, or Luther and Zwingli at Marburg, or Beza at Poissy, is one of the dramatic scenes of Reformation history. Professor Schwarze has written it up for us with almost the lively touches of an American reporter, though with far more concern for accuracy. It is, as we should expect, the best part of the book.

The spirit of Huss abides. Who can visit the little city on the *Bodensee*, and go into the *Consilium-Saal* on the second floor of the old *Kaufhaus*, where the Council met, and see the fine frescoes by Pecht and Schwörer, or pass to the old Dominican monastery, now the *Insel Hotel* (what changes the centuries do make!), or pause at the little house hard by the *Schnetzthor*, or sit in the *Münster*, or, best of all, wander out from the city and up the shaded walk that leads to the *Hussenstein*, a huge rock overgrown with the kindly ivy and guarded (far better than its hero was) by a tall iron fence, read the inscription telling of the deed, five centuries ago, that has made that spot forever holy and the memory of Huss and Jerome of Prague a fadeless benediction,—who can do this, and not thank God that "Such as these have lived and died"?

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

The Revival of the Gift of Healing. By REV. HENRY B. WILSON, B.D., Rector of St. John's, Boonton, N. J., and Director of the Society of the Nazarene. Including Suitable Prayers and an Office for the Anointing of the Sick. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co.; London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. 1914. Pp. viii, 78.

According to the author of this booklet the Christian Church, all through the centuries since the apostolic age, has been "operating one-half her powers", and so fulfilling only a part of her mission in the world. The gift of healing was never withdrawn (p. 10), and so the therapeutic ministry of the Church ought never to have been abandoned. In this neglect of a vital function which was designed to be permanent, Mr. Wilson sees the perfectly logical explanation of much of the dissatisfaction and defection within the Church, and the taking up with such extremes as Christian Science, New Thought, Faith Cure, and the Emmanuel Movement (pp. 11, 38). Yet he is

aware that the idea for which he contends has been abused, and does not hesitate to rank Christian Science, New Thought, Church Miracles, Mental Therapy, etc., as among these abuses (pp. 13, 15, 23, 30, 42-43). Nor does he hesitate to criticize the Prayer Book for this neglect.

The healing for which this author pleads is a purely religious act performed by a genuinely religious person and in the name of Christ, but robbed of all magical association (pp. 9, 40-41, 45). The idea is now embodied in the aims of the "Society of the Nazarene." The stock quotation is James v. 14-15 (*cf.* Mark vi. 13), and something is made of the healing of the lame man at the Temple (Acts iii. 1 ff.). The practical working out of the theory in detail, while not the Romish sacrament of Extreme Unction, is a carefully conceived ritual. Anointing becomes an "office" (Chap. 5). A confession is followed by a pronouncement of absolution. Though the oil has no magical properties (p. 57), it must first have been blessed by a bishop, and for this office a form is given (p. 68).

That some truth may reside in Mr. Wilson's contention, we may not deny. But the presentation of his case, as given in this booklet, is, to speak frankly, far from convincing, if not actually weak. The most that can be safely argued from the passage in James is simply the power of concerted believing prayer, which all true Christians everywhere accept. There is no conclusive intimation of any miraculous gift, or that the transaction was to become an ecclesiastical rite with attendant ritual. Nor was this the primary feature of the Comforter's dispensation. Even Christ found it easier to command a cure than to say: "Thy sins are forgiven thee" (Luke v. 23-24). Bodily healing was only a means to an end. Spiritual productivity, conviction of sin, sanctification,—this was the goal of the Church. "Greater works than these shall ye do, *because I go unto the Father*" (John xiv. 12. *Cf.* xvi. 7-15). It was this "greater" work that Christ commended to His Church. In view of these facts, it is furthermore unlikely that a gift which so soon vanished from the Church and remained unrecognized so long, was ever, in the strict New Testament sense of it, meant to be a permanent part of the Church's equipment.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Sabbath Theology. A Reply to Those who Insist that Saturday is the Only True Sabbath Day. By MAURICE S. LOGAN. Published under the auspices of The New York Sabbath Committee, 31 Bible House, New York City. 1913. Pp. xvii, 451. \$1.50.

This volume, as the subtitle explains, is written to refute the Seventh Day Adventists. The careless reader may wonder why a book of such solidity should be needed in a controversy seemingly of no great moment. Our author assures us, however, that in the half-

century before 1912, the Seventh Day Adventists increased from 3500 members to 114,000; that their present-day mission is to proclaim the "Third Angel's Message" the vital point of which is that Sunday is the "mark of the beast"; that in their propaganda they oppose Sabbath legislation, encourage the violation of existing Sabbath laws, and promote in every way possible the desecration of the Sunday Sabbath.

The nub of the argument seems to be in the opening chapter. Is the Sabbath on which God is said in Genesis ii. 3 to have rested, the seventh day of the week or the first day? Our Adventist brethren hold to the former; our author asserts the latter. The Adventist belief involves the further belief that God created the heaven and the earth in six twenty-four-hour days; that time began with the first day of creation; and that God rested on the seventh day of the first week of time. Mr. Logan believes that the creation days were indefinite periods; that time began with the first measured day of man; that God rested, consequently, on the first day of the first week of time. The Jewish Sabbath was on the seventh day of the week. How is this to be explained? The worship of the sun had come, by reason of the widespread of idolatry, to be connected with the first day of the week, and during the stay in Egypt many of the Israelites had yielded to this worship. To break the association God changed the day of Sabbath from the first to the seventh. This expedient was merely temporary, however, because the first day, the day of the original Sabbath, was "all the more gloriously restored in the Resurrection of His own Son, who is the 'Sun' of Righteousness."

The book is written with spirit and conviction. There is contained in it a great deal of interesting information and subtle reasoning. Doubtless it will be of use to those who are called on to meet the arguments of the Adventists. Nevertheless, some of the assertions made are open to criticism, such as, "The Sabbath even would not seem to be a needful institution, either physically or morally, till sin made it needful." Again, that the original Sabbath was the first day of the week, seems to contradict the plain language of Scripture. To be sure the temptation in polemics is not to be over nice in the employment of the argument that will bring the result desired. Still it is always better not to plow with the heifer of the opponent, which means in the present case to avoid subtle distinctions and unsupported conclusions in controverting the subtle distinctions and the unsupported conclusions of the Seventh Day Adventists.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The Reconstruction of the Church. By PAUL MOORE STRAYER. New York: The Macmillan Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 309. \$1.50 net.

The reconstruction which the author advocates is not radical or

revolutionary; it is more a matter of emphasis and method than of substance and aim. Nor is it the suggestion of one who is a mere theorist, but an active pastor who is seeking to adapt the work of the church he is serving to the needs of the community. He writes this volume as the result of his own experiments, and as an expression of the hope that all Christian churches will become more alive to the moral issues involved in the social and the economic conditions of the day. It is really a plea for more efficient methods in churches which are now "suffering under the law of diminishing returns".

The author deals particularly with the message and program of the church. In treating of (1) *The Revised Message* and "the need of a social Gospel" his purpose is to suggest that the daily lives and business practices of confessing Christians must be brought into closer conformity with the law of Christ. It is possible that he should have suggested a more insistent proclamation of the fundamental doctrines of grace, and of the need of a personal Saviour; but it is to be understood that he assumes all this and is only urging Christian ministers to adapt their message to existing conditions and to teach their hearers what Christian discipleship demands in the intricate social and industrial problems of the day. He further endeavors to show "the spiritual possibilities of business life", the "social creed" the church must advocate and adopt in case she is to minister to "the men of toil", and the effort which must be made "to Christianize a competitive world" by introducing the Master's law of service.

Part II of the volume contains a diagnosis of the present situation of the church in view of its main purposes which are held to be "moral and religious instruction and worship". It is shown that these purposes are not being attained for the vast majority of persons in our land, and particularly in our cities, and the failure of the church is due in large part to the lack of a definite program, to deficient methods of propaganda, and to lack of virile leadership. The church is declared to be "*at the parting of the ways*".

Part III deals with "*Reconstructing the Program*". It is insisted that the test of efficiency must be fearlessly, if carefully, applied to all church activities. If the usual services, with which all Protestants are familiar, are not found to be suitable in character or time to any particular community, they should be altered to meet the obvious needs of that community; especially is this true of the Sunday evening and the mid-week services. There must be found new methods of bringing the message of the church to the masses of the people, and new ways of serving the social needs of the communities to which the churches are ministering. The church needs to be kept in the consciousness of the people by judicious advertising. It has a special opportunity and task in the rural districts of America; both there and in the cities it can at times render a great service by supplying recreational centres for the young. Among the greatest of the present needs is that of closer coöperation and of actual union between the various denominations and branches of the church.

Such in substance is the content of this volume. From some of its positions and suggestions many readers will differ; yet among recent volumes, written with a view to discuss the problem of "the church and social service", this one is distinguished by discrimination, courage and restraint.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Restatement and Reunion. By BURNETT HILLMAN STREETER, Fellow, Dean and Lecturer in Theology and Classics of Queen's College, Oxford. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 194. Two shillings and sixpence, net.

This "Study in First Principles" is by an eminent representative of the Anglican Church, and is intended primarily for the consideration of members of this church; but as it relates to the popular question of church union, it cannot fail to be of interest to the members of other Christian communions. It comprises four related discussions, which are entitled as follows: *I. The Simplicity of Christianity, II. Authority, Reunion and Truth, III. What Does the Church of England Stand For, IV. The Conception of The One Church.*

In the first of these discussions the author attempts to present "the essential elements of the Christian message in such a way as to render it independent of all subtleties of historical criticism or metaphysics. The following is the result: "First, Christianity is a disposition of the soul: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' Secondly, a resultant course of action: 'If any man would be my disciple, let him take up his cross and follow me.' Thirdly, a consequent achievement: 'If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God.' Fourthly, if it be asked, 'And who is sufficient for these things?' there is the promise of a response on the part of the divine to such feeble efforts as we may make: 'Knock, and it shall be opened unto you,' 'My grace is sufficient for thee.' Fifthly, there is the assurance that failure can be retrieved: 'For this my son was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is found.' Lastly, there is the sure and certain hope, 'This is the promise which he promised us, even life eternal.'"

This summary seems to omit certain verities which many hold to be of the very essence of Christianity; and those who are thus impressed will probably find an explanation as they read the second paper, which treats of *Authority, Reunion and Truth*, and which suggests rather a low view of the character and authority of Scripture. The intimation is made that the authority of the church needs to be established, but that this can be done only by a reunion of the church, effected by a restatement of Truth. "The divided branches of the church must draw together, first for coöperation in good works and then for discussion of belief."

In such a "clearer delimitation of truth", and in aiding the movement toward reunion, the Anglican church should take a leading part; for, in the third paper, *The Anglican Church* is shown to stand for "Comprehensiveness", for "the considerate and sympathetic temper", for

"intellectual humility", for "a synthesis of Hebraism and Hellenism", for "sanity and charity". For this reason "the Church of England should be competent to make" a "contribution to the problem of theological restatement", "a problem never more urgently pressing than today".

With the thought in mind of this movement toward a reunion of Christendom, the last paper, "*The Conception of the One Church*", tranverses the ground (a) of the historical course of the church "*From the Unity to Disruption*"; and (b) "*The Preliminaries of Reunion*", which must include "sympathetic and non-controversial discussion", "coöperation in good works", and a "temporary federation or alliance, without any central authority possessing coercive powers". (c) "*The Problems of Intercommunion*" between the Anglican and the non-Episcopal churches, is shown to be not only serious, but acute. Because of her position on this question, the Anglican church is shown to be "holding back" movements toward reunion "in every part of the globe". This last admission seems to be rather at variance with the things for which Anglican communion has been shown to stand; but the frank statement is quite in accordance with the candor, frankness, fairness and sincerity of the author, and with his evident desire to do all in his power to bring into closer and more sympathetic relations the separated parts of the one universal, Christian church.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Christian Principles. By G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D. New York:

Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 157. 50 cents net.

These lectures by the distinguished minister of Westminster Chapel, London, were first delivered in the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York, under the auspices of the "Bible Teachers' Training School". They deal with realities which form the very essence of Christian beliefs, and of which it may be said that "the measure in which they are the master things of life is the measure in which Christianity is a living experience". These are, first, the spiritual nature of man; and, secondly, the right and the obligation of the direct dealing of man with God; thirdly, the relation of reason and faith; fourthly, the losing and finding of life, the dethronement of self and the consequent enthronement of Christ; fifthly, the realization of the Christ life, when Christ is for life both its centre and its circumference; lastly, the passion of Christ and of his Church for the perfected kingdom of God upon earth.

These lectures are not speculation, but are interpretations of the truth revealed in Scripture, to the authority of which they make their constant appeal.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Variety in the Prayer Meeting. By WILLIAM T. WARD. New York:

The Methodist Book Concern. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 192. 50 cents net.

Any book which can aid in reviving interest in the prayer service

of the Protestant churches should be welcomed by the Christian public. This little volume of suggestions, intended as "a manual for leaders", contains practical suggestions which will certainly tend to make the prayer meeting not only less stereotyped, as the title indicates, but also more full of life, attractiveness, and helpfulness. The brief chapters treat of the nature and value of the service, the leader, the room, the opening exercise, the scripture lesson, the music, the benediction and "other things worth while". In the "Appendix" is found a valuable bibliography.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, July: ARTHUR C. MCGIFFERT, Christianity and War—A Historical Sketch; STANLEY A. COOK, Significance of the Elephantine Papyri for the History of Hebrew Religion; GERALD B. SMITH, What Shall the Systematic Theologian expect from the New Testament Scholar?; THEODORE B. FOSTER, "Mysterium" and "Sacramentum" in the Vulgate and the Old Latin Versions; ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, The Abandonment of the Canonical Idea; BURTON S. EASTON, Trial of Jesus.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, July: FRANCIS B. DENIO, Israel's Philosophy of History; HANS C. JUELL, The Fourth Gospel a Genuine Narrative; WINTHROP D. SHELDON, The Moral Dynamics of World Power; WARREN UPHAM, Geologic and Archaeologic Time; MILEHAM L. O'HARRA, The Incarnation; JAMES MUDGE, To What Extent Does God Reign?; JOHN T. WARD, The Work of Christ; HAROLD M. WIENER, Professor Lofthouse and the Criticism of the Pentateuch.

Catholic Historical Review, Washington, July: THOMAS J. SHAHAN, In Memoriam: Rt. Rev. Camillus P. Maes, D.D., 1846-1915; CHARLES W. CURRIER, The Church of Cuba; H. T. HENRY, A Forgotten American Hymnodist; JAMES A. ROONEY, Early Times in the Diocese of Hartford, Conn.; H. C. SCHUYLER, Apostle of the Abnakis: Father Sebastian.

Church Quarterly Review, London, July: P. BATIFFOL, France at War; F. B. JEVONS, Human Thought and the Philosophy of Höffding; ARCHDEACON OF HALIFAX, Prayer Book Revision: Procedure by Canon; H. J. WHITE, "Dogmatic" Variations in St. Matthew; A. C. HEADLAM, Kikuyu: The Archbishop of Canterbury's Statement; CYRIL BICKERSTETH, St. Augustine's "City of God" and the War; W. C. BISHOP, Prayer Book Revision: The Present Stage; BASIL LEVETT, Mysticism; J. W. HORSLEY, The Church and Prison Reform; The War: Our Danger; A. C. HEADLAM, Nestorius and Orthodoxy.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, September: ARCHBISHOP EVODKIN, A Constructive Sketch of St. John the Divine; M. J. LAGRANGE, Some Points recently gained in the Study of the Epistle to the Romans;

ARCHBISHOP SÖDERBLOM, Soul of the Church of Sweden; MEREDITH DAVIES, Congregationalism and Its Ideal; ADOLF DEISSMANN, Christianity in Germany During the War; E. A. PACE, Education and the Constructive Aim; CHARLES JOHNSTON, Controversy between St. Paul and St. James; ARTHUR J. GOSSIP, Footnote to Buddhism.

East & West, London, July: DR. EVERY, Anglican Church in Latin America; A. W. TYNDALE, Seeing is Believing. A scene in Kashmir; Raymond Lull; C. E. TYNDALE, Seeing is Believing. A scene in Kashmir; J. STEELE, Missionary Education; DEAN CARTER, The Call to Repentance for the Church's Failures in the Mission Field; B. A. YEAXLEE, A Plea for Making Many Books; C. HARFORD, Fifty years of Medical Missions.

Expositor, London, July: G. BUCHANAN GRAY, Sacrifices of Cain and Abel; JAMES H. MOULTON, Early Liturgical Development of the Lord's Prayer; ALLAN MENZIES, The Art of the Parables; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Eschatology of the Old Testament and Judaism; P. T. FORSYTH, The Mind of Christ on His Death; JAMES MOFFATT, Four Notes on Ephesians. *The Same*, August: H. R. MACKINTOSH, The Eschatology of Jesus; P. T. FORSYTH, Christ's Offering of His Soul for Sin; J. M. THOMPSON, Is John xxi an Appendix?; LAURENCE E. BROWNE, Journeys of St. Peter; G. MARGOLIOUTH, Abner's Answer to Ishbosheth; A. E. GARVIE, Prologue to the Fourth Gospel and the Evangelists Theological Reflexions; ALEXANDER SOUTER, The Koridethi Gospels; C. ANDERSON SCOTT, Not Discerning the Body.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, July: THE EDITOR, Notes of Recent Exposition; J. A. ROBERTSON, The Tragic Schism: Has it Been Healed?; M. GASTER, "The Lord of Hosts"; EDWARD GRUBB, The Anointing of Jesus; ROBERT OSWALD, The Task of To-Day. *The Same*, August: THE EDITOR, Notes of Recent Exposition; ELEANOR A. JOHNSON, The Unrealized Christianity of Shelley; THEOPHILUS G. PINCHES, The Niffer Story of the Creation and the Flood; ALFRED E. GARVIE, The Pioneer of Faith and of Salvation; J. AGAR BEET, The Study of Theology. *The Same*, September: THE EDITOR, Notes of Recent Exposition; CAVENDISH MOXON, Jesus' Teaching and Modern Thought; ALFRED E. GARVIE, The Pioneer of Faith and of Salvation; E. W. HIRST, The Implications of the Golden Rule; A. H. SAYCE, The Archaeology of the Book of Genesis.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, July: F. CRAWFORD BURKITT, Johannes Weiss: In Memoriam; WILLIAM A. BROWN, Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion; FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL, Function of Educated and Uneducated Ministry; PAUL E. MORE, Evolution and the Other World; GEORGE BATCHELOR, Three Notable Dreams; DANIEL J. FRASER, Recent Church Union Movements in Canada; THOMAS N. CARVER, What Ails the Church?

Hibbert Journal, Boston, July: EUGENE TROUBETZKOY, Unity Beneath the Present Discord; NORMAN SMITH, The Moral Sanction of Force; CLOUDESLEY BRERETON, A Spiritual Balance-Sheet of the War; S. M. MITRA, War Philosophy, Hindu and Christian; A. KEENE, War, and

How to Meet it: the Views of British Thinkers; J. A. R. MARRIOTT, The War and the Theory of the State; EVA MADDEN, Behind the Scenes; BERNARD HOLLAND, Some Inscriptions; J. M. WILSON, Christ's Sanction as well as Condemnation of War; E. A. SONNENSCHIE, The Golden Rule and its Application to Present Conditions; PHILIP A. BRUCE, Race Segregation in the United States.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, May-June: P. A. WADIA, Napoleon's Place in History I; MARY MARKOVITZ, Position of Women in Persia; C. J. RYAN, Mosque of Sultan Selim II at Constantinople; G. A. CHANDAVARKAR, The Dayanand Anglo--Vedic College, Lahore; AKSHAY K. GHOSE, Napoleon and the Kingdom of Italy; SHAIKH F. HUSAIN, Origin of Tazia-keeping in India; K. S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, Growth of the Philosophical Spirit in English II.

Homiletic Review, New York, July: COUNT LÜTZOW, Message of John Hus to the Preachers of To-Day; CHARLES S. MACFARLAND, Religious Education and the New Internationalism; J. G. STEVENSON, Religion and the Child; T. RHONDDA WILLIAMS, The Minister's Social Conscience. *The Same*, August: GEORGE L. PARKER, Parish Psychology; J. G. STEVENSON, Religion and the Child; CALVIN D. WILSON, Ecclesiastical Points of View; WILLIAM E. GRIFFIS, Does the Bible Throw Any Light on the Race Question?

International Journal of Ethics, Concord, July: J. C. MEREDITH, Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Neutrality; HENRY C. EMERY, What is Realpolitik?; MORRIS R. COHEN, Legal Theories and Social Science; ALAN J. DORWARD, Betting and Insurance; W. K. WRIGHT, Private Property and Social Justice; ELSIE C. PARSONS, Marriage and Parenthood—A Distinction; J. C. FLÜGEL, Ethics and the Struggle for Existence.

Interpreter, London, July: T. HERBERT BINDLEY, Relation of the Fourth Commandment to the Christian Sunday; ARTHUR WRIGHT, Allegories of the Fourth Gospel; A. C. BOUQUET, Christology in the Making; T. F. ROYDS, Job and the Problem of Suffering; H. D. A. MAJOR, The Secret of a Nation's Welfare; Our Conception of God; H. H. B. AYLES, A Recent Attempt to Determine the Original New Testament Text; J. C. HARDWICK, The Christian Apologetic of Fyodor Dostoyevsky.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, July: JOHN ASHTON, Pessimism or Supernaturalism; DAVID BARRY, Influence of Error on Responsibility; J. BYRNE O'CONNELL, Beginnings of Philosophy; J. M. FLOOD, Sacred Latin Poetry; JAMES MACCAFFREY, Position of Irish Catholics during the Reign of James I.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, July: JACOB NACHT, Symbolism of the Shoe with Special Reference to Jewish Sources; JACOB Z. LAUTERBACH, Midrash and Mishnah. A Study in the Early History of the Halakah II; B. HALPER, A Volume of the Precepts by Hefes B. Yasliah; ALEXANDER MARX, Recent Hebrew Bibliography and Palaeography; I. M. CASANOWICZ, Recent Works on Comparative Religion; B. HALPER, Recent Rabbinical Literature.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, July: A. H. FINN, The Tabernacle Chapters; T. H. ROBINSON, Text of Jeremiah 6: 27-30 in the Light of Ezekiel 22: 17-22; A. GUILLAUME, David's Lament over Saul and Jonathan; H. J. BARDSLEY, Derivation of the Acta from Early Acts of Peter; R. H. MALDEN, St. Ambrose as an Interpreter of Holy Scripture; C. H. TURNER, Notes on the Apostolic Constitutions. II the Apostolic Canons; P. BATIFFOL, Un texte peu remarqué de Saint Augustin sur le Canon de la Messe; C. H. TURNER, Ordination Prayer for a Presbyter in the Church Order of Hippolytus.

London Quarterly Review, London, July: H. S. SOUTTAR, Work of our Doctors and Nurses in the Field of the War; COULSON KERNAHAN, The Noblest Man I have Known: S. J. Stone, the Hymn-Writer; ERNEST E. GENNER, Theology and Experience; W. ERNEST BEET, Military Annals of the Manchester Regiment; F. W. ORDE WARD, The Kingdom of God; T. H. S. ESCOTT, The International Cement of Art and Letters; W. J. ACOMB, Shakespeare's Cardinal Wolsey; JOHN S. BANKS, Clement of Alexandria; W. HANDLEY JONES, Message of H. G. Wells.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, July: J. A. W. HAAS, Social Christianity; MARTIN L. WAGNER, Theology of Freemasonry; JOHN C. MATTES, Foundation of the Faith; HUGO W. HOFFMAN, Commentary on 1 Peter; L. A. FOX, Scientific View of Conscience; S. G. WEISKOTTEN, Problem of Our Church in New York City; ARTHUR T. MICHLER, The Individual Communion Cup; E. L. WESSINGER, Place of the Church in Evolution; HUGO W. WENDELL, Papacy and Modern Times; JOHN H. STRENGE, Ancient Position of Women; C. F. PFATTICHER, Ritschl and Mysticism; HUGO W. HOFFMAN, A Suggested Theological Exchange; GEORGE H. TRABERT, Doctrinal Position of the Lutheran Church and her Relation to Other Churches; CHARLES R. KEITER, The Mohammedan Missionary Problem II.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, July: JOHN A. HIMES, The New Obedience; HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, Place of Art in Worship; T. B. STORK, Pulpit Prayer; JACOB A. CLUTZ, American Defects of Sentiment; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Christ's Authority Throughout the New Testament; L. H. LARIMER, Lutheran Education; J. S. SIMON, Revelation and Dogmatics; W. A. LAMBERT, War Letters of a Pastor to his Colleague.

Methodist Review, New York, July-August: JAMES M. BUCKLEY, Study our Episcopacy; JAMES MUDGE, Father of American Literature; WORTH M. TIPPY, New Era for Motherhood; HARRY F. WARD, Songs of Labor; ELBERT C. HOAG, Cerebral Records; CHARLES E. LOCKE, Wages and Wickedness; H. C. SHELDON, Notion of a Changing God; C. A. HERRICK, Laureate of the English Seasons; FLORA L. ROBINSON, The Faqir's Conspiracy.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, July: J. W. HUDSON, America's International Ideals; G. W. DYER, A Man; E. R. HENDRIX, Principal Rainy, the Great Church Leader of Scotland; W. J. MCGLOTHLIN,

Augustine, Great Sinner, Saint, Thinker, Theologian, Church-maker; ED. F. COOK, Japan's Imperialistic Program as Seen in Korea; PORTER McFERRIN, Daniel Webster, Orator and Statesman; F. S. PARKER, Worship in the Congregation; T. C. CHAO, Bright Side of Superstition; O. D. WANNAMAKER, Primal Memories; LOUISE S. HOUGHTON, The McAll Mission and the War.

Monist, Chicago, July: ROBERT P. RICHARDSON and EDWARD H. LANDIS, Numbers, Variables and Mr. Russell's Philosophy; HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER, Definition of Number; BERTRAND RUSSELL, Ultimate Constituents of Matter; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Newton's Hypothesis of Ether and Gravitation from 1693 to 1726; E. H. STRANGE, Bergson's Theory of Intuition; PAUL CARUS, Anyness and Pure Form.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, July: ELMER L. COBLENTZ, Jesus' Messianic Consciousness; ROBERT F. REED, Aim of the Sermon; N. C. SCHAEFFER, Truth; PAUL B. RUPP, The Newer Orthodoxy; WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, The Logos Doctrine; PAUL J. DUNDORE, Philosophy of Evil; A. V. HIESTER, Contemporary Sociology; A. T. G. APPLE, The Stars not Inhabited.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, July: W. O. CARVER, The Insight and Error of Eucken in Regard to Christianity; W. E. HENRY, Christianity and The City; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Recent Thought on the Atonement; J. F. LOVE, The Home Base; R. SAILLENS, Moral and Religious Effect of the War on the French People; J. M. BURNETT, Psychology and Preaching; JOHN A. FAULKNER, Dies ist mein Leib: A Celebrated Debate; WILLIAM C. TAYLOR, Tests of a Universal Religion.

Yale Review, New Haven, July: EDWIN PEARS, The Fate of the Dardanelles; WILBUR C. ABBOTT, Germany and the Prussian Propaganda; JOHN C. RANSOM, The Question of Justice; HENRY H. CURRAN, Home Rule for American Cities; JACQUES LOEB, Mechanistic Science and Metaphysical Romance; VIDA B. SCUDDER, Plato as a Novelist.

Bilychnis, Roma, Maggio: PAOLO ORANO, Dio in Giovanni Prati; ANTONINO DE STEFANO, Le origini dei Frati Gaudenti; MARIO ROSSI, L'opera di Thomas Kelly Cheyne; P. GHIGNONI, La guerra e il cristianesimo. *The Same*, Giugno: GIOVANNI COSTA, Imperio Romano e Cristianesimo; DR. DELIO, L'autonomia della religione; "CATHOLICUS", Che pensare del celibato ecclesiastico?; GIOVANNI PIOLI, Sulla via dell'Unione delle Chiese—L'esperienza di Kikuyu.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Julio-Agosto: J. G. ARINTERO, Por qué hay tan pocos contemplativos; FRANCISCO MARIN-SOLÁ, La Homogeneidad de la doctrina católica; V. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, La enseñanza de Santo Tomás en la Compañía de Jesús durante el primer siglo de su existencia; LUIS URBANO, De Cosmología; A. G. MENÉNDEZ-REIGADA, De Ética; E. COLUNGA, De Derecho eclesiástico.

Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift, Heusden, Juni: A. G. HONIG, Albrecht Ritschl en Wilhelm Herrmann II; L. P. KRIJGER, Is het eten van vleesch, den afgoden geofferd, geoorloofd; F. W. GROSHEIDE, I Kor-

in the 15:33. *The Same*, Juli: S. GREIJDANUS, Dr. Ihmels antwoord; F. KRAMER, Het Gebedsleven van Immanuel I; A. M. DIERMANSE, Twee Lijnen in ons kerkelijk belijden. *The Same*, Augustus: T. J. HAGEN, Theologen in het leger; F. KRAMER, Het Gebedsleven van Immanuel II.

Lehre und Wehre, St. Louis, Juli: Der Prophet Jonas; Der Unterschied zwischen dem neunten und zehnten Gebot. *The Same*, August: Paragraphen über den neuesten Chiliasmus; Der Prophet Jonas.

Theologisch Tijdschrift, Leiden, 49e Jaargang, Afl. iv: A. RUTGERS, VAN DER LOEFF, De zondvloed-verhalen der Israëlieten, vergeleken met die van andere volken; H. J. TOXOPEÛS, Nieuw licht op de betrekkingen tusschen Petrus en Paulus; H. R. OFFERHAUS, Rondom de verheerlijking op den berg.

Theologische Studiën, XXXIII Jaargang, Afl. iii en iv: A. VANDER FLIER G. JZN, Een betere methode tot het leeren der Hebreeuschwe taal; J. WEENER, Iets over het beeld Gods in den mensch; F. E. DAUBANTON, Ter inleiding tot de Didaktiek des Nieuwen Verbonds V.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, xxxix, iii: FRANZ HATHEYER, Über das Erkenntnisbild in der Scholastik; J. B. UMBERG, Kajetans Lehre von der Kinderersatztaufe auf dem Trienter Konzil; JOHANN EV. RAINER, Entstehungsgeschichte des Trienter Predigtreformdekretes. II.

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